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PEOPLE POWER FROM LIBERATION SQUARE TO ALEPPO: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
THE APPLICATIONS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE ARAB SPRING 
 
Beginning with Gene Sharpe’s seminal work The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1974) strategic 
nonviolent action has been touted as an alternative to violent insurrection against repressive regimes, and, 
in its earliest hours, many touted the Arab Spring as a powerful example of nonviolent resistance in the 
face of longstanding and well-armed bastions of power. However, the epithet “Liberation Square” 
imprinted on the architectural center of the protests that overthrew Hosni Mubarak has faded, while the 
architectural centers of Aleppo, Manama, and Misrata no longer exist. However, the Arab Spring should 
not be forgotten by nonviolent actors. By mapping the methods, both the successes and failures, and the 
dynamics of resistance as it spread across the region this project forwards three central arguments 
regarding nonviolent action. First, participants in civil resistance do not maintain uniform agency across 
cases, and structural conditions play a significant role in determining the success of nonviolent resista ce. 
Second, nonviolence should not be an ultimatum, and integrating violent strategies of resistance can 
bolster resiliency and strength. Finally, nonviolence is not a panacea, and should be contextualized within 
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Chapter One- Introduction 
 
 
In 2011, beginning with the self-immolation of a street-side fruit vendor in Sidi Bouzid Tunisia, a 
wave of protests embracing democratic ideals and the expansion of political freedoms swept through the 
Arab World. Lauded for their nonviolent emphasis in the face of notoriously repressive regims, these 
protests initially forced Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from power on January 14th, 2011, and subsequently 
ended Hosni Mubarak’s nearly 30 years as president of Egypt. Since, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, 
as well as a number of other countries, have felt the effects of this spread of civil unrest, not to mention, 
in many cases, the marked increase in both political instability and civil war. 
Unfortunately, the inspirational moment that was the Arab Spring quickly gave way to what 
Vijay Preshad (2012) calls “the Libyan Winter”. Within a matter of days largely peaceful protests in 
Benghazi transitioned into an armed insurgency throughout Libya, and sectarian violence quickly 
emerged in Syria following the onset of protests in mid-March. Eventually, a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) lead air campaign against Qaddafi’s forces empowered a violent overthrow of the 
Libyan regime, while the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) interventions in Yemen and Bahrain quelled 
popular unrest in the Persian Gulf. Yet, even in the face of the chaotic and troublesome political outcomes 
the protest movements tied to the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia has engendered, many still hold on to the 
possibilities and potential that those first few months of protests possessed.  
To be sure, all of the protests drew from an evolving and largely inspirational zeitgeist, and 
popular media and news coverage overwhelmingly placed emphasis on the nonviolence of strategies of 
resistance implemented. In the first few months of 2011, powerful images of popular unrest from Tunis, 
Cairo, Sana’a, Tripoli, Dera’a, and Manama captured imaginations across the globe, and highlighted the 
potential of individual action for achieving radical political change. Put differently, i  rhetoric, the 
protests of the Arab Spring epitomized the agency of the individual in the face of long standing, well-
armed bastions of power. For many, these images of protests in Cairo and Tunis also fostered analogi s




movement in India, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, th  African National Congress’s 
(ANC) resistance to apartheid in South Africa, and the Serbian student movement in 2000 to name only  
few (see for example al-Khawaja 2014; Batstone 2014; Zunes 2011, 2013a, 2013b).
Put differently, especially in the early period of the uprisings, many authors found that 
preliminary evidence existed for the fruitful application of strategic nonviolent action, a burgeoning 
theoretical approach to contentious action started in large part by Gene Sharpe (1973, 2005), to the 
political developments surrounding the protest movements of the Arab Spring. In fact, perhaps most 
significantly, many of the movements central to the wave of resistance—especially those in Egypt and 
Syria—explicitly used several of the authors discussed above in preparation for their demonstrations. As a 
case in point, in 2011 al-Jazeera noted that leaders of the initial stages of the Syrian resistance movement 
used Gene Sharpe’s 1993 book titled From Dictatorships to Democracy as a means of teaching 
nonviolent strategies (Q & A with Gene Sharpe 2011). Similarly, a plethora of news outlets have reported
on how the April 6th movement in Egypt, spent time studying the Serbian student revolution detailed by 
Sharpe (2005) and Stephan & Chenoweth (2011), and furthermore Zunes (2011) affirms such anecdotal 
evidence—even explicitly saying that the April 6th organizers had access to the works of Gene Sharpe 
(400).  
Moreover, in many ways the organizers and protest leaders across the Arab Spring contexts even 
consciously followed many of the strategies and advice found within strategic nonviolent action literature. 
For example, the April 6th movement in Cairo spent years planning and preparing for the type of 
demonstrations observed in January and February, 2011 (Khalil 2011, 21-67; Lynch 2011, 55-65; Zunes 
2011). Further, the April 6th movement built itself around a largely decentralized form of organization, as 
suggested by Schock (2005); spent time prior to and during the protests communicating and organizing a 
commitment to nonviolence, as suggested by Ackerman and Kruegler (1994), Francisco (2005), and 
Stephan and Chenoweth (2008, 2011); attempted to highlight and publicize regime brutality, as suggested 
by Francisco (2005), Sharpe (2005, chap. 3), Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson (2013); focused on 




2011); tried to create an inclusive and open-minded protest environment, as suggested by Sharpe (2005, 
chap. 3), Schock (2005), and Stephan & Chenoweth (2008); and even developed strategies to directly 
increase the resiliency of the protest movement itself, as suggested by Ackerman and Duvall (2000), 
Schock (2005), and Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson (2013)—implementing defensive measures, providing 
provisions, and even shelter and medical care in certain cases. La tly, many of the activists’ central to the 
success in Egypt played active roles supporting and participating with the Syrian and Libyan opposition 
movements as the Arab Spring spread throughout the region, and therefore these protesters were also 
influential in organizing and promoting the spread of the uprisings throughout the region (Batstone 2014; 
Zunes 2011).  
Finally, amidst the propensity for academic literature to dismiss the Arab Spring as a “black 
swan” or an anomaly, at least initially, theory surrounding strategic nonviolent action, or what Ackerman 
and Duvall (2000) label “people power”, seemed to hold potential in terms of explaining the impact of 
those early protest movements. In particular, the theoretical framework behind strategic nonviole t action, 
through its promotion of the power of individual agency, the disruptive potential of nonviolent actio , nd 
the communicative advantages nonviolent action presents in terms of garnering increased levels of 
international and domestic support, seemed to offer some prediction regarding how, if not when, the long 
awaited Arab Awakening could occur. Lastly, the transition to Preshad’s “Libyan Winter”, for some, even 
provided empirical support for the enhanced success of nonviolent resistance vis-à-vis more violent 
strategies of contentious action (al-Khawaja 2013; Batstone 2014; Zunes 2011, 2013a, 2013b).  
However, the enthusiasm of these early academic works has all but faded away, and to what 
extent the Arab Spring actually conforms to the theoretical framework underpinning strategic nonviole t 
action is a question that remains largely unanswered. More precisely, perhaps two central questions 
represent important avenues within in which research on nonviolent contentious action can progress and 
evolve, especially in relation to the Arab Spring. First, does strategic nonviolent action presenta model 
with lasting significance for individuals within the political contexts of the Arab World? Or, second, does 




within the region? Essentially, will the methods of contention intrinsic to the various protest m vements 
be repeated in any significant fashion, and is strategic nonviolent action similarly effectiv across cases 
with diverse economic, political, and demographic conditions such as Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Bahrain, and Syria?       
In brief, this project argues that the theory surrounding strategic nonviolent action maintains 
significant shortcomings in relation to the evidence associated with the Arab Spring, even in its earliest 
incarnations. More specifically, three central arguments deserve elaboration. First, the nonviole ce that 
did exist within the Arab Spring was selective and limited. I say selective, because the type of 
nonviolence observed maintained a strictly counter-hegemonic emphasis. That is to say, nonviolent 
strategies existed only in relation to the security apparatuses directly tied to the regim s in power; 
otherwise, in every case, significant amounts of violence occurred along ethnic, sectarian, tribal, gender, 
or class fault-lines. Moreover, I say the nonviolent emphases were limited because they were temporary, 
and maintained specific and limited geographies. Put bluntly, primarily nonviolent resistance rarely 
outlasted the first week of demonstrations, was typically isolated to major urban centers, and was
ubiquitously supported by episodic fringe violence. Together, the selective and limited nature of 
nonviolence within the Arab Spring altered how demonstrations disseminated across contexts, and 
impacted how effectively they drew in less politically engaged segments of the population.   
Second, the importance of strategy and the degree of agency present across cases exhibited 
significant variability. More importantly, such variability was also highly correlated with specific 
structural and historical conditions. Among others, divisive demographic heterogeneity, specific colonial
experiences, and the influence of regional and global power politics all altered both the strategic menu 
available to and the degree of agency possessed by individuals and organizers, which eventually played a 
significant role in determining the outcome of resistance. In some instances, foreign intervention 
effectively destroyed resistance, and in others demographic heterogeneity promoted escalations of 
violence and limited the solidarity of protest movements across regions. Moreover, while it may be 




making in Tunisia and Egypt, such agency occurred in relation to the absence of many of these 
aforementioned conditions. Both are highly homogeneous societies, have well-constructed national 
identities, avoided the most significant pitfalls of the Ottoman Capitulations, Colonialism, and the Sykes-
Picot agreement—as opposed to Syria and Iraq for example—and lacked key strategic factors which 
eventually led to external intervention in other contexts.  
Moreover, two additional points in relation to the degree of agency and strategic decision making 
that pervaded resistance in each case are important. For one, the three cases of successful regime 
change—Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen—directly contradict the notion that nonviolent resistance is more 
likely to be successful. In particular, as Sharpe (2005), Stephan and Chenoweth (2008, 2011), and Sutton, 
Butcher and Svensson (2013) all point out, the key to successful resistance lies in increasing levels of 
social mobilization. However, in these three cases, the massive influx of individuals necessarily implied 
both a loss of strategic control by organizers, as well as an empirical upswing in violence: That is to s y, 
as these movements became more successful, they also became more violent. For another, in all cases, 
demonstrations drew from a population largely outside the sphere of institutionalized politics or 
opposition groups, and protests themselves were almost universally most successful when they were most 
spontaneous. No-one predicted the events associated with the Arab Spring, and as protests became more 
predictable, organized, and infused with institutionalized actors, they also became easier to control and 
repress.   
Third, in part derived from the previous two arguments, strategic nonviolent action lacks both the 
generalizability and explanatory power that theory has attributed to it. As noted, structural conditions 
impacted the significance of group-level agency across cases, and further, specific conditions may 
significantly alter the potential and possibly even the desirability of strategic nonviole t action altogether. 
Not only may nonviolent resistance not necessarily be better than violent resistance, but in many cases 
there may be much better alternatives, even potentially the absence of resistance altogether. In short, 
where and why nonviolent resistance should occur are still two questions that deserve further 




resistance; hence, whether or not resistance is nonviolent may not represent an independent variable with 
strong explanatory power for explaining successful outcomes. In fact, many of the causal mechanisms 
outlined by strategic nonviolent theory may not even be neatly tied to the use of nonviolent strategie, nd 
therefore nonviolent theory might suffer from both spurious arguments and intervening variables.              
Moving forward, this paper will proceed as follows. First, I will present the existing li erature on 
strategic nonviolent action, providing a concise definition of the term, an analysis of the important 
arguments presented within nonviolent theory, followed by an elaboration on many of the arguments 
made in this section. Second, I will outline the method and data collection techniques implemented, as 
well as provide a justification for the cases selected. Third, I will present the six case studies relevant to 
the Arab Spring. These cases will be grouped according to the similarities between the structural 
conditions observed, and each grouping will be followed by a discussion of the implications of the 
component case studies. Fifth, I will discuss and synthesize the information provided, and pose additional 





Chapter Two- Literature Review 
 
 
To begin, this section is broken into three distinct sections. First, I outline the definitional 
advancements that have contributed to a more precise conceptualization of what constitutes strategic 
nonviolent action. Essentially, this section addresses the questions of what nonviolent resistance i  and 
what it looks like in practice. Second, I will outline the core arguments nonviolent theorists have 
developed out of the cursory definition presented. Third, I will highlight three potential weaknesses 
within the literature. In particular, I argue that there is likely an interaction between viol t and 
nonviolent modes of contention in certain contexts, that structure tends to play an important role in te ms
of determining both the eventual outcomes and how resistance unfolds, and that nonviolent resistance has 
been inadequately defined, and may suffer from conceptual stretching.  
 (2.1) What is Strategic Nonviolent Action? 
To begin, definitions of nonviolent resistance typically focus on three objectives. First, lite ature 
attempts to precisely describe both what nonviolent resistance is and what it is not. Put differently, a 
corollary emphasis to defining nonviolent action within the literature is to provide a negative definition of 
nonviolent resistance, primarily in order to highlight a range of theoretical and popular misconceptions 
associated with what nonviolent resistance actually is. Second, the literature focuses on identifying the 
specific methods through which nonviolent contention occurs, and contains two principal theoretical 
arguments regarding both the nature of these methods as well as why they are effective. Third, literature
empirically identifies cases of nonviolent resistance, essentially highlighting the rang and 
generalizability of nonviolent resistance both spatially and temporally.  
First, building off his earlier contributions Gene Sharpe (2005, chap. 2) offers perhaps the 
foundational definition of strategic nonviolent action, emphasizing its strategic nature, its ability to be 
successful even in acute conflicts (as in ethnic and religious based conflicts), as well as both its historical 




action, which can be further broken into three general categories: Actions to send a message (protest and 
persuasion), actions to suspend cooperation and assistance (noncooperation), and methods of disruption 
(nonviolent intervention). These methods range from less disruptive forms such as boycotts and petitio s 
to the much rarer extremes of large-scale protests and demonstrations. 
In addition, Sharpe (2005, chap. 2) also provides a list of important misconceptions that serve to 
more precisely outline what is meant by the idea of nonviolent resistance, and such misconceptions have 
been similarly outlined and elaborated on by others (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994, chap. 1; Ackerman & 
Duvall 2000, chap. 1; Schock 2005, chap. 2; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008, 2011, chaps. 1, 2). In 
particular, specific misconceptions include the idea that nonviolent action must be principled, that is 
rooted in a pacifist ideological position, the notion that nonviolence is similar to forms of violent 
contention, that it has little or no disruptive properties, that it requires special leadership or extraordinary 
as opposed to ordinary individuals, that it is limited in terms of its geographic or historical observability, 
that it is limited when facing repressive and non-democratic regimes, or that it takes a comparatively 
longer time to succeed. In all, these misconceptions promote a conceptualization of nonviolent resistance 
that is intended to be both highly natural as well as pervasive within the vast majority of resistance 
movements. That is to say, nonviolent resistance occurs within every type of resistance movement, even 
primarily violent rebel organizations, and may even be normalized into our day-to-day lives, that is, 
outside of explicit moments of resistance (McAllister 1999; Sharpe 2005, 78-93).1  
Second, definitions of nonviolent action typically maintain two important theoretical components. 
For one, nonviolent theory establishes an expansive notion regarding the amount of agency that resistance
movements and resistance leaders possess in relation to achieving their political objectives. In other 
words, perhaps, the central pillar of nonviolent theory rests on the notion that specific forms and 
manifestations of power inevitably exist within any political context, which can be specifically exploited 
through the strategic organization and actions of nonviolent demonstrators in order to achieve their goals 
(Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Ackerman & Duvall 2000; Schock 2005; Sharpe 2005; Stephan and 




models present within military strategy literature into their framework for nonviolent action, and Schock 
(2005, chap. 5), Sharpe (2005, chaps. 3, 4, 5), and Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) all similarly construct 
frameworks to empirically elaborate on the specific types of strategic action that may promote successful 
resistance in individual cases. 
For another, nonviolent action is defined as a type of resistance capable of taking a litany of 
different forms and styles, and is also defined as a generalizable form of resistance across cases. First, 
nonviolent action can be viewed as broad in that it can incorporate a wide variety of economically, 
politically, and socially based forms of resistance. As stated, Sharpe (1973, 2005) identifies 198 forms of 
contention in total, and these have been elaborated on by others (Ackerman & Duvall 2000; Francisco 
2005; Nepstad 2013; Schock 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008, 2011). As such, the quantity of styles of 
nonviolent resistance has been shown to promote its viability and utility across differing scales and types 
of resistance (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Sharpe 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008, 2011). In other 
words, nonviolence is as applicable to small scale environmental or economic protests (strikes 
particularly) as it is to national revolutions, and therefore different forms and styles of nonviolent action 
can be selectively applied to individual circumstances and settings, making it a highly useful and 
malleable tool for resistance movements.   
As such, third, nonviolent theory argues that the presence of specific manifestations of agency 
intrinsic to nonviolent actors in combination with the flexibility of nonviolent strategies, promotes the 
potential for strategies implemented within individual cases to be generalized from and implemented in 
others. For one, many nonviolent theorists have elaborated on the important nonviolent elements that have 
historically played a central role even within many prominently violent resistance movements. Pam 
McAllister (1999) shows that boycotts, hunger strikes, petitions, and other forms of nonviolent protest 
were as important as violence in a variety of Marxist revolutions including those in Vietnam a d China. 
Similarly, Stephan and Chenoweth (2011) argue that within violent movements, important nonviolent 
forms of contention have contributed to the maintenance of support for resistance, the placement of 




internationally and domestically, for resistance movements. In all, Ackerman and Duvall (2000) 
summarize such viewpoints rather bluntly, “violent victors had not always won because they used 
violence” (458). Essentially, nonviolent resistance is highly important even in civil war, a fact which 
could potentially promote its universal utility, and even, according to some, across examples of resistance 
empower nonviolent resistance as a universal replacement for violent resistance (Ackerman & Kruegler
1994; Batstone 2014; Sharpe 2005, 14-26, Stephan & Chenoweth 2008, 2011; Zunes 2011). 
For another, nonviolent theorists have highlighted the significance of the variation in cases in 
which nonviolent action is evident, and have also explicitly attempted to promote the application of 
nonviolent action in examples where its application is seemingly limited. For one, many semi al cases of 
nonviolent theory—such as the Indian independence movement, South African resistance to Apartheid, or 
the Serbian student movement in 2000—exhibit both temporal and geographic variation. Sharpe (2005) 
expands analysis to 17 cases, Ackerman and Duvall (2000) add five more, and Stephan and Chenoweth 
(2011) provide significant regional diversification to the Middle East and North Africa. In short, examples 
of nonviolent action have been identified in every inhabited continent and in every decade since 1900 
(Ackerman & Duvall 2000, 456).  
In addition, Sharpe (2005), Stephan and Chenoweth (2011), and Zunes (2011, 2012, 2013b) have 
also highlighted the utility of nonviolent action in what Sharpe (2005) labels acute conflicts—or those 
maintaining heavy ethnic or sectarian overtones (11). Nonviolent theorists also highlight the utility of 
nonviolent action even in authoritarian contexts likely subject to high degrees of repression (Ackerman & 
Duvall 2000; Sharpe 2005); in areas with low levels of technological capacity for mobilization 
(Ackerman & Duvall 2000; Batstone 2014; Schock 2005; Zunes 2013a, 2013b); in areas with 
geographically dispersed populations (Batstone 2014; Sharpe 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth 2011); and in 
areas with strong histories of violence (Ackerman & Duvall 2000; Sharpe 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth 




(2.2) Why is Strategic Nonviolent Action Effective? 
To begin, the definitional advancements associated with strategic nonviolent action have 
contributed to several arguments regarding both why and how nonviolent action can be successful, and 
also forwards explicit arguments regarding the enhanced effectiveness of nonviolent resistanc  vis-a-vie 
forms of violent resistance, even in examples of national revolution. Most explicitly, Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008 2011) present a model that empirically outlines the increased effectiveness of 
nonviolent resistance as compared to violent resistance. Utilizing a variety of sources, Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008) find that nonviolent resistance movements have achieved success in 53 percent of the 
cases compared to a success rate of only 26 percent for violent resistance movements (8). Further, Sharpe 
(2005), Ackerman and Kruegler (1994), and Ackerman and Duvall (2000) utilize qualitatively based 
comparative case studies to similarly argue that nonviolent resistance has maintained enhanced 
effectiveness across a wide variety of cases.  
Moreover, arguments regarding the enhanced effectiveness of nonviolent resistance vis-a-vie 
violent resistance have highlighted a variety of important mechanisms that can be broken down into two 
general categories: Those that support enhanced levels of social mobilization, and those that engender 
negative consequences for regime legitimacy and power. Obviously, these two types of mechanisms are 
in many cases tightly linked, as enhanced social mobilization tends to be a leading factor behind the 
occurrence of either of the two principle sources of negative consequences for regime actors, political ju-
jitsu or military defection; however, the specific causes behind each type of mechanism can be 
differentiated, and are thus important to consider separately. 
First, nonviolent action literature argues that strategic nonviolent action presents positive impacts 
for resistance movements in terms of obtaining heightened international or domestic support. Put 
differently, nonviolence may inhibit external promotion of repressive regimes while simultaneously 
providing sources of revenue, protection, and influence for resistance movements themselves, and may 
also be a primary source of domestic mobilization (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994, chap. 2; Batstone 2014; 




strategies maximize the potential for the strategic use of popular power—or power derived from 
increasingly larger demonstrations—by expanding participation beyond able-bodied young men (Schock 
2005, 26-45; Sharpe 2005, 47-51; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008, 2011, 17-28; Zunes 2011 2013a, 2013b). 
Nonviolent resistance can also occur in areas with more population density than is possible utilizng 
violent resistance, which avows for increased participation out of convenience and word-of-mouth 
(Sharpe 2005, 51-55; Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson 2013; Zunes 2011, 2013b). Nonviolence can also force 
the hand of international supporters of repressive regimes, creating financing opportunities for resistance 
movements, enhancing the degree of media coverage and public support, and potentially posing economic 
restraints on regime actors, as in South Africa for example (Ackerman & Duvall 2000, chap. 4; Schock 
2005, chaps. 3, 5; Sharpe 2005, chap. 6; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008 2011; Sutton, Butcher, and 
Svensson 2013; Batsone 2014).  
Finally, many have highlighted specific characteristics of nonviolent resistance that may bolster 
the probability of increasing social mobilization and external support. For example, Schock (2005, chaps. 
2, 3) finds that resiliency is increased by more decentralized approaches to organization, a multifaceted 
and flexible approach to the methods of nonviolent action, more expansive and inclusive movements, and 
finally by the existence of tactical innovations in both the forms of contention and the responses to 
repression. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008, 6-13) also highlight the importance of pre-existing campaigns, 
or that nonviolent resistance can help lead to the enhanced success of future examples of nonviolent 
resistance within individual cases. In particular, pre-existing campaigns tend to normalize nonviolent 
strategies into the repertoire of contention, and also serve to solidify future expectations of what 
participation in nonviolent resistance will entail. 
 Second, nonviolent action facilitates the occurrence of two central outcomes that pose significant 
problems for regimes: Military defection and political ju-jitsu, first coined by Sharpe (1973), to indicate 
situations in which regimes experience negative backlashes from episodes of repression (Ackerman & 
Duvall 2000, chap. 2; Nepstad 2013; Sharpe 2005, chap. 3; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008, 2011; Sutton, 




strand of thinking presented within this project, Nepstad (2013, 338-341) highlights specific structural 
conditions for which military defection and disobedience occurs in relation to nonviolent resistance. In 
particular, military actors are more likely to refuse to defect or disobey when they have the potential to 
lose large amounts of influence or privilege from a reduction of military authority, or when they perceive 
the regime as particularly strong.  Further, perceptions of the strength of regimes depend on several 
factors: The international support garnered by the regime, the military capability of the regime, as well as 
the scale and scope of demonstration movements themselves. 
Similarly, Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson (2014) present, to date, the only empirically based study 
on political ju-jitsu, which places emphasis on the role of effective communication in enabling resistance, 
elaborates on the specific conditions that help lead to regime backfire, and also places emphasis on the 
role of “pre-existing campaigns”, or when nonviolent strategies have been effectively routinized as a 
legitimate means of resistance (3-6). In particular, these authors find that political ju-j tsu occurs in 46 
percent of the cases in which the repression occurred during a pre-existing nonviolent campaign (11). 
Further, they find that political ju-jitsu occurs most frequently when parallel media institutions, especially 
those not affiliated with state-run media outlets, are present both within and around resistance. In gen ral, 
political ju-jitsu is intrinsically linked to the ability of nonviolent resistance movements to maintain a 
positive image vis-à-vis the repressive regime, which subsequently enhances the potential of international 
support and popular mobilization to separate regimes from their traditional pillars of support (Francisco 
2005, Sharpe 2005, Stephan & Chenoweth 2008, 2011).          
In brief, a number of important elements within the previous two sections warrant re-iteration. 
First, as Sharpe (2005) highlights nonviolent actors have a broad range of forms of resistance to choose 
from in order to achieve the withdrawal of both consent and assistance from the ancien regime. In 
addition, nonviolent resistance is more successful than violent resistance. In particular, it incorporates a 
higher portion of the population, creates a higher probability for military defection and disobedience, 
fosters a greater degree of international support, and targets regime vulnerabilities in ways they re not 




among others, show strategy and strong leadership are highly important for successful nonviolent action. 
Strategic decision making can bolster resiliency, help effectively communicate goals and objectives, and 
alter international and domestic perception.  
(2.3) Discussion 
To begin, this section outlines three potential theoretical weaknesses present within the literature 
highlighted above. First, nonviolent literature often forwards an oppressively narrow definition of 
violence, and ignores important feedback loops between forms of violent and nonviolent resistance. 
Second, nonviolent literature expresses an expansive notion of individual and group-level agency, which 
does not mesh well with the political outcomes of the Arab Spring. Structural conditions significantly 
shaped the impact of individual and resistance movement agency across cases, and may pose significant 
barriers to effective nonviolent resistance. Third, nonviolent literature may overstate the generalizability 
of nonviolent resistance across cases, as well as the explanatory potential of nonviolent strategie  in 
relation to successful resistance. In other words, the application of nonviolent resistance may be li ited, 
and its success, when it occurs, may be determined by a host of alternative factors     
(2.3.1) Conceptual Stretching and Radical Flanks 
To begin, nonviolent theory tends to marginalize the impact of episodes of violence within any 
case of nonviolent resistance examined, or to re-word Ackerman’s and Duvall’s (2000) statement, it is 
possible that nonviolent victors did not always win because of nonviolence.  More specifically, three 
arguments may hold significance. First, forms of nonviolent and violent contention are rarely completely 
absent from episodes of resistance, especially on a national scale, and this fact presents significant 
externalities that warrant consideration. Second, radical flanks and various types of physical violence may 
have important positive impacts on even otherwise nonviolent resistance movements. Third, nonviole t 
literature also tends to produce an overly narrow definition of violence thereby placing virtually complete 




state, and, in relation to the first point, alternative forms of violence, drawing from Galtung (1996, chap. 1 
and 2), this may significantly impact the process of nonviolent resistance for a host of reasons.    
First, the interplay between forms of violent and nonviolent contention, as well as the strategic 
importance of radical flanks are both important factors to consider. Seidman (2001) shows how violent 
guerilla groups were important strategically within the ANC resistance, especially initially, to Apartheid 
in South Africa—a classic, almost universal, case for nonviolent theorists. Similarly, Herbert Haines 
(1994) identifies a radicalization of the civil rights movement in the United States during the 1960’s, 
which he argues was the catalyst for the unprecedented change achieved. Haines defines radical as any 
group directly opposed or viewed as particularly threatening to some segment of society (16), and finds 
that radical flanks within the civil rights movement actually served to support and benefit the mainstream 
movements themselves. While Haines does not explicitly link radical flanks with violence, others hav  
shown that more violent groups can have similar positive impacts for resistance (Tilly 2008, 20-27; 
Tarrow 2011, 103-111). Evidence from the Arab Spring also supports such a conclusion. The Tunisian 
and Egyptian examples maintained significant examples of violence, even if specific geographic locales 
and demographic populations maintained strong elements of nonviolence, and Syria, Libya, and Yemen 
quickly turned violent, but also still simultaneously maintained examples of nonviolent resistance in 
major urban centers.  
Furthermore, the existence of radical flanks is even a point conceded by several authors within 
strategic nonviolent action literature. For example, Schock (2005) finds that positive, and importantly 
specifically violent radical flank effects existed in at least half of the cases of nonviolent resistance he 
examined, and Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson (2014) even find that violent radical flanks can explicitly 
create political ju-jitsu derived from changes in international backing—therefore becoming a potentially 
important factor in determining the success of resistance.   
In addition, it is important to consider how more expansive definitions of violence may impact 
the spread of resistance, as well as how physical violence may be problematically directed against specific 




one, Brantz (2014), drawing heavily from Galtung (1996), shows how nonviolent resistance fails to 
address many sources of violence within society. In particular, Brantz argues that what many nonviolent 
theorists, focusing on Sharpe (1973) most explicitly, have essentially posed is a situation in which: 
...there is a temporary separation of the current head of state from the pillars of support, 
not an entire restructuring of the state system to make it more inclusive and life enhancing. 
Furthermore, even if collective refusal to cooperate with government leads to top-level 
resignations, economic structures are likely to remain unchanged, particularly if most property is 
privately owned. The dictator and his guards are gone; the structural violence is the same (6). 
 
Hence, Brantz views most strategic nonviolent campaigns as reformist, and therefore as not 
altogether revolutionary. Put differently, strategic nonviolent action tends to create minimal changes to 
pre-existing structures, and although possibly changing who benefits, does not affect the way in which 
society generally functions. As such, due to factors derived from structural inequalities, racism or other 
forms of discrimination, nonviolent resistance may fail to spread evenly across geography especially on a 
national level. Underprivileged ethnic groups may fail to participate, and privileged groups may back the 
regime. For example, in Syria Sunni organized protests in Dera’a failed to spread evenly or cohesively 
across the Kurdish dominated areas, and largely failed to reach the central bases of regime support in 
Damascus and Aleppo. Morever, as Brantz shows, nonviolent resistance may be least capable of 
overcoming these structural obstacles, or may face extreme difficulties in doing so.  
For another, many of the outlined mechanisms behind the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance, 
such as military defection and political ju-jitsu, tend to place complete emphasis on the importance of 
avoiding violence in relation to hegemonic forces—as in reactionary violence against regime repression—
as opposed to avoiding violence against other forces or segments within society. Such is in part necessary, 
as no movement is typically entirely nonviolent, in order to have empirical data to analyze nonviolent 
action, literature must identify cases of nonviolent resistance even if important and blatant examples of 
what Tilly (2003) labels individual aggression—such as looting, non-fatal beatings, and rape—occur. 
However, individual level violence can potentially be strongly linked to cultural norms and historically 
derived grievances, and thus may be highly difficult for resistance organizers in certain situat ons to 




Hence, even if protest movements can maintain a nonviolent stance towards hegemonic forces, 
they are unlikely to be able to control violence against segments of society that have been traditio ally, 
or, in some instances where economic grievances related to inequality persist, newly disenfranchised. 
Moreover, the organizational problems associated with individual level aggression imply that where 
grievances along sectarian, gender, or ethnic lines are especially pronounced, the execution of nonviolent 
action faces unique difficulties. In highly patriarchal societies women may be less inclined to participate 
due to the negative attention and violence they may receive, and the same logic applies to religious and 
ethnic minority groups. As such, while nonviolent theory certainly stresses the importance of broad and 
inclusive movements, the central reason such movements exist may be due to the lack of significant 
ethnic, sectarian, or tribal cleavages, which all represent factors beyond the control of idividuals or 
movements themselves. Put differently, the reality of individual aggression linked to specific grievances 
may significantly alter the degree to which protests spread, as well as the extent of solidarity and 
coordination between geographically separated groups. 
In short, collectively, these violent realities across all resistance movements indicate that 
descriptions expressing the lack of physical violence within the Arab Spring may necessitate the us of 
lenses of analysis that are extremely limited by both scope and scale. For example, within the Egyptian
context moving geographically away from Tahrir Square, as well as temporally away from January 25th, 
the nonviolence of resistance begins to fade away (Thager 2011; Masoud 2011; Kirckpatrick b, 2011). 
Looting in Alexandria and Luxor was taking place soon after protests started, and the widespread 
destruction of infrastructure and buildings was rampant even in Cairo. Over time, protests espousing 
divergent political orientations emerged, and eventually the intimidation of Coptic populations became 
normalized within protests themselves. Put differently, nonviolence may be a normal starting point for 
resistance movements attempting to place pressure on highly militarized regimes; however, such 
emphases are rarely effective in their own right, and are likely temporary, eventually giving way to 




To summarize, this section highlights two central points. First, resistance is rarely ever totally 
either entirely violent or nonviolent, and radical flanks may have important benefits for nonviolent 
resistance. Second, differing forms of violence, such as structural or cultural violence, as well as diff rent
targets of violence, as in the state or other hegemonic actors as compared to more disenfranchisd 
segments of population, are likely to occur in cases maintaining sectarian or ethnic conflict, and may also 
be an inevitable consequence of higher numbers of participation. As such, individual level aggression 
targeted at specific populations may create important difficulties for nonviolent demonstrati .    
(2.3.2) How Strategic is Nonviolent Resistance? The Agency-Structure Problem 
A second weakness within nonviolent theory may be the emphasis typically placed on individual 
or group level agency, and its relative lack of emphasis on the importance of specific structural 
conditions. First, as discussed above, the presence of either of Galtung’s (1996) definitions for structural 
or cultural violence, or the presence of Tilly’s (2003) individual level aggression against underprivileged 
segments of the population may be one mechanism through which nonviolent resistance faces structural 
difficulties. To simplify, one particular structural condition that may hold significance is the presence of 
stark ethnic or tribal heterogeneity. Here, Syria, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen are prime examples 
highlighting the difficulties of the effective dissemination of protests across these fault lines. Moreover, 
the stark homogeneity of both the Tunisian and Egyptian population may provide insight into why these 
protest movements were relatively more successful.  
For example, in Syria, the problematic reality of a regime dominated by a minority sectarian 
group representing about 12 percent of the total population, almost certainly limited the potential, and 
potentially even the desirability of persistent nonviolent action. For one, military defection in such 
instances is highly unlikely, as it would effectively destroy the privileged position of military personnel 
and put them in danger of retributive violence (Nepstad 2013; Bellin 2014). For another, the regime itself 
may be more likely to have an all-or-nothing attitude towards resistance, and therefore may be far mor  




prominent nonviolent example, it may be true that Christian Serbians could successfully overthrow 
Slobodan Milosevic, but it would likely be problematic to suggest Muslim Bosniaks could do the same. 
Unfortunately, while violent resistance by minority groups may not be more desirable than nonviolent 
resistance, no resistance may be the best solution of all.   
Second, structural conditions may significantly alter the strategic considerations of both reginal 
and international state actors regarding regime change, and this may have significant influence on the 
outcome of resistance. Here, Bahrain is the most obvious example: Saudi Arabian apprehension to a 
democratic, and therefore Twelver Shi’a dominated Bahrain eventually led to military intervention by the 
GCC on March 14th, 2011. Similarly, NATO intervention occurred in Libya, but not in Syria in part due 
to international support within the Security Council for the Assad regime, as well as his strong regi al 
ties between the Assad regime and both Hezbollah and Iran. In short, in cases where international 
intervention is likely, as in Bahrain for example, nonviolent protests may be especially vulnerable, and in 
some cases, as in Libya and Yemen, may even force a transition to more violent strategies.  
 Third, a host of other factors also had important impacts on the strategic nature of the Arab 
Spring protests. For one, the strategic nature of the Tunisian protests in particular, but also of he five 
subsequent cases has been overstated. As a case in point, the symbolic suicide of Muhammad Boazizi 
seems unlikely to represent a strategic point of origination for nation-wide protests. Further, clear 
messaging and effective communication in Sidi Boazid, or in protests in Tunis and elsewhere around the 
country lack evidentiary support. These protests were far more spontaneous than they were strategic, and 
Egypt’s, Syria’s, Bahrain’s, and Yemen’s early demonstration drew heavily from the example of Tunisia. 
Moreover, the central mechanism behind the success of movements such as those in Tunisia and Egypt, 
the large scale of protests, significantly deteriorates the ability of movements to effeciv ly communicate 
and act strategically. Put more bluntly, to succeed these movements required more protesters, yet with 
larger protests came an inevitable loss of centralized or even decentralized control.   
Put differently, the very mechanism through which nonviolent action can achieve success and 




a loss of strategy. In both Tunisia and Egypt, centralized protests not only grew to numbers reaching into 
the millions, seemingly all but eliminating the prospects of organizers effectively controlling individual 
actors, but each movement also relied to a large extent on a significant degree of geographic dispersion—
as for example between Luxor and Alexandria or Sidi Bouzid and Tunis—that also likely limited the 
ability of organizers to act strategically and communicate effectively, especially as virtually all formal 
communication networks ceased to function. Further, given the violence that occurred in areas that 
experienced enhanced repression, such as in Suez or Sidi Bouzid, it seems possible that the nonviolent
nature of contemporaneous protests— hose in Cairo and Tunis—may be highly correlated to the 
comparatively lower levels of regime repression in those locales. Had repression in Tunis occurred on a 
similar scale as that in Sidi Bouzid, the outcome may have been significantly different. 
Moreover, while the size of demonstrations or the degree of disruption they caused were central 
to the success of both the Tunisian and Egyptian protests; those variables can easily be linked to a number 
of other explanations. Years of economic stagnation left important demographic categories unemployed, 
educated, and likely bored, perhaps this was for more important in determining the scale of initial
protests. Further, to give one example, Batstone (2014), Stephan and Chenoweth (2008, 2011), and Zunes 
(2011) all link enhanced international pressure as a possible mechanism through which regimes became 
severed from their external support; however, it was also one of the single most limiting fac ors in the 
Bahraini, Syrian, and Yemeni contexts. In addition, international support explicitly promoted the 
transitions to violence in Libya, and attempted, if only half-heartedly, to do the same in Syria. While 
some admit this point, the degree to which the influence of external actors directly influenced the 
outcome of protests is hard to overstate. Put bluntly, where the economic powers of both the International 
System and the region promoted protest movements, they succeeded, where they did not they failed, and 
this may not be significantly linked to the means of resistance implemented. 
As such, there is an important degree of ambiguity with which identified mechanisms for 
effective resistance are actually related to the nonviolence associated with the strategies implemented. At 




times this failed miserably and in other cases transitions to violence even caused such pressure (Libya for 
example). Moreover, the agency of protesters may be highly contingent on specific structural and 
historical conditions across cases, and this is an important point to effectively understand and unpack. 
(2.3.3) Is Nonviolent Resistance Generalizable Across Cases? 
A third weakness of nonviolent resistance is that the forms and styles of nonviolent resistanc  
may not be generalizable across cases, and nonviolence may not be effective as a primary strategy in 
many cases altogether. The successful strategies, regardless of how nonviolent they actually were, utilized 
in Egypt cannot simply be transmuted to and replicated in political contexts like Syria and Libya—and in 
many respects, such was rather exhaustively attempted to little to no success. Moreover, the effective 
communication and strategic decision making which were able to occur within the Egyptian example, was 
buoyed by a host of structural factors that avowed for successful resistance to Mubarak, and the absence 
of these conditions posed monumental stumbling blocks to protests elsewhere. In short, the agency of 
protesters and organizers was quickly subsumed by structural realities, which subsequently determined 
the success, and in some instances the extent of nonviolence, for each individual movement.  
In other words, taken collectively, the arguments presented above present a rather bleak picture of 
either the utility of generalizing applications of nonviolent action to other cases, or it func ion as an 
explanatory variable of unique significance. For one, areas with stark demographic heterogeneity, and 
protests in countries that possess problematic strategic considerations for external actors, m y be poor 
areas for the initiation of nonviolent resistance. As a case in point, the fact that both Yemen and Bahrain 
maintain majority Shi’a populations, while neighboring (in Bahrain’s case connected by a 15 miles long 
highway) one of the most important Sunni Arab countries in the world was highly problematic. Further, 
in Yemen, multiple violent secession movements existed, the Houthi rebels in the North and the al-
Qa’eda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) in the Southwest, which presented a potentially significant limiting 
factor for the application of nonviolent resistance. Similarly, Syria maintains a Shi’a dominated 




neighboring the most powerful Shi’a country in the world. In Libya, historical conditions and tribal 
relationships had created large differences between the Eastern, Western, and Central regions of the 
country, and Qaddafi had also systematically isolated every possible source of external support. 
In summation, the nonviolence observed was highly selective, only observable in relation to 
hegemonic forces, and was limited both temporally and geographically across cases. Second, the agency 
and strategic capabilities of protest movements was almost entirely determined by two structural 
conditions: The extent of social heterogeneity and the strategic interests of external actors. External 
support also had little to do with the activities of resistance movements, and dissemination a d solidarity 
across regions were limited by pervasive demographic heterogeneity. In all, the application of 
nonviolence may be limited, and the degree of nonviolence within particular examples of resistance may 
not be as significant of an explanatory variable as theory would like to believe.    
Endnote 
1 This point is certainly not confined or original to literature on strategic nonviolent action, which 
in part leads to my argument of conceptual stretching. For example, it correlates nicely with innovations 
within social movement literature such as Scott (1985, 1-88) or Tarrow (2011, 93-118). In short, because 
violence may be easier to explicate from day-to-day life, it may be important to better distinguish between 
everyday resistance and “nonviolent revolution”.   
2 Here Galtung (1996, Chaps. 1, 2, and 3), Tilly (2003, chap. 2), and Tarrow (2011, chaps. 5-8) all 
offer theoretical support. In short, increasing social mobilization may pose dynamic problems, as 
increasing violence in relation to longstanding manifestations of cultural and structural violence, may 
beget examples of physical violence under circumstances such as the Arab uprisings. In turn, this may 
actually negatively impact levels of mobilization, and may pose barriers, based on individual and group 
level expectations, to mobilization in the first place. 
 




Chapter Three- Method, Data, and Case Selection 
 
 
(3.1) Method  
To begin, this project presents a set of the category of comparative case studies, which Liphart 
(1971) labels “theory-infirming case studies”. According to Liphart, theory-infirming case studies present 
a largely inductive picture, which highlights “infirming” evidence for existing hypotheses (see 684-686). 
To be sure, Liphart finds this category of case studies to have limited utility; however, central to Liphart’s 
preference for other types of case studies is the assumption that the theory under considerati  involves 
an adequate accumulation of case studies therefore limiting the utility of adding only one more theory-
infirming case study. Hence, the central logic behind the methodology implemented, centers on the 
argument that strategic nonviolent action does not contain a large enough number of cases to adequately 
dismiss the value of a single non-conforming case, much less a set of six.  
In particular, two issues lend credence to such an argument. First, existing comparative studies 
inevitably contain bias towards nonviolent resistance vis-à-vis violent resistance. For one, the br adth of 
forms of nonviolent contention, avow researchers to empirically focus on cases where the objectives of 
resistance are more achievable than in many cases involving violent resistance. According to Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008), the best empirical study within the literature, “To be designated as a “success” 
campaigns must meet two criteria: (1) its stated objective must have occurred within a reasonabl  period 
of time (two years), (2) the campaign had to have had a discernible effect on the outcome” (17). In short, 
the “stated objective” of a boycott or a strike is much different than the “stated objective” of a violent 
revolution, or even claims associated with more small scale types of violence such as terrorism. Gups 
opting for violent strategies may be operating from a disadvantaged starting point, or may be operating in 
situations exhibiting extreme instability, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for example. 




nonviolent resistance because of potential visibility increases; that is to say, mainly due to the fact that 
methods of nonviolent contention can be subtler and fine-tuned towards specific purposes.  
Second, research has the potential of exhibiting systematic bias due to the fact that structural 
conditions may exist as a significant intervening variable. Again, taking the most exhaustive empirical 
study presented above, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), two problems emerge. First, the primary 
independent variable, whether a movement utilizes nonviolent or violent resistance, is merely represented 
by a dummy variable, which seems inadequate to effectively outline the complexity of types of contention 
within resistance. Second, indicative of the central point mentioned above, the independent control 
variables utilized leaves much to be desired, especially in comparison to the nuance of both controls and 
methodology in literature on violent resistance (conflict literature for example). As a case in point, a 
Polity Score on a scale ranging from -10 (authoritarian) to 10 (democratic) is included, yet Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), Lujala (2010), and Ross (2012), to avoid listing the full gambit of conflict literature, 
have all shown that polity is irrelevant in terms of predicting onset. In other words, standard practice in 
conflict literature involves a squared polity score in order to test non-linear effects on onset, because 
resistance in general seems more likely in locations with political instability, not highly entrenched 
democratic or authoritarian regimes. Similarly, a control for income or GDP/capita is absent, which could 
also significantly skew results towards nonviolent resistance. 
As such, while limited in terms of empirical capability, this project has two general intentions: 
First, as a potential guide for future empirically based research, and second as a means of addressing the 
structural deficiencies of previous research. In all, each case study attempts to answer three gneral 
questions: (1) what structural conditions were relevant to the political environment and groups invlved, 
(2) to what extent did protest movements effectively implement nonviolent resistance, and (3) to what 
extent are the answers to the first two questions inter-related? Put differently, relying on a set of 
inductively built, primarily descriptive, case studies this project attempts to highlight specific structural 
conditions that both create the space for nonviolent resistance, and dictate the success of nonviolent 




In addition, any hesitance to make over-reaching generalizations from the case studies presented, 
does not imply that this project is simply intended as a pilot study or some stepping stone towards future 
empirical research. Flyvberg (2006, 237-241) has shown how it is possible for researchers to effectively 
generalize from descriptively inclined case studies, and also shows how such case studies are not merely 
limited to hypothesis construction and testing. Nonviolent literature exists on the agency side of agent-
structure issues, and individual structural characteristics that emerge as determining factors across cases 
almost certainly apply to other cases. Further, if through descriptive analysis structure is fo nd to play an 
important role in either determining the extent of agency or the probability of success, that very f ct is 
generalizable in relation to other cases of nonviolent resistance, even if the particular s ructural conditions 
are different.  
In summation, this project utilizes an inductive set of cases to outline the relationship between 
specific structural conditions and both the nature of resistance and the success of resistance. A  such, this 
methodology necessitates effectively describing the social, political, and economic context in which 
resistance occurred, as well as the way in which resistance disseminated and changed over time. For 
clarity, the extent to which the historical record is presented is determined by the importance f specific 
aspects of that record in understanding the nature and causes of resistance. This inevitably implies 
different historical timelines, as the problems associated with colonialism for example are not 
homogeneous across cases. Yemen, Libya, and Syria were impacted by colonialism in different, and often 
times more problematic ways than say Tunisia and Egypt.  
(3.2) Data  
This project utilizes data collected in relation to two types of sources. First, in order to develop a 
narrative regarding the existence of relevant structural conditions, each case will draw from a variety of 
historical accounts. As such, each case’s structural background is intended to be highly descriptive, and 
synthesizing a wide variety of sources mitigates the potential of bias from over-reliance on anyone auth r. 




largely derived from regional or international newspaper outlets with either regional affili tes or on-the-
ground reporters.1  
As such, the second set of sources entail a far greater degree of complexity than the first in t rm  
of data collection problems and information verification. For one, regional and local news outlets 
throughout the region have the tendency to exhibit significant degrees of bias towards regime , if not 
existing as pure propaganda tools for regime actors. Hence, regime affiliated new sources may tend to 
overstate the negatives associated with resistance, as in its potential links to Islamic Fundamentalism, the 
amount of violence present within demonstrations, and its potentially sectarian nature (as in Bahra n and 
Syria for example). Put differently, local sources may not by valuable in terms of obtaining casualty 
numbers or other specific characteristics of resistance, but they may hold value in terms of indicating 
where and what to look for.  
For another, across cases regimes cracked down on media access, and shut down all formal 
communication networks. Hence, first-person sources may contain selection bias due to the fact that they 
represent groups and individuals that the regime did not feel necessary to outwardly ban. Again, it is 
important to consider the general implications of individual sources, rather than relying on them for 
specific details. Further, where violence within resistance is highlighted by individual source , it is also 
important to actively verify such details across sources. In all, throughout I attempt to blend local and 
international sources in order to mitigate potential biases, and as a means of verifying specific details  
(3.3) Case Selection 
According to the Liphart (1971) a central mechanism for improving comparative efficiency 
resides in, “a focus on comparable cases” (686). In context, “comparable” refers to a set of cases that are 
similar in regards to specific characteristics or variables, but vary in terms of the way in which they relate 
to one another. Further, Liphart argues that an alternative possibility in strengthening the comparative 
                                                             
1 Due to the methodological requirements of incorporating a vast amount of newspaper articles, 
in cases where the author is anonymous, citation of articles will take the form of the first three major 




methodology lies in focusing on specific geographic regions. While others have forwarded opposing 
arguments, it seems clear that geographic regions are not only related in terms of locational proximity, 
and possibly maintain similar cultures, inter-related political regimes and economies, and similar external 
influences, all in addition to similar climates and geographies. 
Furthermore, as this project is intended to be at its core descriptive, negative cases are avoided, 
and cases are selected according to the following criteria: (1) did individual cases maintain protest 
movements that initially emphasized nonviolent strategies, and (2) were these cases geographically and 
temporally linked to the first case, Tunisia in late 2010 and early 2011. Such is not intended to downplay 
the potential utility of understanding the lack of protest movements that occurred in many of the Arab 
Monarchies for example; however, that question is not the central focus of this project. In other words, 
case selection aligns with the primary six cases of the Arab Spring, and includes the protest movements 
that occurred following the Tunisian example in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya. Each of these 
cases involved a highly discussed and well covered period of resistance, each protest movement 
maintained a nonviolent emphasis at its outset, and each unfolded in relation to structural conditions i  
differing ways.  
In short, case selection was made in order to maximize both the inter-related nature of the various 
protest movements, as well as variation in structural conditions. Specific cases are also organized in order 
to effectively highlight several significant variations, and also to help address a host of alternative 
explanations. For example, the importance of sectarian divides between regimes and protest movements, 
rather than the case specific sectarian divide, as in either Sunni or Shi’a, can be highlighted in relation to 
Bahrain and Syria. In the first case, a majority Shi’a population existed in relation to a Sunni minority 
government, while the sects were reversed in the Syrian case. Moreover, the absence of such sectarian 
divides in Tunisia and Egypt serve as relevant counter-examples to be considered. 
More precisely, the organization of cases is dependent on structural conditions. Egypt and Tunisia 
are grouped to consider the importance of highly homogeneous populations, and the lack of strategic 




countries with significant sectarian differentiation, which maintains specific strategic dimensions for other 
regional and international actors. Finally, Libya and Yemen are grouped to highlight the importance of 
heterogeneous populations maintaining largely tribal dimensions, the lack of a clearly defined national 






Chapter Four- Tunisia and Egypt: Social Homogeneity and External Inaction 
 
In general, taken together, the Egyptian and Tunisian cases present two central findings regarding 
the application of strategic nonviolent action. First, they highlight the selective and limited nature of 
nonviolent strategies of resistance. These protests were never entirely nonviolent, and nonviolence, where 
it did exist, can be described as both selective, as it only existed in relation to hegemonic actors (prima ily 
the police apparatuses connected to either Hosni Mubarak or Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali), and limited, as it 
was geographically isolated and temporally impermanent. Second, the lack of militarization of resistanc , 
and the success in achieving regime change in each case were promoted by two central structural 
conditions. First, both populations are extremely homogeneous in relation to either sectarian or ethnic 
differences. Egypt is 90% Sunni Arab and Tunisia is 98 % Sunni Arab (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 
332-333). Second, both countries did not face external intervention for two central reasons. For one, 
neither represented a key strategic interest to key regional or international powers, and, for another, both 
had highly autonomous and institutionalized military apparatuses that alleviated the post-r sistance 
anxiety of regime change. Put bluntly, the implications of regime change in either context was simply not 
as dire as in other cases. Hence, these structural conditions promoted the agency of individual protesters 
in ways that did not occur in other examples tied to the Arab Spring.  
(4.1) Case One: Tunisia 
To begin, the Tunisian case is a prime example of three important issues related to the theory of
strategic nonviolent action. First, a set of specific structural conditions influenced the various protests 
within the Tunisian case in three critical ways. Structural conditions played a pivotal role in determining 
the extent to which specific protests maintained influential agency, influenced the degree to which the 
protests maintained nonviolent emphases, and finally played a central role in facilitating the removal of 
Ben Ali. Second, Tunisia highlights both the selective and limited nature of nonviolent action. Ben Ali 




engendered both space and opportunities for the dispersion and expansion of protests to other urban 
centers.3 Moreover, as the protests spread throughout the country nonviolent strategies maintained strictly 
counter-hegemonic emphases, and in many cases were absent altogether. Third, the success of Tunisian 
resistance was as dependent on spontaneity as it was on strategy. Here, Muhammad Boazizi’s self-
immolation essentially represents a case and point. However, beyond the fact that the inspiratio  for the 
symbolic action behind the Jasmine Revolution can be derived from a spontaneous action, spontaneity 
also became embedded within the protests in two important ways: The expansion of protests was highly 
unpredictable both in terms of geographic expansion and increasing degrees of social mobilization, and 
the organization of individual protests lacked the centralized organization associated with formal political 
parties and activist groups.4   
 (4.1.1) The Nature of Social Homogeneity in Tunisia 
To begin, the modern demographic trends in Tunisia contain two important patterns. First, 
Tunisia possesses an extremely homogeneous population in terms of ethnic and sectarian composition. 
Nearly 98 percent of the population of 10.5 million people are Arab Sunnis, with the remaining two 
percent largely comprised of relatively isolated Bedouin populations. Second, Tunisia’s population 
demonstrates the prototypical pyramid shape associated with lengthy increases in population grow h. 
Since 2000, population growth has occurred at an annual rate of 1.4 percent, and in 2010 individuals 
between the ages of 0 and 14 represented 23.3 percent of the population, while those aged 65 and above 
represented only 7.5 percent—in a population with an average life expectancy of nearly 74.2 years 
(World Bank Indicators 2015).  
In particular, these population trends are important for several reasons. For one, the population 
growth rates, combined with universal primary school enrollment and high levels of tertiary education, 
have produced a problematic situation in relation to the limited concomitant job growth produced by th  
Tunisian economy. In 2010 nearly 29% of the total youth population was unemployed, as were nearly 




from their families and marry (World Bank Indicators 2015). These numbers also possess a high degree 
of geographical stratification that does not emulate the relatively even population spread amongst urba  
centers that Tunisia possesses. For example, in 2007 unemployment in the Galia Basin region reached 
highs of 38.6 %, nearly triple the national rate, and the presence of intermittent protests since 2008 in 
geographic fringe areas such as Gafsa or along the Libyan border point to similar conclusions (Murphy 
2011; Perkins 2014, 222). 
 Furthermore, politically, beginning in the late 1990’s domestic perception of the Ben Ali regime 
was becoming increasingly negative. For example, in July 2010 a Gallop Poll showed that the number of 
respondents who felt they were “thriving” fell consistently by 10% from 2008 to 2010, and nearly 40% of 
all young adults indicated that they wanted to emigrate (Osman 2011, 185). Moreover, in 2002, mainly 
due to upswings in domestic unrest related to the increasing consequences of economic reform, Ben Ali 
began to roll back previous reforms ensuring civil liberties, and began relying more and more heavily on 
the use of repressive tactics by the independent security apparatus (Alexander 2010, chap. 4). Essentially, 
in practice the police apparatus served two primary functions: First, as a means of ensuring the coercive 
balance between the regime and the military to protect the Ben Ali regime, and second, as a means of 
garnering loyalty. However, in practice police corruption was highly visible and rampant; police routinely 
unlawfully extended detentions, falsified documents, utilized excessive force, often committed abuses of 
power, and frequently refused to report claims and offenses altogether (Fergany 2016, 58-70; Perkins 
2014, 200-213).  
In addition, within the general population, the overriding perception was that police impunity was 
granted as a means of assuring Ben Ali’s authority, and for the defense of the rampant cronyism and 
corruption engaged in by both the political elite and the Ben Ali family. While not entirely conclusive, 
hints regarding the extent of the Ben Ali family’s control over the Tunisian economy are beginning to 
emerge. A World Bank report in 2014, reported that politically connected firms evaded nearly 1.2 billion 
dollars’ worth of import taxes from 2002 to 2009, and the total number of family owned firms was 




and Raballand 2015). Reports even indicate that Ben Ali’s wife successfully smuggled nearly 37.6 
million dollars in gold bullion on her way out of the country in 2011 (Tunisia: Ousted President, Gold; 
Guardian Unlimited: Ice, World).   
Finally, perhaps the one important source of partisan division within the Tunisian population, that 
existing between secular and religious political orientations, had itself even been muted throughout the 
1990’s and 2000’s. For one, Tunisia possesses a highly urbanized and educated population, with a 
relatively strong middle class—at least by MENA region standards—and Tunisia maintains a primary 
school enrollment rate of nearly 100% with literacy rates and other human development indicators 
amongst the highest in the region (WBI 2015). For another, regional economic integration with European 
and Mediterranean countries had also been underway since 1995, and helped increase Western influence 
within the country, as well as develop a burgeoning industrial base, which by 2010 represented 38 percent 
of the economy (WBI 2015). Finally, Ben Ali had also effectively eliminated the most significant Islamist 
party, al-Nahda, from domestic politics by 1992, and the primary religious institution al-Zaytouna has 
been widely heralded for its moderate teachings (Perkins 1994, 28-34; Willis 2012, chap. 5).5 In short, 
while present, the Islamist-Secular divide was less divisive in Tunisia than other contexts, and contained 
more moderate tendencies and a larger amount of class-based overtones than many other contexts as well.  
In all, significantly, the homogeneity of the Tunisian population expands beyond the presence of 
ethnic and religious similarities. The majority of the population is under the age of 35, residesoutside of 
the largest city—the capital Tunis—faces similar constraints in terms of economic opportunities and 
social mobility, and faces similarities in terms of experiences with both the regime and the police 
apparatus in particular. These shared experiences are also exacerbated outside of Tunis in areas where the 
extent of police oversight is limited, and economic opportunities most constrained. Such is obviously not 
intended to ignore the obvious complexity of identity and ideology present within the country; however, 





(4.1.2) The Reasons for External Indifference  
As a starting point, many of the factors described in the previous section, as well as two other 
structural conditions—the institutionalized nature of the military apparatus, and Tunisia’s political history 
since Habib Borguiba’s presidency—also impacted the strategic calculations of potentially influential 
external actors. For one, over time the extent of familial corruption, journalistic and scholarly opposition 
to Ben Ali, and persistent human rights abuses served to gradually derail the enthusiasm of Western 
support for Ben Ali’s regime. Although official French relations never changed significantly, several 
Wikileaks cables have noted the pervasive perception amongst US political elites of Ben Ali as a liability, 
one even referring to the U.S. relationship with Tunisia as an “expendable friendship” (Rejeb 2013, 84). 
Such a fact is also logically enhanced by the lack of resource wealth, as well as the lack of regional trade 
importance of the Tunisian economy. For another, the same factors that muted the divisive nature of 
secular-religious political orientations, also served to limit the importance of Tunisia and Ben Ali in 
relation to the War on Terror following September 11th. Finally, the lack of the potential of a sectarian 
change emanating from regime change, as existed for example in a Sunni majority ousting a Shi’a 
minority in Syria, in part prevented regional power politics from altering political outcomes within the 
Tunisian case. 
However, two alternative factors also influenced strategic considerations by external actors. First, 
Tunisia had developed a highly autonomous and institutionalized military apparatus.7 In particular, the 
institutionalization of the military had two possible impacts on the outcome of resistance. For one, it 
largely mitigated the potential of a large-scale loss of human life as, for example, was possible if Qaddafi 
was allowed to march on Benghazi. Put differently, Ben Ali was unable to order military personnel to fire 
on demonstrations, and was also vulnerable to military intervention on their behalf. For another, it 
lowered the risk of regime change in terms of producing political and economic chaos, as was distinctly 
possible in Syria and Yemen. Throughout, the military maintained a clear monopoly on the use of 





Second, at the onset of protests, Tunisia could be politically differentiated from the Arab 
Monarchies, and also had traditionally maintained a historical tendency towards relatively isolationi t 
policies. In regards to the first point, the lack of political similarity to Saudi Arabia as well as its 
geographic distance from the Persian Gulf, as opposed to Bahrain and Yemen for example, likely limited 
the extent to which Riyadh feared protests in Tunisia would impact their own domestic political situation. 
Tunisia was not a Constitutional Monarchy, and also plays an insignificant, that is almost non-existent, 
role in global oil production. In regards to the second point, Former president Habib Borgiuba had 
effectively isolated Tunisia from the rest of the Arab world in three significant wys. First, Borguiba 
maintained a highly diffident view of Islamism, often outwardly criticizing and repressing Islamist 
groups, and this differentiated Tunisia as the growth of Salafism and the Iranian Revolution made religion 
an increasingly important political consideration throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. Second, Borguiba had 
also maintained a strictly pro-Western stance throughout his tenure, and was at times even outwardly 
critical of both Egypt and the spread of Nasserism throughout the region. Borguiba also chose to remain 
largely on the sidelines as the Arab-Israeli conflicts grew in intensity throughout the second half of the 
20th century, and chose Western development strategies over the military driven statist policies that 
became entrenched in other Arab contexts (Perkins 2014, chaps. 5 and 6).  
In short, the Ben Ali regime represented a non-essential partner in relation to most regional and 
international powers. The United States had explicitly labelled its relationship wit  Ben Ali as an 
“expendable friendship” in security cables, and the extent of corruption created problems in terms of 
Tunisia’s relationship with the European Union (Willis 2012, chap. 9; Rejeb 2013). Further, historical 
trends had also created separations between the successive Tunisian regimes and their Arab counterparts. 
(4.1.3) Nonviolent Resistance and the Jasmine Revolution 
As a point of departure, at the onset of protests, a plethora of factors engendered reasonable 
frustrations amongst Tunisians, which would eventually become powerfully encapsulated and symbolized 




order to support his family, and his younger sister’s education in particular. His mother later indicated that 
the intensity of police harassment was becoming hard for him to bear, and that being slapped in the face 
by a female police officer, whom Boazizi refused to allow to confiscate his produce, was in essencethe 
final straw. In desperation and in reaction to the humiliation of the incident the day before, Boazizi
marched to the municipal government building in Sidi Boazid, doused himself with gasoline and lit 
himself on fire. 
However, emphasizing the catalytic nature of Boazizi’s self-immolation largely belies the extent 
to which the Tunisian protests drew on an existing history. First, the Tunisian movement had significant 
labor origins, and as the protests progressed the mobilization capacity of labor groups such as the Union 
Generale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) played an important role in organizing protests in support of 
those in Sidi Bouzid (Benien 2015, chap. 3; Zemni 2013). Second, the growth and expansion in 
communication technology, while not the determinant factor many make it out to be, also likely 
contributed to the expansion of interpretation across various communication platforms, which 
significantly facilitated the emergence of a complex collective social identity (Halverston, Ruston, & 
Tretheway 2013; Webb 2014, chap. 4). Put differently, social media helped develop and entrench a shared 
narrative that built off of historical precedents—most prominently the North African Martyr narratives 
that have played important anti-establishment roles throughout North African history. In addition, social 
media outlets may also enhance a sense of communal cohesion, even if that cohesion is not entirely 
factual, during events that cross class, ethnic, and sectarian boundaries, and may also force individuals to 
take a higher degree of ownership over the process of information dissemination—both of which may 
enhance participation. 
Moreover, the influence of non-traditional outlets also significantly began to alter the way in
which traditional and popular media began to cover the protest movements, a point typified by the 
popular portrayal of Boazizi’s action. The video of the act spread throughout Tunisia very quickly, and 
even became a model of action, occurring at least seven more times throughout the period of protest 




aspects of Boazizi’s life—his piousness, his generosity, and his recurring struggles against repression—
that aligned Boazizi’s story with the traditional conception of the martyr narrative. Further, emphasis was 
also placed on identifying and confirming similarities between the collective experience of many Sidi 
Bouzid citizens, and many Tunisians for that matter, in relation to their individual experiences with 
economic and political difficulties under the Ben Ali regime. These changes in coverage also influenced 
regional and global news outlets, which served to shape the international narrative through which te 
Tunisian protests were covered. 10 
Put differently, especially within regional outlets, as the events unfolded the Jasmine Revolution 
largely avoided much of the vitriol and myopic descriptions of idealized resistance that subsequent cases 
were subjected to. Chronologically, throughout the first week of protests the majority of demonstrations 
occurred regionally, were violently repressed as they emerged, and largely lacked autochthonous 
motivations beyond shows of solidarity to the ongoing situation in Sidi Boazid where they occurred 
beyond the Sidi Boazid Governorate— ven if such solidarity at least mimicked the economic origins of 
the protests in that city. On the 23rd, demonstrations occurred in Menkassi, Eriquab, and Mazounna, all 
within the Sidi Boazid Governorate (Police Surround Tunisian, Continues; Social Unrest Continues, 
Projects). On the 24th, regime violence was witnessed in Manzel Bouzayene, and the first inklings of 
resistance in the city of Tunis itself emerged, with 1,000 protesters being violently repressed by police 
forces (Protests in Tunisian, Continues; Youth Employment Sparks, Tinderbox). On the 25th, the breadt 
of protests in the capital progressed, as trade unionists and human rights activists gatheredin solidarity. 
By the 27th, protests had spread to virtually every city in the Kessarine province, and the narrative of 
protests in the capital was slowly beginning to shift to emphasizing a unified message of regime change 
based on the existence of collective economic injustices, rather than simply showing support for the 
ongoing demonstrations in Sidi Boazid (Social Unrest Continues, Projects; Youth Unemployment Sparks, 
Tinderbox). 
On the 28th, protests in some form or another occurred in every important urban center across 




However, in particular, two important elements related to both the dissemination of protests, as well as 
the experiences of individual protests are important. First, even though violence was a relatively 
ubiquitous strategy across protests, it is true that nonviolent strategies were more evident wher  both 
formal organization was highest and repression lowest. Further, as large scale protests spread to economic 
centers like Tunis, which had seen largely ineffective and intermittent nonviolent protests previously, 
transitions to violence occurred almost immediately. Second, no central organizing group existed at any 
point, and where organization was implemented it tended to be less effective than examples of resistance 
that lacked strong ties to pre-existing organizations. Such is not to say that trade unions such as the UGTT 
or al-Nahda did not eventually play an important role, but they were neither the inspiration nor the driving 
force behind the expansion of protests throughout the country (Rare Rally Tunisian, 1,000; Social Protests
Tunisia, Says; Zemni 2013).  
In many ways, the violence within Sidi Boazid was emblematic of the nature of resistance in the 
urban interior. Specific details are somewhat unclear as the regime effectively set siege to th  city 
throughout December; however, according to eyewitness reports protests in the city typically started off 
relatively small, gradually drew in participants, and then utilized violent strategies—d troying 
government infrastructure, using petrol bombs, throwing other projectiles, and looting shopfronts and 
stores—as police forces engaged with protesters (Maghreb-Unrest December 24th; Police Surround 
Tunisia, Continues; Protests Tunisian Towns, Continues; Youth Unemployment Sparks, Tinderbox). 
These reports also indicate that in the city of Sidi Boazid protesting was occurring throughout the night, 
thereby pointing to the high probability of looting and rioting as these protests were never as 
geographically contained as protests in other parts of the country. Further, as protests spread throughou  
neighboring provinces they unfolded in a similar fashion. For example, reports of a peaceful student 
organized protest in the center of Manzel Bouzayene on the 24th, gave way to an onslaught of reports 
indicating the presence of violent rioting, the destruction of government infrastructure, polic  targeting, 





Moreover, as protests spread to the larger urban centers of Tunis and Sfax, a similar logic of 
resistance unfolded with one added dimension. In particular, the largely ineffective and intermittent 
protests organized by trade unions and other political organizations began to grow in size, and as they id 
transitions to violence ensued. By the 12th of January, intermittent gun-battles were seen throughout the 
capital, government buildings were targeted and looted, and violence between protesters began to emerge 
as a concern (Boazza, Ganley 2011; Kirkpatrick 2011a; Tunisia-Unrest 14th). Ben Ali loyalist 
demonstrations were also targeted and violent clashes between anti-government protesters and loyalists 
emerged as a daily occurrence following the 12th. To take another example, in the resort town of 
Hammamet, by mid-day on the 13th initially nonviolent protests had cornered and beaten the non-local 
members of the limited police force that remained, ransacked a host of store fronts, and also destroyed 
and looted the largest house, belonging to the connected Tablesi Family, in the city (Kirkpatrick 2011b). 
In short, the nonviolence within the Tunisian case was highly limited and selective, as it never 
applied to non-hegemonic forces. As the Manzel Bouzayene example above highlights, at most persistent 
nonviolent resistance lasted for only two or three days. Sidi Boazid transitioned to violent tactics within 
hours, and as protests spread looting and rioting grew and intensified. At times violence targeted elements 
of the Ben Ali regime, Ben Ali loyalists, and a plethora of non-reported, small scale examples of violence 
were alluded to in many reports. Further, areas like Tunis and Sfax transitioned to violence as 
participation increased, and violence persisted even as Ben Ali fled the country after the 14th of January. 
Reports as late as the 28th of January also indicated the pervasive instability and chaotic nature of post-
resistance Tunisian society. In addition, the selectivity of nonviolent strategies, in that they were only 
implemented when protests were in direct contact with segments of the coercive apparatus of the state, 
within the Tunisian case also likely failed to detract from the resistance underway due to the xtreme 
inequality and unfair political environment that had defined the country for two decades. Here, perhaps 
the case of the resort town of Hammamet is the most blatant example. Within hours a large portion of the 




population been more diverse and numerous the continued expansion of participation may have been 
hampered. 
Moreover, one point in particular—that violence increased with participation—is significant in an 
additional sense, as participation was also perhaps the single most important factor behind both the 
durability and success of protests. For example, the UGTT organized protests on the 24th were disbanded 
within three hours, and the larger protests on the 27th and 29th fared little better (Kirkpatrick 2011b; Rare 
Rally Tunisian, 1,000). The UGTT did eventually play a significant role as a political go-between, and in 
certain cases as a source of organization and message framing; yet, they were only ever significant after 
the fact, and relied on increasing participation that they could not effectively control.             
Put differently, the organization within the Tunisian Revolution, at best can be characterized as a 
strategic response to spontaneous actions, and further may actually have been inherently limitd b  
strategically inclined actors. Trade unionists were able to draw on specific populations; however, two 
largely interconnected issues emerged within these institutionally organized demonstrations. First, where 
the trade unionists planned demonstrations, popular integration was limited by the publically available 
knowledge that these protests were likely candidates for regime repression (Social Protests Tunisia, Says; 
Zemni 2013). The UGTT had several ministers within the Ben Ali regime, and also maintained a set of 
comparatively formal and centralized communication networks that facilitated regime monitoring, at least 
in comparison to the relatively informal and decentralized networks, typically Facebook or some 
alternative form of social media, utilized by the youth based demonstrations. Second, individual parties 
and organizations such as trade unions presented narrow interest groups, which did not effectively draw 
upon the pervasive social narratives available. More than anything, time gaps between the start of planned 
protests and the actual influx of non-affiliated participants occurred, most significantly in Tunis, and as 
such also instilled important elements of spontaneity into the demonstrations themselves—in that 





 Effectively, what emerged rather than top-down organization, were pervasive social agreements. 
Gradually, protest activity became routinized following noon-prayer, essentially separating daily activity 
into two spheres: Relative normalcy in the morning and protest in the afternoon. To be sure, such social 
agreements were subject to similar logics of repression as were formally organized protests, bu  most 
importantly they capitalized on and influenced the collective social narrative under constru tion, and 
therefore produced more expansive demonstrations by drawing in previously apathetic segments of the 
population. Significantly, the expansion of the collective social narrative was also never highly linked to 
the explicit framing of each demonstration as overwhelmingly inclusive; no real geographical or 
architectural center as was present in Cairo or Manama existed, and no real attempts at cohesive message 
framing occurred outside of the relatively limited mediums of Facebook or Twitter. Those able to gain 
illegal access to foreign media were able to gain limited knowledge about events in other provinces, but 
outside of the limited communication between regionally based segments of the UGTT or between 
extended families, these remained largely isolated albeit congruent and closely aligned demonstrations.   
Moreover, the impact of the combined social narrative within the Tunisian case was bolstered by 
the similarity of both the grievances protesters held, and the ethnic and sectarian homogeneity betw en 
the protesters themselves. The segments of the population targeted by resistance were clear minority 
groups: Either Ben Ali loyalists, Ben Ali’s coercive apparatus, or extremely wealthy individuals (which 
more often than not implied ties to the regime as well).  
In addition, a clear national identity was present, and nothing beyond political interests, as in 
ethnic or religious cleavages, presented sources of anxiety for post-resistance society. These two points 
are significant. In terms of the former, the general demographic homogeneity prevented the growth of 
demonstrations from being regionally constrained, or from being absent from certain segments of the 
population altogether. In terms of the latter, the relative dearth of post-resistance anxiety avowd for the 
inclusion of relatively well-off populations, especially in the political and economic centers such as Tunis 
and Sfax, and likely facilitated the expansion of movements to these centers as well. To be sure, many 




(MB) in Egypt, the highly institutionalized nature of the Tunisian military alleviated fearsof a total 
political and economic collapse as in Libya or Yemen, and the liberal and highly educated nature of 
Tunisian society limited the potential political success of radical Islamists.  
In other words, by the new-year regular protests were occurring daily in at least 35 major cities, 
and the regime was being forced to back down in the ongoing situation in Sidi Boazid (Maghreb-Violence 
January 4th; Montagne 2011; Tunisian-Unrest January 9th). Only then and only half-heartedly, did Ben 
Ali and the RCD attempt to initiate non-repressive tactics such as reforms, cabinet re-shuffles, and forced 
resignations. Such reactionary moves were inevitably too little too late, and the social momentum of 
protests had already built up to a level of no return. Such a position, in relation to the Ben Ali regime, was 
emphasized by the expansive nature of social media communications regarding the events in question, the 
lack of external support manifesting out and out allies for Ben Ali, and the expansive nature of the 
protests themselves. Ben Ali’s future as president of Tunisia was untenable, and on the 14th of January he 
officially resigned and was extradited to Saudi Arabia. 
(4.1.4) Discussion 
In particular, the Tunisian case effectively addresses two principal questions. Does the Jasmine 
Revolution present evidence for strategic nonviolent action, and what structural conditions were 
important in determining the course of events? In relation to the former, the evidence is unclear at best. 
For one, the protests were never categorically nonviolent, and for another they were far more spontaneous 
than they were strategic. Further, nonviolence was linked to low, institutionally derived participation, and 
as participation increased protests became increasingly violent and successful. Such a finding directly 
contradicts evidence presented by nonviolent action theory. Nonviolence did not make these protests 
more successful, and neither did strategic decision making; in fact, both were more closely linked to 
higher probabilities of effective regime repression and ineffective resistance. 
In terms of the second question, the presence of a clear national identity, an extreme amount of 




Tunisian society, and a lack of international intervention all played central roles in determining the extent 
and characteristics of resistance. A clear national identity and ethnic homogeneity facilitated the spread of 
the combined social narrative throughout the country, and the lack of foreign interference allowed for th  
autochthonous resolution of the political situtions. Moreover, the lack of intervention was itself linked to 
many important structural factors. Ben Ali’s regime was viewed as an “expendable friendship” by many 
U.S. diplomats, and other Arab leaders only cared about the events in Tunisia insofar as they loomed 
ominously for their own precarious political situations. Moreover, the relatively liberal nature of Tunisian 
society, and the institutionalized nature of the Tunisian military made regime change less likely to 
engender negative political outcomes for Europe or the United States. To be sure, it is possible to argue 
that the generally nonviolent nature of protests generated international apprehension to heightened 
repression by the Ben Ali regime; however, in comparison with the later cases presented, international 
apprehension and pressure is highly vulnerable to structural conditions that impact the strategic decision 
making of external actors. 
Obviously, other factors played a major role, and the importance of the protesters themselves 
cannot be understated; however, these structural conditions, especially in comparison to other cases, 
remain highly significant. Such a conclusion, more than anything else, points to the necessity of 
effectively considering the importance of specific structural conditions as they relate to other examples of 
nonviolent resistance. 
(4.2) Case Two: Egypt 
To begin, the original protest movements in Egypt beginning on the 25th of January maintain 
important points of differentiation from the Tunisian case. For one, these protests were never entirely 
spontaneous, and maintained important elements of strategy and organization. Further, the Egyptian 
protests spread from the most important urban centers—Alexandria, Cairo, Luxor, and Aswan—to other 




was far more pronounced than at any point during the Tunisian revolution. Cairo during the first few days 
of protest was a powerful experience, and participation was highly diversified and largely peaceful.  
However, unfortunately, such a description presents only a cursory analysis of the political 
situation and resistance movements that were evident in Egypt during 2011. For one, nonviolent 
emphases exhibited similar geographic tendencies as in the Tunisian case, and also exhibited a high 
degree of temporal impermanence. By the 28th of January, the violence of resistance within the key urban 
centers of Cairo and Alexandria had escalated, and in areas where the degree of economic dislocation was 
more pronounced, such as Aswan and Suez, a much higher upswing in violence occurred. For another, the 
agency of individual participants and resistance organizers was similarly facilitated by important 
structural factors, with the added caveat of also being afforded the benefit of drawing heavily from the 
Tunisian example that predated the Egyptian Revolution.  
Put differently, the Egyptian case amplifies many of the conclusions that emerge from the 
Tunisian case. Three points in particular are important to consider. First, similar structural conditions 
avowed protest movements the agency to succeed and expand, and therefore eventually alter the political 
environment. Egypt, although less so, is still made up of a highly homogeneous population in comparison 
to other countries within the MENA region. The spread and expansion of the protests faced no significant 
ethnic or sectarian limitations (Coptic Christians, the most significant minority, repres nt only about 10 
percent of the population), and divergent political actors and organizations were able to overcome 
partisan differences and coalesce around forcing the resignation of Mubarak. For another, the 
institutionalized nature of the military, the perception of the democratic potential of Egyptian society, the 
relative strength of the Egyptian national identity, the relative global insignificance of th Egyptian 
economy, and the increasing regional isolation of Egypt since the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser limited 
external resistance to regime change, even if it still existed on some level.    
Second, even though Egyptian opposition parties and organizations had been maneuvering and 
active for at least a decade, and that the popularity of Hosni Mubarak and the National Democratic Party 




Revolution had failed to garner the type of public support and participation that occurred in 2011.11 
Furthermore, the timing of the Egyptian Revolution also impacted the effectiveness of regime repression. 
Mubarak’s response wavered, was probably disastrously delayed, and was never enough to address the 
central grievances associated with the demonstrations. In effect, the idea of waves of resistance may 
generate unique windows of opportunity for nonviolent action to succeed, and in the Egyptian case served 
to promote the agency of protesters and limit the agency of the state to repress and end resistance.  
As such, the modularity of the Tunisian case represents a factor that cannot be understated in 
terms of effectively understanding the outcomes associated with the Arab Spring in Egypt. As a case in 
point, devoid of a concomitant martyr comparable to Boazizi, Egyptian organizers undertook a 
posthumous mythologization of a teenager, Khaled Said, beaten to death by police in 2010 in the outskirts 
of Alexandria. The mythologization of Khaled Said occurred between the onset of the Tunisian 
Revolution and the January 25th protests, and similarly emerged as both a source of mobilization and as a 
source of inspiration for the imperative collective narrative, again drawing on the North-African Martyr 
figure, that eventually avowed for large-scale protests to take place. Further, as the Tunisian situation 
escalated activists pushed grassroots mobilization in the slums of Cairo, Alexandria, and Aswan, and by 
the onset of the protests on the 25th general excitement regarding demonstrations, though muted by the 
intimidatingly prolonged period of regime stability, was nevertheless growing. Some authors have even 
referred to the creation of the “social obligation” to protest on the 25th, and this even applied to many of 
the more affluent populations attending the American University of Cairo (Khalil 2011, chap 4, 5).12  
Third, while the initial organization of protests was far more centralized, nonviolent, and infused 
with strategic decision making, in part drawn directly from literature on nonviolent action; as in the 
Tunisian case, the nonviolence was highly selective and limited, and the expansion of social mobilization 
and participation served to both dilute the centralized organization and to dramatically increase the degree 
that violent strategies infused resistance. Violence in the major urban centers within the Egyptian case 
emerged along similar class fault-lines and targeted Mubarak loyalists as in the Tunisian case, with the 




outside of the major urban centers, as in Tunisia, protests were only ever partially nonviolent, and 
violence directly targeted the police and state-owned infrastructure almost immediately. Finall, Egypt 
also contains a sizeable minority population, Coptic Christians, which quickly became the target of 
looting, rioting, and other forms of individual aggression.13 Significantly, all of these manifestations of 
violence within resistance are deeply tied to the massive increase in public participation, which 
simultaneously involved a dilution of organization and control over the protests, while dramatically 
increasing the influence and power of resistance.  
(4.2.1) The Nature of Social Homogeneity in Egypt 
As a starting point, two social factors in particular are significant. First, Egyptians have a 
relatively strong national identity in comparison to many other MENA countries, even if the exact nature 
of that identity has been subject to contestation and revision. For one, Egypt maintains one of the earliest 
histories of political and military centralization within the Arab World, dating back to Muhammad Ali 
Pasha’s destruction of the Mamluk political dynasty in the early part of the 19th century. For another, the 
architectural legacy of Egypt’s historical past has always existed as a point of unification, and the 
economic importance of this legacy remains a central source of income for a very large segment of the 
population. 
Second, Egypt has a high degree of social homogeneity as Sunni-Arabs make up nearly 90 
percent of the population with predominantly Coptic Christian minorities making up around 10 percent. 
Further, population densities in the urban centers have been steadily rising since 1990, and altogether 
urban populations made up about 50 percent of the population (WBI 2015). Moreover, according to the 
more nuanced agglomeration index constructed by Uchido & Nelson (2008) Egypt is the second most 
urbanized country in the world, which essentially means that the majority of the non-urban population 
lives very close to the major urban centers along the Nile corridor.  
In addition, the problematic trinity of a maturing and increasingly educated youth-bulge, lack of 




evident in the Egyptian context. In particular, unemployment was highly concentrated within younger 
populations, and was specifically problematic in relation to youth populations with higher levels of 
education. In 2010, 52 percent of the total unemployment rate consisted of individuals possessing a 
tertiary level of education, and unemployment rates for both females and males aged 15 to 24 exceeded 
35 percent of those segments of the labor force (WBI 2016). Throughout that period, the total population 
had also grown at an average of two percent annually since 2000, and demographic-age trends emulated 
the classic pyramid structure of rapidly growing populations: About 31 percent of the population w s 
under the age of 15, and 18 percent was between the ages of 15 and 24 (WBI 2016).14 
Furthermore, the secular-religious divide within Egyptian society, while present and definitely 
more pronounced than in Tunisia, did not represent an insurmountable obstacle for the expansion of 
resistance for two primary reasons. First, the majority of divergent partisan viewpoints held their 
president in contempt. Mubarak’s declining popularity, the increasing visibility of both state and police 
corruption due to the rise of social media outlets, unpopular diplomatic and political actions, the prospect 
of the National Democratic Party (NDP) naming Mubarak’s son Gamal as Hosni’s successor, and the 
countries problematic economic situation alongside increasingly problematic structural reforms, al 
engendered a cross-partisan powder-keg that could coalesce around the idea of removing Mubarak from 
power (Clarke 2014).  
Second, the key Islamist party, the Muslim Brotherhood, maintained significant class-based 
elements of support, which, more than anything, meant that large segments of the rank-and-file were far 
more aligned with the initial protesters than their membership would imply. For one, beginning after the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, and ramping up during the 1990’s as a result of the increasing 
militancy and radicalization of both al-Jihad and the Islamic Group, Mubarak essentially struck a bargain
with the MB as a means to provide moderate leverage against the increasingly militarized radical factions 
(Weaver 1999, chaps 5, 6; Ashour 2007). In particular, although still not entirely free from regime 
pushback and repression, this still afforded the MB unrivaled freedom of movement and speech for an 




array of occupational “syndicates”, including those related to pharmacists, lawyers, doctors, and engineers 
(including eventual president Muhammad Morsi), and in the relatively competitive elections of 2000 even 
won every seat they contested—64 in total (Campagna 1996, 290-292; Collumbier 2007, 100-102). In 
addition, structural adjustment and increasing liberalization entailed the reduction or absolution of many 
subsidies lower class Egyptians depended on to survive, and this void was primarily filled by religious 
organization such as the MB. In short, membership within the MB avowed for two important political 
commodities, relative freedom of action, and some degree of economic security, which served to enhance 
its popularity beyond its religious affiliation. 
In short, the degree of social homogeneity within Egyptian society, as in the Tunisian case, went 
far deeper than just ethnic and sectarian composition. The vast majority live in or around urban centers, 
most are in some sense or another economically struggling if not directly unemployed, and most are under 
the age of 50. Furthermore, political opposition to Mubarak was deeply entrenched, and crossed partisan 
boundaries. As such, the dissemination of protests faced no insurmountable geographic or demographic 
hurdles, and participation, support, and mobilization were primarily dependent on the effectiveness and 
growth of the protests themselves not on factors beyond the control of protest organizers. In turn this
facilitated many of the central mechanisms highlighted by nonviolent literature such as political ju-jitsu 
and military defection, as inclusion is not limited by demographic factors and the military is unlikely to 
be demographically differentiated from protesters. 
(4.2.2) The Reasons for External Indifference 
To begin, Egypt garnered little in terms of staunch external opposition to regime change for a 
host of reasons. First, on a regional level two separate processes proceeded to limit Egyptian influence 
within the Middle East. For one, the continued wealth generated by the Persian Gulf, was cementing their 
position, Saudi Arabia in particular, as a far more crucial Arab actor for both regional and Western 
interests. Egypt’s once heralded strategic holding of the Suez Canal, witnessed gradual reductions in 




reliance on oil-pipelines as a primary transportation method, as well as the growing stability surrounding 
the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, even Egypt’s traditional role as an important source for Arab media 
and culture, was beginning to decline as competing news outlets such as al-Jazeera, and increases in 
social media communications and technology began to further infiltrate Arab societies. For another, the 
Camp David Accords and Mubarak’s entrenchment of policies aligned with the agreement, also gradually 
nullified any remaining mystique Egypt possessed in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Second, like Tunisia, several factors also contributed to the lack of staunch international 
apprehension to regime change from either the Security Council or N.A.T.O. For one, Egypt’s army 
represents a highly institutionalized organization, and even plays a diversified and highly significant role 
in domestic affairs. At the start of the Arab Spring, estimates placed military control over the Egyptian 
economy at around 20 percent of GDP, and also showed military participation in industries across a 
variety of sectors (Harb 2003, 282). In part, such institutionalization likely alleviated the potential risks of 
post-resistance chaos, and also eventually became the central counterweight to the escalation of violent 
repression by the Mubarak regime, thereby playing an important role in limiting civilian casualties. For 
another, Mubarak’s effective military campaigns against the IG in the South and al-Jihad in the North, as 
well as his political maneuverings towards the MB had collectively served to limit the relative strategic 
importance of Egypt in relation to the War on Terror following September 11th, 2001.  
Finally, and perhaps not insignificantly, nonintervention by the West could also be interpreted as 
pro-democratic action. Like many Arab leaders, Mubarak’s political rhetoric emphasized implementing 
democratization slowly, while his actions simply entrenched the depths of his authoritarianism. During 
the 1990’s every application presented to the Constitutional Assembly for official opposition party status 
was rejected. Moreover, two periods of minimal reform, during the late 1980’s and prior to the 2000 
election, were almost immediately reversed in subsequent periods. By 2010, the NDP had reverted back 
to the widespread use of unregistered voters, legislation of restrictions on opposition mobilization, ballot 
stuffing, and voter intimidation. In short, Hosni Mubarak represented an entrenched authoritarian leader, 




In sum, a breakdown of the specific importance of the structural conditions outlined in the 
previous two sections is necessary. First, Egypt maintains a highly urban, homogeneous, and relatively 
well-educated populace, as well as a relatively well established national identity. Second, Egypt’s status 
as an important international power has declined since the height of the Nasser regime, and although 
Egypt maintains strong relations with the U.S., the importance of that relationship had gradually declined 
over time, at least as far as the United States was concerned. As in Tunisia, these factors combined to 
facilitate the expansion of protests, and limit the extent to which external forces determin d the course of 
events. Put differently, these structural conditions served to promote the geographic dispersion of protests,
and also enhanced the likelihood of the international community being amenable to regime change.  In 
short, these factors were necessary conditions for resistance to succeed, without them the agency of 
protesters and protest organizers would have been severely limited.  
(4.2.3) Nonviolent Resistance and the Egyptian Revolution 
As a point of departure, chronologically, on the 25th of January, protests occurred throughout 
most of the urban centers. In Cairo, thousands marched intending on meeting in Tahrir Square; however, 
due to their decentralized and loosely coordinated nature, as well as the regime response in terms of 
setting roadblocks on important thoroughfares, many demonstrations did not actually reach their 
destination (Egypt-Unrest 26th; Protests Continue in Downtown, Night). Moreover, while most prote s 
maintained an initial nonviolent emphasis, largely in response to the scale of regime repression, 
escalations to violence gradually occurred, and by nightfall intermittent street-battls were witnessed 
across the country (It Started Peacefully, Eyewitnesses). On the 26th of January, the regime publicly 
banned demonstrations, and as people returned to the streets the violence of resistance within the key 
urban centers of Cairo and Alexandria escalated (Murdoch 2011; Protests Against Hosni, Day). 
Furthermore, protests occurring where degrees of economic dislocation were more pronounced, such as 




mobilization also proceeded with thousands arrested across the country, and most formal communication 
networks were completely disrupted (Lynch 2011, 89; 166 of 1,000, Lawyers).  
Significantly, once protesters began entrenching themselves in Tahrir Square on the 26th and 7th, 
on-the-ground coverage of the unfolding resistance movements, in most cases indicate the presence of 
demonstrations maintaining a centrally located nonviolent core with significant episodic violence 
occurring on the fringes of the demonstrations. For example, on the 26th r porters affiliated with the Sun 
identified the presence of “missile throwing protesters”, and several reports corroborate the death of at 
least one police officer in Cairo as well as three in Suez (Egypt Erupts). Further, in Suez reports indicate 
that “protesters set fire to a government building and hurled petrol bombs at offices of the ruling party” 
(Hundreds Held After, Protests). However, all also discuss the importance of the organized ceter that 
existed in Tahrir Square. In part, such a core had to do with the geography of the Square itself, as it 
contains two major thoroughfares for police entrance connected to a complex web of alleyways and side 
streets for protesters to escape into.  
Regardless, In Cairo, by the 27th a similar process to the social contract present within the 
Tunisian Revolution began to manifest itself. In general, demonstrations gathered following noon-prayer, 
and protesters either unwilling or unable to exit loci of resistance formed the bedrock of the population 
who began to demonstrate around the clock. In all cities violent clashes between protesters and police 
forces occurred, and violence in areas more prone to regime repression, such as the traditional MB 
strongholds of Aswan and Alexandria, saw increased violent activity in accordance with increased 
repression (Murdoch 2011; Muslim Brotherhood to Organize, Monday; Protests Continue in Downtown, 
Night). The poorer areas of Suez erupted in gun battles, and beginning on the 28th (Thursday) the regime 
also moved to once again shut down all formal communication networks in the urban centers in an 
explicit attempt to impede the organization of protests planned for noon prayer on the following day 
(Friday). 
As such, by the 28th and 29th, most formal communication was cut off, and throughout the eve of 




in order to maintain their position. Further, throughout Friday looting and rioting took place across the 
city, and such looting disproportionately pitted lower class individuals against more affluent segments of 
the population, especially those living in accessible neighborhoods such as Heliopolis (as opposed to 
Zamalek for example, which is an island). Eye witness reports indicate the presence of gun battles at the 
entrances to several gated communities in Cairo, and malls and shopping centers outside of the city cent r 
saw the brunt of looting and rioting. On January 30th the New York Times reported that “At the ravaged 
City Centre Mall, looters had pulled bank A.T.M.'s from the walls, smashed in skylights and carted away 
televisions, and on Sunday a small crowd was inspecting the damage and debating the causes.” 
(Kirkpatrick 2011c). Several reports also indicate that the scale of government inactivity was more 
pronounced in areas that have been traditional strongholds of the MB. This in part led to shortages and 
inflation tied to the state of emergency, which was in part responsible for the increased degre  of looting 
in cities like Alexandria (Murdoch 2011; Muslim Brotherhood to Organize, Monday).     
In response to the events of the 28th three crucial processes unfolded. First, Mubarak appointed a 
new vice president and cabinet, and gave a largely disastrous crisis management speech on the 1st to the 
ire of many Egyptians. Throughout the unrest, government rhetoric surrounding the Egyptian museum 
break-ins and the emergence of chaos and looting in Suez and Alexandria focusing on blaming Islamists 
and opportunists, contrasted with the belief many protesters held, backed by some official corroboration, 
regarding the use of government thugs and saboteurs to foment instability. Fears of government saboteurs 
were also engendered by the massive release of violent criminals by the Mubarak regime on the 29th in 
areas North of Cairo and in Alexandria, and also by reports that military personnel allowed armed 
individuals to enter protests in Cairo (Army Out in Cairo, Prevails; Egyptian President’s Use, 
Commentary; Olster 2011).15 Throughout, state-ran media outlets fostered narratives that emphasized the 
existence of looting and crime across differing urban centers, and a general sense of slipping regime 
control began to creep in. For example, in Cairo neighborhood watches were set up across the sprawling 




themselves against the reported looting and rioting taking place (Lawlessness on Egyptian Streets, Clings 
on; Neighborhood Watch Groups, Thugs; Olster 2011). 
Second, as Mubarak gave his speech on the eve of the 28th, the military moved to replace the 
police force in the urban centers, and significantly, remained relatively neutral as the process unfolded. 
Furthermore, at least initially, the military take-over was encouraged by protesters themselves a  it both 
insulated them from attacks from the far less trustworthy and institutionalized police apparatus, and 
therefore also allow for international and domestic pressure to continue to build (Egypt-Unres  31st; Olster 
2011).16 In particular, the Obama administration maintained dialogue with the regime throughout this 
period of resistance, and also voiced criticism of excessive repression and threatened to significantly 
reduce the extent of American aid to Egypt if a political transition did not occur (Lynch 2011, 91-99). In 
short, the military served a highly important protective role, and the neutrality of the S.C.A.F leadership 
for all intents and purposes represented the nail-i -the-coffin for the Mubarak regime.17 
Third, both the transition to military control over the protests and the general persistence of 
opposition demonstrations, facilitated the expansion of social mobilization beyond the youth populations 
that had made up the core of demonstrations up until the 28th. On the 28th, the General Bureau within the 
MB finally decided to execute a full call-to action, and thus the entirety of the largest opposition group, as 
much of its youth-based constituents were already protesting, was unleashed against the Mubarak regime 
(Muslim Brotherhood Organizes, Monday; Opposition Call for Million, Strike. Two large scale protests 
marching towards the center of Rafl district in Alexandria occurred on the 31st, and in Cairo the 
experienced veterans of the Muslim Brotherhood played a crucial role in enhancing the resiliency of the 
demonstrations (Sennot 2011). For another, workers in Suez called for a strike on the 31st, at both labor 
unions and other secular opposition groups eventually propelled to a general strike (Opposition Call for 
Million, Strike). Essentially, as the full extent of both the industrial labor force and the MB joined into 
protests, millions of people flowed into the urban city centers, and Mubarak was increasingly pushed into 




For the remainder of the protests, an extreme degree of violence occurred on a daily basis. To 
take perhaps the most famous example of regime repression, on February 2nd, the most visible signs of 
regime violence emerged. In the early part of the day, Mubarak loyalist demonstrations emerged often 
times directly alongside opposition demonstrations, and these pro-regime groups were reportedly 
typically comprised of both NDP salaried thugs and violent criminals (Khalil 2011, 199-243; Egyptian 
Presidents Use, Commentary). Around 11:00 in the afternoon, loyalists and police forces began entering 
the Square in order to directly engage with opposition demonstrations in what would end up being the 
most violent day of protesting until Mubarak stepped down. In short, initial gunfire transitioned to a siege 
on Tahrir Square by pro-Mubarak forces riding horses, donkeys, and camels and wielding iron bars, guns, 
and knifes (Cairo Attack Shows, Goes; Foes Sticks to Demands, Rages). By dusk, thousands were injured 
and an estimated 10 people dead, and for the rest of the night intermittent battles between pro-r gime 
forces and the protesters ensued along four major fronts: In the alleyways in and around Tahrir Square, on 
the fringes of the protest movements, inside the Square between the entrenched protesters, and at the 
major entry points where protesters attempted to push police and military forces backwards (Foes Sticks 
to Demands, Rages). Throughout the night protesters also began to target military installme ts originally 
intended to protect the resistance from the police apparatus, and this brought about a series of gunfights 
that echoed throughout the city.  
Eventually, by February 6th most external allies of the Mubarak regime, began to publically 
denounce the use of repressive tactics, and by February 9th even the Arab Union had expressed its 
opinion regarding the untenable future of Mubarak’s presidency. Finally, on February 11th, Mubarak 
stepped down from his role as president, was evacuated from the country, and a military takeover of the 
government immediately ensued.  
(4.2.4) Discussion 
To begin, the development of the Egyptian Revolution has two central implications for theory 




prominent nonviolent emphasis at the start of each movement, and most Egyptian cities also had a far 
more organized resistance than ever really emerged in Tunisia. Groups like the April 6th Movement 
played a far heavier hand in organizing and recruiting participants before protests themselves started, and 
the MB played an important stabilizing and defensive role as participation expanded and repression 
became more lethal. With that said, the 25th of January essentially amounts to an annual day of protest—
as it is a state-holiday celebrating the much hated police apparatus—and both the MB and the April Sixth 
Movement had been unsuccessful in previous attempts to garner the type of support it received in 2011. 
The central reason for that, is relatively straightforward: The events in Tunisia provided inspiration which 
drove formerly apathetic citizens to participate, and also provided a blueprint for how resistanc could be 
successful.  
Hence, as in Tunisia—and contrary to nonviolent theory—the increase in participation that 
determined the unique success of the protests movements that occurred after the 25th of January created 
three important consequences. First, the degree of centralized control exerted by protest organizers greatly 
diminished as participation increased. Such an argument is largely theoretical in nature: A protst 
movement of two million people is logically harder to organize and control than one of 2,000. Second, 
diminishing centralized control entailed the growth of violence within resistance, and that is based on 
empirical results. For one, by early February violence against non-hegemonic forces became more and 
more visible. Coptic minorities began to be targets of violence, and looting, rioting, and physical violence 
directed towards the more affluent segments of society increased as well. For another, violent clashes 
between protesters and hegemonic forces also became more and more visible; as MB participation 
increased traditional counter-repression tactics emerged, and in places where repression was more 
pronounced—such as Suez and Alexandria—out and out attacks on police forces and NDP infrastructure 
occurred. Third, and most significantly, as the nonviolent emphasis of protests diminished, the 
effectiveness of protests increased. Such a trend is obviously linked to higher participation rates, but 
intrinsic to the arguments made above is the idea that a loss of control and transitions to violence are 




Second, the dissemination of protests and the spread of messaging across cities was facilitated by 
the lack of clear ethnic or sectarian differences within a population that maintained strong similarities in 
terms of lived experiences, as well as the presence of a strong national identity. Such is not to dismiss the 
importance of political and ideological differences within the Egyptian protest movements; however, 
these were mitigated within the time frame of the protests themselves most importantly by the simplistic 
nature of the demand presented—namely that Mubarak step down.  
Finally, the institutionalized and centralized nature of the Egyptian military helped alleviate many 
post-resistance anxieties, and served to both promote the resiliency of protests and act as the key sourc of 
elite opposition to Mubarak. In addition, the structural commonalities within resistance movements 
helped with the construction of a unified social narrative, and helped to increase the likelihood of military 
defection, thereby increasing the durability of resistance. Finally, external non-intervention could be 
justified on pro-democratic grounds, and was similarly bolstered by a host of structural conditions. 
(4.3) Summary 
To begin, the Tunisian and Egyptian examples highlight two specific sets of weaknesses within 
literature on nonviolent theory. First and foremost, they highlight the selective and limited nature of 
nonviolent resistance as they relate to each case. As mentioned above, within a week, even Tahrir Square, 
the best example of nonviolent resistance in either case, had become the scene of large-scale gun battles, 
knife-fights, infrastructural destruction, and carnage, and in geographic fringe areas such as Alexandria, 
Suez, and Aswan nonviolent resistance lasted only a matter of hours. In Tunisia, “nonviolent resistance” 
was merely an epithet applied to what in reality were protests riddled with violence, and in certain places 
and circumstances potentially dependent on it. Looting, rioting, classed-based targeting, and many other 
trappings of political unrest defined the resistance in Sidi Boazid from the onset, and as protest spread 
from the interior to economic hubs such as Tunis and Sfax violence quickly emerged.  
Moreover, nonviolent emphases were always selective. Violence against specific elements of the 




minorities were ubiquitous, except perhaps in the early days of the demonstrations in Tahrir Square. 
Moreover, the potential negatives associated with the selectivity of nonviolent forms of esistance was 
overcome by the pervasive degree of social homogeneity that existed in each context. The many had been 
long oppressed by the few, and this meant that limited violence against these minorities would not 
severely impact mobilization. In fact, the ability to loot certain areas and populations may have had a 
positive effect on mobilization as well. However, such an argument is by no means intended as an 
indictment of either movement, more than anything it seems possible that such violence is merely a 
product of the necessary influx of numbers each protest movement required to remain resilient. Had 
protesters in Tahrir Square not outnumbered the pro-government forces that attacked on the 2nd of
February by a scale of 10, the outcome may have been different. Moreover, had experienced anti-regime 
protesters, more often than not associated with the MB, not played a major role in defending the 
protesters position at the nodes of contestation, the continued presence of the sit-in protesters in Tahrir 
may have been in doubt. Put differently, some violence is likely inevitable, and some is likely necessary 
for continued protestation, especially in contexts like Tunisia and Egypt where regime repression is 
essentially and expected norm. 
Second, both of these cases also highlight the fact that the agency wielded by each set of protests 
was highly contingent on a preferable set of structural conditions, and this point will be eventually 
bolstered through comparison to other cases as well. In both cases, a large swath of the population shared 
the same ethnicity and religious affiliation, and also harbored many of the same apprehensions towards 
both their economic prospects and political freedom. In each case, the vast majority were also young, 
based in urban centers, and connected in some fashion through increasingly fluid and agile 
communication networks. Protests had no clear geographic or demographic blockades in terms of 
dissemination, and protesters coming from vastly different political orientations could temporarily 
coalesce around a relatively simple set of prescriptions. Therefore, political ju-jitsu could happen leading 




apparatus, as no incentive existed, as in Libya for example, for the military to accept orders from a 
dictator in an increasingly weakening position.  
Finally, regime change went unopposed in each case by regional and international actors. There was no 
invasion, aerial campaign, or military support given to any actors involved, and this was primarily due to 
the relevant outlined structural conditions in each case. Moreover, in both cases international support, a  
predicted by nonviolent theory, inevitably tilted towards the pro-democracy protest movements, and this
placed unique pressures on the regimes in power. However, it remains unclear how closely linked this fact 
is to the means of resistance, although that remains a distinct possibility. Neither regim maintained any 
significant strategic considerations that would have made regime change problematic for relevant actors, 
and the likelihood of persistent chaos and instability was relatively lower than in other cases. In short, at 
the very least important structural conditions should likely be the central concern of future examples of 
nonviolent resistance. 
Endnote  
3 Since Sidi Boazid refers to both a city and a governorate, I will be using that name to refer to the 
city unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
4 That is certainly not underestimate the eventual role that labor unions and al-Nahda eventually 
played; however, these movements merely supported the resilience of resistance, and were never in 
control nor the central reason for the eventual removal of Ben Ali. For a more detailed discussion see 
Beinin (2015b, especially chaps. 3 and 4), Lynch (2011, 44-46), Murphy (2011), and Perkins (2014, 214-
222). For more details on the general maro-economic position of the Tunisian economy see Richards and 
Waterbury (2008, 239-243).   
5 For more information on the influence of French education reform throughout the mandatory 
period see Perkins (1994). Willis (2012, chap. 5) also provides a detailed account of how the Young 
Tunisian Society influenced reforms at al-Zaytouna, and both Willis and Perkins highlight how Islamic 
Reformists in Egypt such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh were highly influential within the 
Tunisian Ulema. Michael Dunn (1994) also shows how the precursor to al-Nahda, the Islamic Tendency 
Movement (MTI), was the one of the first, and clearly most moderate Islamist group to participate in 
secular politics, Dunn also eloquently describes the moderate tendencies of its founder, Rached 
Gannouchi (149-153). 
6 Here, the intended emphasis is especially related to lived experiences with both the regime and 
political and economic conditions of the Tunisian economy. Reality is obviously much more complex; 
however, most were relatively young, faced difficulties finding employment, were well educated, and 
lived in urban centers, while political orientations were not identical, divergent actors could coalesce 
around the similarity of their lived experiences as well as their disdain for the Ben Ali regime.  




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 For a more detailed discussion of the degree of institutionalization of the Tunisian milit ry see 
Fergani (2014, 84-102, Perkins (2014, chaps. 5 and 6), and Willis (2012, chap. 3). In particular, Habib 
Borguiba was relatively unique within MENA politics for the degree to which he forced military 
disengagement from politics. 
8 Here, both Bellin (2012) and Nepstad (2013) provide crucial insights regarding the importance 
of institutionalization of transitions from autocratic rule. Stacher (2012) may also be appli d to the 
Tunisian case, and in many ways the centralization of authority within Tunisian politics was even more 
pronounced than in Egypt, given the fact that the Tunisian military was far more disengaged from 
Tunisian politics and economics. 
9 As a point of reiteration, to avoid confusion with citations of newspaper articles, I use the name 
when given, and then abbreviate the title with the first 3 major words of an article title, with a comma 
indicating a break and the last word of the title. 
10 The role of media in facilitating and expanding the influence of the Arab uprisings has been 
written about extensively. Kellner (2012, 31-40) provides an interesting analysis of how U.S. politicians, 
specifically Barack Obama, promoted the rise of a “media spectacle” in Tunisia, which bolstered 
resistance. Lynch (2011, chaps 1 and 2), perhaps excessively, lauds the role al-Jazeera played, and 
envisions a unified Arab public-sphere, that was indelibly shaped by media outlets and communication 
networks. Finally, see Bossia (2014, 9-26) for a detailed account of how media coverage changed over 
time.   
11 Here, I am not intending to ignore the importance of what for example Lynch (2011, 55-64) 
labels as the “Kefaya movement moment” (56), or the gradual manifestation of popular opposition to 
Middle Eastern regimes in general and Mubarak in particular beginning in the early years of the 21st 
century. Nor am I ignoring the importance of labor unions, see Beinin (2012), or other opposition parties 
and the MB; what is important is that opposition and protests existed, but did not reach anywhere near the 
levels of mobilization reached during 2011 (Clarke 2014; Khalil 2011, chaps. 4,5, 6). I see Tunisia as a 
spark that increased the unified stance of divergent political orientations, and brought previously apathetic 
populations out on to the streets. Here, Clarke (2014, 89) even provides a set of interviews that show how 
Tunisia even altered the perceptions of important brokers, and brought in different political blocs that 
would have likely otherwise remained on the sidelines.     
12 Khalil (2011) for example refers to Said as both the “Emergency law Martyr”, and “Egypt’s 
Muhammad Boazizi” (71). However, Said’s death itself occurred on June 6th, 2010, and was significant in 
relation to the degree that Said was both needlessly beaten to death and representative of the vast majority 
of Egyptian Youth. According to reports he was essentially entering an internet café store trying to play 
the Playstation video game FIFA (soccer) when he was detained and beaten to death. Eventually, the 
Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” became a central organizing mechanism for the Youth 
movement that protested on the 25th. 
13 For a more detailed description of the Coptic stances on the protest movements see Guirgis 
(2012). Essentially, the Coptic Catholic Church initially supported protests, and then altered their stanc  
over time; the largest Church, the Coptic Orthodox, remained on the sidelines, and publicly denounced 
the protests as they unfolded. As such, their demographic insignificance played a role in facilitating the 
dissemination of protests on some level. 
14 The intended emphasis here is on the similarity of lived experiences. In fact, given the 
productivity of Egyptian media, many movies and books coming out between 2000 and 2010 offer vivid 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
underprivileged characters, Taha and Buthayna al-Sayed, maneuver in a world mired by corruption, 
increasingly menacing examples of patriarchy, and unfair disadvantages due to their relative lack of 
“Wusa”—or connections. In film, Cultural Film (2000) is perhaps the most famous example. In which, in 
one of the most disheartening scenes, the lead character Effet screams “How many like us are out there?”.   
15 As Khalil (2011, 170-172) describes, the violence on behalf of the protesters that occurred on 
the 28th was absolutely essential to reduce the impact of regime repression, and also to protect the protest 
movement in the center of Tahrir Square. In other parts of the country, Suez most blatantly, resistance 
was far closer to a “war zone” than a peaceful protest (185-186).  
16 For a more nuanced discussion of why the military was essentially called for by protesters see 
Khalil (2011, 170-192) or Thager (2011). In short, the military is far more institutionalized than the police 
apparatus, which means less arbitrary violence, and that it commits less visible corruption.  
17 Here, two authors Stacher (2012, 8 -86 and 93-119) and Harb (2003) provide a set of crucial 
insights. First, Harb shows that the disengagement of the military that occurred under Sadat and 
accelerate4d under Nasser, was in part predicated on the continued professionalization and 
institutionalization of the military as an independent actor. Second, Stacher highlights how the centralized 
nature of executive authority in Egypt was successful at limiting the role of the NDP in Egyptian politics, 
and actually facilitated regime change because elite decision making within the military could a t with 





Chapter Five- Syria and Bahrain: Social Heterogeneity and Sectarian Intervention 
 
 
To begin, the Bahraini and Syrian cases are important in two principle ways. First, each 
highlights how the agency of nonviolent protest movements is contingent upon significant structural 
factors. In either case, the momentum of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions sparked organized, mostly 
nonviolent demonstrations that ultimately failed to achieve the degree of domestic and internatio al 
mobilization and support necessary to succeed. Each country is also geographically proximate to a major 
regional power, and maintains divisive sectarian problems that made each protest vulnerable to foreign 
intervention. As such, both sets of protests failed to evenly and coherently disseminate across both 
geographic distance (although Bahrain has little in this regard) or differing populati ns. In fact, the 
geography of resistance in Syria neatly aligns with Sunni-Arab populations outside of Damascus, and the 
Kurdish Northeast maintained cotemporaneous, but largely divergent protests. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
invaded on March 14th, and in Syria international support for Assad allowed him to recover and 
eventually both entrench and expand his position. 
Second, and in part as a result of these important structural issues, each protest movement also 
quickly, and perhaps necessarily, transitioned towards violent tactics as regime repression became more 
intense and lethal. Put bluntly, neither of these cases represent ideal conditions for the implem ntation of 
nonviolent resistance, and this is important to consider and unpack. Furthermore, the nature of the social
heterogeneity in each case exacerbated the selectivity of nonviolent resistance, which, unlike in the 
Egyptian and Tunisian cases, placed severe limitations on the expansion and dissemination of resistance. 
Shi’a minority populations living in Dera’a and Homs were targeted immediately, as were other minority 
populations that maintained support for the Assad regime due to their traditionally vulnerable situation 
within Syrian politics. In Bahrain, clashes between Sunni and Shi’a demonstrations were ubiquitous, and 
Sunni loyalists quickly targeted primarily Shi’a neighborhoods, which fomented necessary transitions to 
violence, especially in the poorer neighborhoods throughout Manama. In other words, where nonviolent 




asymmetries in terms of the use of coercive force, and individual aggression against minority populations 
followed similar logics as in previous cases, but in these cases became far more detrimental o the 
resiliency and impact of resistance.     
(5.1) Case Three: Syria 
As a point of departure, in relation to nonviolent action theory, the Syrian case presents two 
central weaknesses. First, the Syrian case highlights the extent to which structural conditions can 
negatively determine the degree of agency that resistance movements possess in two principle ways. For 
one, stark ethnic and sectarian differentiations may limit the extent to which nonviolent prots s can 
disseminate across geography, as well as the extent to which geographically stratified protests assert a 
unified message.  Due to the Assad regime’s extensive patrimonial networks in key urban centers like 
Damascus and Aleppo, protests emerged in these areas very late into the period of resistance. Further, the 
non-dualistic nature of divisions within Syrian society combined with the geographic stratification of 
particular ethnic or sectarian minorities, may promote divergent types of claims— s in secessionist 
ones—over unified messages of regime change. For another, the presence of a firm and willing external 
base of support for the regime, here taking both a regional form in relation to the sectarian connection to 
Iran and Hezbollah, as well as an international form in terms of the Security Council support of Russia in 
particular, severely limited the success of nonviolent resistance. In short, Assad was willing and able to 
kill protesters that stood up nonviolently, and his persistent ability to do so was supported and funded 
over time.    
Second, Syria highlights the lack of control protest organizers have in terms of effectively 
maintaining nonviolent emphases in relation to both hegemonic and non-hegemonic forces. For one, the e 
was rarely a single situation in which a sizeable protest was not met with harsh repression, and very few if 
any that did not face live ammunition and devastating casualties. It is likely difficult if not impossible to 
maintain persistent nonviolent emphases in such circumstances. For another, clashes between divergent 




locales. Such clashes frequently precipitated discriminatory looting and rioting, and served to reify the 
divisions within Syrian society overtime. Hence, nonviolent resistance may face difficult dynamic 
problems associated with controlling violence within resistance. In particular, if intermittent clashes and 
other types of discriminatory practices reify ethnic and sectarian divisions, even if they were not 
necessarily important initially, this may directly inhibit the expansion of mobilization and support that is 
needed in order to insure greater resiliency, and such issues are beyond the control of protesters and 
opposition organizers.    
(5.1.1) The Nature of Social Heterogeneity in Syria 
To begin, as Tunisia and Egypt began to experience the repercussions of popular resistance in 
2011, the Syrian situation was perhaps the most intractable of the three. In particular, the Alawite 
minority that formed the bedrock of the Ba’athist regime made up about 12 percent of the population, 
Sunni Arabs represented somewhere between 60 and 67 percent of the population, and Kurds and 
Armenians made up about 9.7 percent each (Wieland 2012, 85). In addition, turmoil in Iraq was placing 
divergent pressures on the Syrian state, emboldening the secessionist Kurds, creating pockets of refugee 
populations, and leading to an influx of Sunni Arabs, and economic reforms, the precarious financial 
position of the Assad regime, trade liberalization with Turkey, and international sanctions were all 
engendering heightened degrees of social animosity. 18 
Moreover, historically, for a variety of reasons, the successive Assad regimes had primarily elied 
on decentralized governing techniques, and focused on the maintenance of fragile power sharing 
relationships between religious communities and geographic areas. For one, the Alawites themselves do 
not represent a coherent sect, and are divided in various areas along familial, geographic, and ideational 
lines. Further, demographically, Alawis make up only around 12 percent of the population, so a degree of 
confessionalism and decentralization was intrinsic to the stability of the Assad regime (Stacher 2012, 
chap. 2).19 Furthermore, while the assertion of sectarian divides tends to oversimplify the complexity of 




ardent secularists (for example, Bashar’s Vice President was Sunni at the time of protest); the realities did 
not always match perception, and often times enhanced sectarian based perceptions of the Assad regime. 
Gradually, many Sunni’s came to perceive the existence of appalling sectarianism, especially within the 
military apparatus, and thus the importance of sectarian differences did hold significance for many non-
connected Sunnis. Such tendencies were especially pronounced outside of Aleppo and Damascus, which 
maintained large pockets of well-connected Sunni based regime support. Put differently, Dara’a, Homs, 
and large portions of the predominately Sunni Northwest continuously represented problematic 
populations for both Hafiz and Bashar.  
Moreover, over time sectarian policies would become further entrenched, and a highly nepotistic 
and corrupt system of governance emerged, which relied heavily on personal friendships between various 
ethnic and religious groups and the Assad regime. Connection became much more important than talent in 
determining advancement, and corruption within the regime became increasingly evident. For example, 
Assad’s younger brother Rifat infamously obtained notoriety for his illicit activities, even reportedly 
playing an extensive role in the regional h shish trade (Fousad 2012). Throughout Hafiz’s regime Sunni 
opposition mobilization and unrest, in the 1970’s and 80’s primarily taking the form of the Syrian 
offshoot of the MB, began to grow specifically in relation to sectarian politics.  
In addition, by 2002, outside of Damascus, the extent of Ba’athist control was beginning to show 
signs of erosion. The important pact inculcated by Hafiz, between Sunni-Arab merchants in Aleppo and 
Dera’a and both the Assads’ and the Alawite elite, was weakening. In the Northeast, the collapse of the 
post-war Iraqi state, and the developing autonomy of Kurdish-Iraq were both placing enhanced pressure 
on an already intractable situation. The Kurds had long been excluded by the Ba’athists, as their Arab-
nationalist ideology, inclusive in regards to religious differences, for the most part failed to ncorporate 
Kurdish populations into Syrian society. In 1958 hundreds of thousands of Kurds had their citizenship 
revoked, and official use of the Kurdish language was banned (Wieland 2012, 86-89; Noi 2012, 17-18). 
As the first decade of the 21st century progressed, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) activity within 




prominent Kurdish figures to admit that they were beginning to lose control over their own population 
(Wieland 2012, 84-102; Tejel 2009, chap. 6). 
Put more succinctly, the extent of social heterogeneity cut far deeper than simple ethnic or 
sectarian divides. The Sykes-Picot agreement and the history of French colonialism in Syria had 
engendered a set of territorial boundaries that made Syria a veritable nightmare to govern, and this forced 
the successive Assad regimes to leverage certain minorities and populations against others. This was 
emerged as a problematic source of deep mistrust between those enfranchised and those disenfranchised 
by such a political environment, and eventually placed severe limitations to the geographic and 
demographic dispersion of protests. Varying experiences with regime repression also made some groups 
more reluctant than others to join in, and even when cotemporaneous protests existed, they rarely 
espoused cohesive messages or organized collectively. Finally, the potential of political chaos associated 
with the lack of an institutionalized military apparatus, the extent of social heterogeneity, and the 
sectarian nature of regionally fragmented bases of support all promoted pervasive anxiety in regards to 
regime change.   
(5.1.2) The Reasons for External Influence and Intervention  
In short, two principle sources of external support existed for the Assad regime. First, on a 
regional level, the Shi’a dominated Alawite regime represents a geographically proximate and 
strategically significant partner to neighboring Iran. In particular, diplomatic and economic relat onships 
between the two countries became increasingly important as both countries fell under the purview of 
harsh Western sanctions throughout the 20th century, and cheap Iranian oil had long been an important 
subsidized commodity that Assad utilized in order to facilitate political stability in Syria (Lesch 2013, 
chap. 7). Furthermore, as the relationship between the two countries had altered over time, another 
important concern regarding regime change in Syria stemmed from the potentially negative outcomes 
such a situation would engender. That is, Assad’s resignation may not be problematic just because it 




also lead to instability, internecine conflict, and the emergence of fundamentalist groups, which would all 
inevitably impact Syria’s neighboring countries (as they eventually did).    
Moreover, while inroads to liberalization and regional integration were attempted, littl  success 
was achieved in terms of improving Syria’s international position, especially in terms of the debilitating 
Western sanctions regime in place. Furthermore, Western sanctions, intended to destabilize the Alawite 
regime, created the diplomatic externality of forcing the Ba’athists to foster relationships with important 
non-Western allies. Seeking foreign transfers had long been a staple of Syrian politics, and Hafiz largely 
maintained the patronage networks critical to regime stability through such transfers. In particular, Syria 
was compensated for its role in the various Arab-Israeli conflicts that emerged in the second half of the 
20th century, had built strong diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and was also compensated for 
their support of the Kuwaiti regime during the Iraqi invasion (Wieland 2012, 203). From 2000 on, Bashar 
also engaged in two debt reduction deals with Putin in Russia, and also visited and opened up trade 
dialogues with China in 2004 (Lesch 2013, chap. 7). These would end up being key sources of support for 
the regime as the Arab Spring spread across Syria.20  
(5.1.3) Nonviolent Resistance and the Syrian Uprising 
To begin, perhaps surprisingly given the political context outlined, Bashar al-Assad, and even 
many Syrian journalists and intellectuals, maintained a veil of confidence as protests erupted in Egypt and 
Tunisia. In fact, according to Wieland (2012, 19), the first protest that developed, largely spontaneously, 
in response to a case of police brutality in Damascus on February 17th even contained protesters chanting: 
“with our soul and blood, we will fight for you Bashar!”. Many A large amount of Syrians also attributed 
the most damning of brutalities to hardliners within the Ba’athist regime’s Mukhabarat, and, to some 
degree, genuinely saw Bashar as a pragmatist who was attempting to address the concerns of the people 
(Lesch 2013, chap. 3). Politically, many observers also saw a differentiation between regimes supported 
by the West, and those that had remained largely outside the purview of Western influence, even if 




maintained a degree of strength as a result of his specific international allies, an idea largely supported by 
how events unfolded. 
However, although delayed, beginning in March protests began spreading across many regions of 
the country that were based on similar grievances and implemented similar strategies as in previous cases. 
Throughout February internet activists attempted to elicit mass scale demonstrations across the c untry. 
Further, on February 17, 2011, nine days after the fall of the ancien regime in Egypt, an estimated 1,500 
protesters gathered in the old-square in Damascus following an incident between a shopkeeper and a 
police officer. However, all of these protests were effectively dealt with, and failed to spark expansive 
and influential levels of social mobilization. Moreover, the continued and often immediate repression of 
instances of resistance by the Assad regime played an important role in manifesting resistance where it 
occurred, as did the inherent corruption and lack of regime oversight in specific locales, and it woul take 
another month for the full force of anti-regime protests to develop.  
As a starting point, on Tuesday, March 15th, 2011, small-scale demonstrations, all between 100 
to 300 participants, occurred across Syria, eventually triggering the arrest of roughly 32 people including 
several important intellectuals and activists (Syria-Protests, March 16th). In response, organizers and 
activists engaged in an active campaign to engender protests of solidarity for those detained by the police
throughout the country, and as with the Yemeni, Tunisian, and Egyptian “days of rage” the mobilization 
potential of the Friday noon-prayer was utilized. However, the Assad regime quickly deployed tanks to 
the epicenter of these organized protests, Old Damascus, and the first Syrian “day of rage”, in Damascus 
at least, faltered with nearly 150 Syrians protesting nonviolently, over 40 of whom were eventually 
detained (Syria-Protests March 18th; Report: Tanks Deployed, Damascus). On the other hand, in the Sunni 
periphery, primarily in the Southern city of Dera’a, protesters and local authorities clashed on the 18th 
eventually leading to the death of three in protesters, while protests in Homs and Hama were quickly and 
effectively dispersed (Syrian Forces Kill, Deraa). As a result, On Sunday, the 20th of March, following 
funeral processions mourning those who died in protests on Friday, protesters in Dera’a burned down 




owned by the Assad family (Syrian-unrest 22nd; Violence against Protests, Response). From there, similar 
to the dispersion of protests from Sidi Boazid in Tunisia, protests in the city of Dera’a continued to grow 
in size and intensity, reaching sizes of 10,000 demonstrators by Monday the 21st, and gradually began to 
disperse throughout the rest of Syria’s Southwestern Hauran Region.  
However, two pieces of clarification regarding the ongoing resistance in Dera’a are important. 
First, significantly, for the first two weeks of resistance, the political demands asserted by demonstrators 
remained highly limited in nature, merely calling for the regime to address the pervasive corruption and 
institute political reforms. Second, as these initial protests grew, they were severely impact by the failure 
of protests to disseminate to other parts of the country. Essentially, throughout the first week of protest 
only largely insignificant small-scale demonstrations emerged in areas dominated by non-Sunni ethnic 
groups, religious minorities, or in the major urban centers of Damascus and Aleppo (Kurdish Youth in 
Syria, ‘Revolution’; Syria-Unrest March 24th). In fact, throughout this period the most significant turnout 
in both Damascus and Aleppo occurred along pro-regime lines, and this occurred both because of the 
networks the Assad regime had carefully constructed and a growing sense of apprehension regarding the 
potential externalities associated with regime change (Six Dead in Port, Grows). In response, Assad’s 
security forces surrounded and closed off Dera’a from the rest of the country by the 24th, and official 
estimates, although deemed unreliable by most sources, placed the death toll at 55 after only a week 
(Queenan 2011; Syrian-Unrest 26th March).21 
Eventually, after a week of contested opposition in Dera’a protests began to spring up in other 
Sunni dominated cities, and along the Western Coast. On Friday the 25th, protests in the highly 
confessional coastal city of Latakia led to death of four people, and the attempted destruction of Ba’athist 
infrastructure (Six Dead in Port, Grows; Syrian Forces Disperse, Speak). However, by the 25th, as protests 
in Latakia intensified, the intensity of protests in Dera’a had dwindled, and therefore the full extent of 
Assad’s repressive capacity could be focused on the emergent protests in Latakia. To be sure, protests 
continued to occur in many parts of Dera’a; however, to a large extent, Assad’s repression succeeded in 




of events occurred in early April as protests spread to the Northern Damascus suburb of Douma, or the 
Southern Coastal city of Baniyas. By the time protests spread to these two cities on the 4th of April, the 
intensity of protests in Latakia had severely diminished, and protests failed to recur in Latakia altogether 
for several months.   
Put differently, in the first month of protests the geographically stratified protest movements 
across Syria reached their mobilization capacity at differing times, and this allowed Assad to avoid both 
stretching his security apparatus as well as having to deal with the types of large concomitant protests that 
became problematic in Egypt and Tunisia. Eventually, on April 8th, following regime attempts to mitigate 
the spread of resistance to the Kurdish Northeast by offering previously revoked citizenship, anti-regime 
protests spread to four cities within the Kurdish dominated region (Muslim Brotherhood Backs, Prote ts; 
Syria-unrest April 9th). By the 15th, protests emerged in Homs and Hama, and on Friday the 17th, the first 
inklings of resistance in Aleppo was violently repressed (Syria Protests Spread, Aleppo; Syrian-Unrest 
April 16th).  
Eventually, by late April and early May the political demands of protesters within the Sunni 
dominated peripheral cities shifted towards regime change; however, the government’s intense repression 
limited the spread of information and fostered variability in both participation rates and inte sity. For 
example, only limited, youth-based, non-institutionalized protests emerged in the Kurdish Northeast  
Damascus. Moreover, these protests, when they did occur at very low intensity levels, also saw limited or 
non-existent regime repression, which was primarily due to the fact that the regime strategically allowed a 
degree of opposition to occur in these locales. As such, one of the central reasons for the limited 
expansion to the Northeast was that Assad saw non-intervention in the Kurdish regions as politic lly 
beneficial (Syrian Kurds Get Citizenship; Syria-unrest April 23rd). Similarly, in Damascus fear of 
government repression kept populations in that city from rebelling in the manner that occurred elsewhere. 
Finally, in the two largest and most important Syrian cities, Damascus and Aleppo, the Syrian military 
maintained a visible and willingly violent stance; eventually leading to the reported death of tens




In addition, moving forward, two aspects of the escalation of violence in Syria are important t 
highlight. First, as demonstrations grew in intensity, eventually overcoming the temporal stratifica ion of 
protests in late March and early April, they evoked increasingly widespread repression, and significantly, 
the regime-demonstration divide became increasingly sectarian. As an example, Maher Assad, Bashar’s 
younger brother in charge of the internal security apparatus, began to selectively utilize sectarian based 
military units in order to engage with protesters, primarily in order to avoid the potential of defection and 
disobedience emanating from the inclusion of Sunni soldiers (Ajami 2012, 50-78; Lynch 2011, 178-192). 
A large paramilitary wing was also dispatched to ensure the dispersal of protests, consisting largely of 
Alawite and other minority based mercenaries, the Shibbiha, who were well compensated by the Assad 
Regime. Finally, within government rhetoric there was also a persistent, and largely effective attempt
(probably because it was partly true) to align Sunni demonstrations with Salafism and religious 
extremism, and this played an important role of facilitating post-resistance anxiety both at home and 
abroad.  
Second, international responses in favor of the resistance were universally slow to materialize, 
and only did so after both the onset of civil war and the emergence of evidence of the use of chemical 
weapons emerged (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2015). Further, the extent of international support for 
both the regime and the resistance movement was also non-conclusive. Iran had established significant 
relationships with the Syrian regime, and following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the subsequent Shi’a 
dominated government also became a source of support, albei  complicated due to the Iraqi government’s 
relationship with the U.S. Further, China and Russia both exerted Security Council vetoes and influence, 
which prevented the extent of overt Western military and aerial support from progressing to that of its 
role in the Libyan Revolution. In short, the anti-Assad coalition was numerous, but not capable of 
exerting enough influence to end the military hegemony of the Assad Regime. Turkey, Israel, the GCC, 
and the U.S. and NATO eventually gave material and technical support to the opposition, but as the 
opposition remained largely fragmented throughout did not succeed in deposing Bashar. The advent of 




However, beyond the influence of external actors simply being non-conclusive, Syria also 
presented a dilemma in terms of Western support because there was little in the vein of ancillary pressures 
available to Western actors. Western sanctions had been reaping havoc on the Syrian economy for several 
decades, and N.G.O’s and international media outlets had frequently highlighted the extent of human 
rights violations in Bashar’s Syria.  Given the usually urban nature of nonviolent resistance, material or 
aerial support also seemed largely unfeasible at the time. In effect, in cases like Syria internatio al 
material and aerial support on behalf of resistance movements is actually likely to either cause, by directly 
arming the resistance, or even necessitate transitions to violence. In certain cases, the financial supporters 
of the regime may be susceptible to pathos centered claims surrounding nonviolent resistance, but that is 
likely a huge and possibly fatal gamble to take in the case of Syria. Finally, Assad was able to continue 
financing his campaign of repression, which had it not been for the continued financial and armament 
support of his external backers would have been increasingly difficult to achieve.   
(5.1.4) Discussion 
In short, the Syrian case, for all intents and purposes, can be broken into two distinct phases, one 
in which social heterogeneity and historical experiences with repression, as in the brutally repressed 
uprising in Hama in 1982, prevented the cohesive temporal spread of protests, and one in which external 
intervention disproportionately benefited the Assad Regime. Further, the Syrian case also shows how 
these two sets of conditions can interact and support each other in significant ways,  
First, ethnic and sectarian heterogeneity placed significant limitations on the dissemination of 
protests from the epicenter in the region of Dera’a. For example, protests in the Kurdish dominated 
Northeast emerged nearly 24 days after the onset of protests on the 15th of March, and when they did 
emerge, these never grew to the levels observable in the Sunni dominated areas. Furthermore, anxiety in 
Damascus and Aleppo surrounding the potential for post-resistance instability kept many politically 
apathetic individuals from outwardly supporting the stance of regime change. Such anxieties stemmed 




associated with the removal of the Ba’athist regime. For all intents and purposes, the major protest 
movements were always predominately Sunni, and also failed to influence many Sunni elites to defect in 
geographically important areas for regime control.  
Moreover, the confluence of external support for continued repression and pervasive social 
heterogeneity mutually supported one another in interesting and significant ways. In particular, the 
strategic interests Iran maintained in a stable Shi’a dominated Syria, allowed for the brutal crackdown on 
demonstrations in Dera’a, and placed coercive limitations on the spread of protests themselves. Protests in 
Damascus and Aleppo were met with extreme lethal force, and continued nonviolent resistance in the face 
of increasingly dire death tolls is difficult to sustain. The regime could also shelter itself from the 
onslaught of Sunni-Arab, Turkish, and Western condemnation, and maintain access to munitions and 
armaments primarily through its Iranian and Russian partners. Hence, both the de-facto immunity of the 
Syrian regime, as well as its continued ability to repress were important elements of regime strength. 
Moreover, continued resistance in the face of regime immunity and its continued access to repressive 
capabilities, likely meant that the militarization of resistance was the only reasonable path moving 
forward. In short, had Assad been left to his own devices, his ability to finance the necessary coercive 
action would have quickly deteriorated, especially in relation to mercenaries, and this would have altered 
the trajectory and influence of resistance. 
Finally, the limited legitimacy of a unified Syrian state, presented significant problems in relat on 
to the conformity of the protest movements that did emerge. Again, the Kurds represent a case in point. 
By late April, the Kurdish message, while supporting regime change in Damascus, was primarily focused 
on the creation of a separated and autonomous Kurdish zone of influence. In part, this was aided by the 
de-facto autonomy experienced by their Iraqi neighbors, and also stemmed from both historical 
experience and the increased activity of Kurdish Nationalist groups such as the P.K.K. within Syrian 
borders. Further, emanating from the early years of Hafiz al-Assad’s regime, many of the smaller ethnic 
and religious minorities that existed along the Western border maintained significant loyalties to th  




Jewish, and other minorities rejected the any symbiosis between regime change and a unified Syrian state. 
For these minority populations, the Ba’athist regime represented the only acceptable way in which they 
could be effectively incorporated into Syrian society, and the absence of the Assad regime posed 
significant vulnerabilities to these populations.   
Moreover, the very process of regime repression, principally because it was an intended 
consequence of the Alawite elite, served to intensify the sectarian nature of the regime-resistance divide. 
Specific units were chosen to repress specific protests on the basis of their sectarian identity, and the 
regime also attempted, in many cases successfully, to foment internecine conflict between the r sistance 
movements themselves. In effect, not only was the effective dissemination of protests limited by social 
heterogeneity from the outset, it was likely to become increasingly limited as resistance continued. 
Throughout May, June, and July 2011 the sectarian nature of both the Baathist regime and geographic 
areas increased significantly; Defections by Ba’athists from Dera’a, the continued sectarian nature of 
repression, and the insertion of ISIL and the growth of other Salafist groups have created a Syria that is 
more divided than ever, and this makes the viability of nonviolent resistance less and less likely. 
(5.2) Case Four: Bahrain 
To begin, the Bahraini protest movements represent a particularly interesting case study for 
several important reasons. First, in comparison to other examples these demonstrations were highly 
nonviolent, and for the most part protests in Manama remained primarily nonviolent far longer than did 
those in Cairo or in Tunis. Moreover, the Bahraini protests maintained the highest rates of participation as 
a percentage of the total population, and Bahrain is by far one of the most Westernized and diversifie  
economies in the Middle East.22 Female participation in both the labor force and civil society is relatively 
high, domestic financial markets are extremely well developed, and the Bahraini national population is 
extremely well educated. Protests even had a very small geographic area to disseminate across, as Bahrain 




vibrant civil society, and the online forum BahrainOnline had been operating as a voice of opposition for 
almost a decade (Lynch 2011, 11-14; Miriam 2012, 117-127). 
In other words, ceteris paribus, the Bahraini case seems a perfect candidate for the application of 
strategic nonviolent action. However, nonviolent protests failed to initiate regime change, and also failed 
to a large extent in appropriating any meaningful political concessions. The central reason for such 
failure: The confluence of divisive social heterogeneity and external intervention. In particular, Bahrain 
represents essentially the reverse of the Syrian case, as Bahrain is governed by a Sunni minority regime n 
the face of a Shi’a majority population that is geographically proximate to the most important Sunni-Arab 
country in the Middle East. Furthermore, Bahrain shows how the interaction between repressive forces 
and demonstrators can create problems for the maintenance of ongoing resistance. In particular, 
repression served to intensify sectarian divides, and this both increasingly infused violent strat gie  into 
resistance and served to limit the cross-sectarian appeal of demonstrations over time, collectively, 
eventually limiting their effectiveness. 
(5.2.1) The Nature of Social Heterogeneity in Bahrain 
To begin, nearly 67 percent of the Bahraini-national population being Shi’a—with Ajami Shi’a, 
basically implying Persian ancestry, making up roughly 22 percent of that population (Pandya 2012, 
66).23 However, since 1783 Bahrain has been governed, either directly or through British colonialism, by 
the al-Khalifa family, which represents a Sunni-Arab Monarchy emerging from a minority populatin that 
makes up about 32 percent of Bahraini nationals (Mathiesen 2013, 16). Hence, like Syria, Bahrain is 
governed by a minority sectarian group, that has historically politically disenfranchised the majority 
population, and has also actively attempted to incentivize Sunni immigration as a means of overcoming 
their demographic disadvantage. Furthermore, unlike in Syria, the demographic divide in Bahrain is far 
more dualistic in nature, and as Bahrain is essentially one large metropolis, this has led to the geographic 




Furthermore, throughout the latter half of the 20th century the majority of the Bahraini Shi’a 
population continued to maintain strong familial and spiritual ties to Iran, and throughout the 1980’s the 
divergence between Bahrain’s minority Sunni and majority Shi’a population would become increasingly 
visible. In June, 1979 the then Islamic Iranian government officially laid territorial claimto Bahrain, and 
during this period Shi’a religious figures within Bahrain became increasingly influenced by and 
publically supportive of the Ayatollah Khomeni. Essentially, as the 80’s progressed the ruling al-Khalifa 
family and the Sunni dominated merchant class began to become more and more tied to both increasingly 
Westernized lifestyles and politically tied to the Persian Gulf Monarchies, while the largely 
disenfranchised Shi’a populations became more and more ideologically linked with the Iranian state and 
increasingly fundamental interpretations of Shi’a Islam. In short, such a split set the stage for enhanced 
sectarian tensions and episodic violence that occurred intermittently throughout the rest of th  20th 
century, most frequently in response to the continuous electoral and legislative failures of Shi’a 
opposition parties. 24  
More specifically, throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s two principal Shi’a opposition groups 
became particularly important. The most active political organization in the country, with around 68,000 
members is al-Wifaq (Mathiesen 2013, 65-89). However, led by Ali Salman, a religious scholar educated 
in both Riyadh and Qom, al-Wifaq has traditionally maintained a prominently secular rhetoric, 
emphasizing cross-sectarian issues such as political and economic reform. On the other hand, more 
recently, a second major group, the al-Haq movement, has emerged, which has yet to be formally 
incorporated into Bahraini politics and espouses a far more confrontational ideology in relation to both 
the Sunni population and the al-Khalifa family. Al-Haq was formed in 2005, and has drawn heavily from 
the Lebanese Shi’a movement Hezbollah. In general, these groups have suffered from extensive Sunni 
political maneuvering, Sunni influenced gerrymandering, and in total make up only 20 percent of the 
seats in parliament, almost all in the hands of al-Wifaq (Mathiesen 2013, 81-95). 
Moreover, economic progress, which has turned Bahrain into a regional legal and financial hub, 




Arab countries, a rising population has been coupled with high unemployment rates of about 15 percent 
(WBI 2015). In particular, labor force participation rates for males and females, as a percentage of either 
group between the ages of 15 and 24, was 55 percent and 32 percent respectively in 2010, indicating a 
large degree of non-participation. These numbers are also important in relation to the fact that nearly 78 
percent of the total population was between the ages of 15 and 24 (WBI 2015). Furthermore, two other 
characteristics of these demographic realities are also important to consider. First, unlike the rest of the 
GCC Bahrain does not generate sufficient petroleum rents to effectively “pay-off” these problematic 
unemployed populations, and unemployment for Sunnis is significantly lower than for Shi’a populations, 
typically being around ten to twelve percent lower across all demographic groups (Mathiesen 2013, 89). 
As such, the dualistic antagonisms between Sunni and Shi’a populations have generated systematic 
inequalities and genuine grievances since independence was granted in 1971. Moreover, since the late 
1990’s the political orientations of young Shi’a populations have been shifting either towards the Shi’a 
fundamentalism associated with al-Haq or towards more critical secular political parties; howver, these 
populations remained highly skeptical of any formal political connection to the al-Khalifa family, nd 
were increasingly fed up with the status-quo political stances taken by established opposition parties like 
al-Wifaq.  
(5.2.2) The Reasons for External Intervention 
To begin, due to Bahrain’s sizeable Shi’a population, which is also comprised of roughly 22 
percent Ajami (Persian) Shi’ites, the country has routinely been the subject of multiple territorial claims 
by different Iranian governments over time. In particular, throughout the 1960’s as British withdrawal 
became an increasingly likely scenario Iran, with what appeared to be American support, began to 
strengthen its influence in Bahraini affairs in a bid to solidify its presence in the Persian Gulf. However, 
eventually Iran was deprived of its territorial claim, and on August 15th, 1971 the ruling al-Khalifa family 
established the country’s independence. However, Bahrain’s relatively low tax base, and low levels of 




naval presence in Bahrain in an effort to maintain stability for other Gulf countries. Moreover, the Iranian 
Revolution served to limit international support for Iranian influence in Bahrain, and several influential 
political analysts writing during the height of the protest movements in mid-February cited the continued 
importance of the naval base that houses the U.S. Navy’s Fifth fleet as a means of monitoring both the 
Strait of Hormuz and Iranian nuclear proliferation (Miriam 2012, 116-121). 
In addition, in May 1981 the Bahraini government along with the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman banded together to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which 
made the relationship between the al-Khalifa family and their Sunni neighbors even stronger. US military 
aid to Bahrain also became more pronounced, and between 1981 and 1986 nearly 164 million US dollars 
was awarded to the al-Khalifa family in official aid contributions (Miriam 2012, 66). Furthermore, in 
1986, the long awaited Saudi funded highway connecting Saudi Arabia to Bahrain was completed, and at 
its onset the causeway experienced traffic volumes reaching peaks of nearly 10,000 vehicles per day. A 
push for an integrated GCC defense coalition also mounted amidst Kuwait’s invasion by Iraq in 1990, and 
the long-contentious territorial dispute regarding the Hawar Islands between Kuwait and Bahrain w s 
eventually settled in 1997.  
In short, the predominately Shi’a demonstrators were acting in the face of strong and vested 
external interests in the existing status quo. The continued hegemony of the Sunni minority and the al-
Khalifa family ensured that Iranian influence within the Gulf did not expand, allowed for the continued 
presence of the U.S. naval base on the island, and ensured stability within the GCC Finally, the fact that 
Bahrain, a country separated by a 15-mile highway from Saudi Arabia, maintained a similar governmental 
structure, and also contained a population that both represented some of the same demographic issues and 
interacted with Saudis frequently (Bahrain maintains many Western vices that are hard to find in Sau i 
Arabia), presented the additional problem that unrest in Bahrain could potentially cause domestic 
problems within the Kingdom as well. As such, the Saudi government also maintained a large vested 




(5.2.3) Nonviolent Resistance and the Bahraini Uprising  
In brief, by 2010, while minimal attempts at democratization and liberal reforms had been 
initiated, the increasing dependency of the al-Khalifa family on GCC participation, and the continued 
disenfranchisement of the Shi’a populations remained largely intact. Constitutional changes had been 
legislated in 2002, and in 2010 the third round of scheduled elections occurred on October 23rd. However, 
Shi’a activists remained concerned about gerrymandering of electoral districts, lack of opportunities to 
mobilize, and other structural inequalities that severely limited their ability to achieve electoral success. 
Further, following the 2010 elections a host of small-scale riots and protests were quickly dealt with by 
the regime, and hundreds of Shi’a demonstrators were arrested.  
Moreover, as the protests progressed, the Bahraini government unsuccessfully attempted to 
negotiate a compromise through existing political channels, which served to highlight the growing 
disconnect between youth-based populations on the ground and existing political groups. Eventually, 
protesters accused al-Wifaq nd its leader Ali Salman of being overly diffident towards the regime, not 
effectively standing up for the demonstrations, and such sentiments were only enhanced by the 
organization of counter-demonstrations by al-Wifaq in mid-February. In short, as the events in Tunisia 
and Egypt progressed, a youth-coalition emerged under the banner of the 14th of February Movement, 
which stood in opposition to the two major political coalitions already in existence. Specifically, one set 
of unlicensed organizations forming the Alliance for the Republic involving Haq, the Bahrain Freedom 
Movement (BFM), and the Islamic Loyalty Society (ILS) existed, as did a set of licensed organizations 
that made up the subsidiary societies associated with al-Wifaq.  
In terms of the actual protest movement, beginning on the 14th of February youth-based Shi’a 
organizes attempted to plan the Bahraini version of the “day of rage” protests that occurred elsewhere in 
the region. In response, security forces immediately targeted poorer Shi’a communities that formed the 
most politically active segment of the opposition, and intermittent clashes between protesters and s curity 
forces occurred in Shi’a neighborhoods across Manama including Karzakan, Newdriyat, and Diya village 




possessions became the central gathering point, serving a similar function as “noon-prayer” gatherings in 
other examples, for the protest movements.  
On the 16th, the existing institutionalized elements of Shi’a coalitions, al-Wifaq and al-Haq 
joined several leftist political groups to form a conditional alliance, which emphasized the importance of 
supporting the predominantly non-institutionalized youth protests underway. On the ground, the 16th was 
defined by a series of funeral processions, mourning the death of two protesters on the 14th, which 
marched on the Pearl Roundabout (Thousands of Protesters March 2011; Call for Better Job Prospects 
2011). However, early on the 17th, regime forces physically engaged with protesters for the first time. 
Essentially, in an attempt to clear the demonstrations that had set up encampments around the Pearl 
Roundabout the previous day, police forces used similar tactics as in previous examples: Rubber bullets, 
teargas, and water cannons. Within several hours, five protesters were reported to have been killed, and 
the violence continued throughout the 17th and 18th, with reports of at least 50 other people injured on the 
18th (Libya, Bahrain Protests: Live; Middle East Could, Protests; Miriam 2012, 119; Two Dead as 
Bahrain, Camp). On the 19th, encouraged by US officials, both King Hamad and the Crown-Prince 
Salman engaged in negotiations with opposition forces. These negotiations were largely unproductive, 
and labeled key opposition parties as tied to regime interests, significantly harming internal cohesion 
within the Shi’a opposition by engendering distrust between establishment parties, and the youth-
populations on the ground (Libya, Bahrain Protests: Live). Further, these negotiations were also limited 
by internal opposition within the al-Khalifa regime emanating from hardline conservatives maintaining 
the strong support of the Saudi government (Miriam 2012, 116; Lynch 2011, 135-141). 
Moving forward, protests around the Pearl Roundabout fluctuated in numbers throughout the rest 
of February and early March; however, they consistently remained a persistently disruptive force for 
regime stability, and did not radically change demographically. Since the beginning they had been 
younger, and typically politically unaffiliated Shi’ites. Shi’a based opposition could also be divided into 
two basic groups: The relatively peaceful demonstrations occurring around the Roundabout, and the 




and communities outside of Manama itself (Zacharia and Birnbaum 2011). The protests around the 
Roundabout were also more symbolic than actually disruptive; several reports indicate that protesters 
controlled entry points to the Roundabout, and routinely let civilian cars and Taxis in and out, only 
prohibiting the entrance of security forces. Moreover, the protests in the poorer Shi’a neighborhoods 
typically only escalated to violence as they were engaged by regime forces, and due in part to the 
sectarian conformity of these areas, also maintained little violence in relation to non-hegemonic forces.  
In response, the al-Khalifa regime initiated an international campaign to construct regime friendly 
narratives regarding the ongoing resistance, and also strategically planned and implemented a harsh 
campaign of repression. First, the regime accused al-Wifaq and Haq in particular, of having ties to the 
Iranian regime, thereby emphasizing the sectarian nature of protests. In particular, the relationship 
between al-Dawa’a clerics and those in Iraq and Iran were pointed at, as was the fact that many key 
figures within Shi’a political societies were educated in Qom. This specific messaging strategy, was also 
part of an ongoing GCC and Bahraini lobbying campaign to obtain the greenlight from the U.S. for GCC 
intervention. Second, the sectarian nature of the protests was both central to the regime’s attempts to 
mobilize Sunni opposition to the February 14th Movement, and actively constructed and enhanced by the 
regime’s strategy of repression. As in Syria, repression, was intentionally conducted by Sunni elements of 
the military apparatus, and the regime also actively imported important mercenary forces that typically 
maintained Salafist and anti-Shi’a ideational dispositions (al-Khawaja 2013; Lynch 2011, 135-141).  
Eventually, as protests in both the poorer Shi’a neighborhoods and around the Pearl Roundabout 
grew, regime panic manifested itself with the entrance of 2,000 armed GCC soldiers across the highway 
linking Saudi Arabia to Bahrain on March 15th, 2011 (Saudi Troops Arrive, Escalate; 6 Dead in Bahrain, 
Crackdown; Thousands of Saudi Troops, Violence). Importantly, on March 11th U.S. Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton altered the official position of the U.S. by issuing a statement indicating, “that Bahrain had 
the sovereign right to invite GCC forces into the country”; within four days the GCC and the al-Khalifa 
family exercised that sovereign right (Bradley 2012, 87). By the morning of the 19th, the Pearl 




emergency”, which placed the Shi’a dominated neighborhoods under curfew, rounded up political 
prisoners, and lead to the death of at least 16 people (6 Dead in Bahrain, Crackdown; Bahrain Protest 
Casualties, Rise; Bahrain Army Demolishes, Square).  
For all intents and purposes, the Bahraini revolution was over, and while occasional protests 
continued throughout April and May, the official stance of both the key Shi’a opposition groups and the 
February 14th movement devolved into calls for reform and better political representation instead of out-
and-out regime change. Further, in order to alleviate the political uncertainty facing the al-K alifa regime 
three important steps were taken. First, the Bahraini government actively encouraged the influx of Sunni
immigrants from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, and other Muslim countries, and also offered citizenship 
to existing pockets of Pakistani migrant workers within Bahrain in order to mitigate the demographic 
problems facing the regime. Second, the regime has combined largely hesitant attempts at engaging in 
negotiations with al-Wifaq and al-Haq, with the continued targeting of Shi’a populations. The 
independent report concerning the extent of regime repression has highlighted the staggering number ratio 
of Bahraini nationals now held as political prisoners (nearly one in eleven), the extent of government 
purges from public institutions, universities, and even hospitals, and the heightened police presence in 
Shi’a neighborhoods. Third, the regime has also engaged in processes of geographic manipulation. Since, 
March 15th the regime has been held responsible by independent reports for the systematic demolition of 
Shi’a Mosques, the construction of housing projects within Shi’a neighborhoods devoted to integrating 
the sectarian based communities, and has prevented Shi’a populations from engaging in any religious 
based festivals or communal gatherings.  
(5.2.4) Discussion 
   In all, the Bahraini case highlights three important limitations in relation to straegic nonviolent 
action. First, the agency of both organizers and the protest movement in general was severely limit d by 
the interplay between divisive social heterogeneity and staunch regime support from external forces. The 




maintains important ties to the U.S. played a huge role in preventing the success of the resistance tha  
emerged. Moreover, without this confluence of structural conditions, these protests would have almost 
certainly been successful. Almost 70 percent of the Bahraini national population demonstrated in some 
form or another, in most cases the sectarian identity of protests was not highly exclusive, and a pre-
existing infrastructure for civil resistance had been in place for decades.  
However, over time the regime both actively fomented sectarian conflict, and spent nearly 1.3 
million dollars to convince apathetic or anti-regime Sunni populations of the dangers associated with he
retributive and violent nature of the Shi’a protests (Protesters Bahrain Call, Freedom; How a Broken 
Social, Protests). Eventually, the possibility of enhanced Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf led to the 
GCC led invasion, and the declaration of a state of emergency by the al-Khalifa regime that placed 
thousands of opposition members in jail and destroyed the Pearl Roundabout. Moreover, significantly, 
unlike the Syrian case, the February 14th movement even maintained two external actors, the United 
States and Great Britain, with both the influential capability and democratic pressures that have f cilitated 
political ju-jitsu in other cases. In short, only half-hearted condemnations of regime repression emerged, 
and no financial or diplomatic pressure was exerted in the face of increasingly violent and oppressive 
regime activity. Nonviolent orientations failed to overcome the strategic considerations of important 
international actors, and this promoted the al-Khalifa regime’s resiliency and eventually forced invasion 
on its behalf.25  
Second, as in the other cases, the Bahraini protests highlight the importance of the routinizati n 
of large scale social agreements as opposed to the strategic organization of protests themselves. In 
Bahrain, the use of the funeral procession as an organizing strategy effectively doubled the demonstration 
size from the 14th of February to the 16th, and from then on protests became both geographically and 
temporally routinized. Primarily occurring around the Pearl Roundabout, with increasing numbers 
associated with the conclusion of noon-prayer. Limited demonstrations organized by the existing political 
organizations were ineffective for a host of reasons, namely al-Wifaq the largest group, only possesses a 




movement was important and continuous, the size and effectiveness, in terms of fomenting regime panic, 
remained highly dependent on the spread of social narratives throughout the period of resistance. 
However, throughout, Sunni neighborhoods and populations represented distinct barriers to the 
dissemination of protests, and eventually led to an important degree of pro-regime mobilizatin as well. 
Third, over time three important facets of the case, regime repression, escalations to violence, and 
the evolution of resistance messaging all served to promote the sectarian nature of the resistance and 
consequently limit its eventual effectiveness. Initially, protests emphasized their inclusive and cross-
sectarian nature, and only presented demands associated with enhanced representation in parliament and 
economic reform. However, as both the extent of regime repression and the civilian death-toll rose, the 
demonstrations became simultaneously emboldened and enraged by regime activity. Only then, did the 
evolution of demands for out-and-out regime change arise, which created problems for many Sunni based 
populations for two principle reasons. For one, as the violence within Shi’a dominated protests increased, 
a fact created by the systematic repression of these protests by security forces, many Sunni populations 
became wary of the retributive nature of Shi’a rule. For another, many largely middle-class and business 
orientated Sunni populations, saw the al-Khalifa regime as an important counter-weight to the growing
influence of Salafi and Wahhabist Islamists immigrating from abroad.      
In brief, taken collectively, the points made above highlight how many of the mechanisms 
outlined by strategic nonviolent action theory are ambiguously to the nonviolence of resistance. For one, 
the escalation of violence within demonstrations was in large part a product of regime activity. Often 
Sunni protests deemed entirely “artificial” by independent sources, being essentially bought and paid for, 
or incentivized through the provision of citizenship, by the regime, were organized specifically to engage 
with Shi’a demonstrations across Manama. For another, demonstrations had little control over anything 
but social media communication networks, and these were, for the most part at least, subject to closure 
and acute censorship by the regime itself. Fallacious connections between Iran and ongoing 
demonstrations were messages that became entrenched both domestically and internationally, and 




international news agencies. In short, the ability to both maintain nonviolent dispositions, as well as 
garner the types of international support nonviolent theory highlights as being crucial factors for success, 
were systematically mitigated by the important structural conditions, and were not highly linked to the 
nonviolence within resistance.26 
(5.3) Summary 
In short, the Syrian and Bahraini cases highlight two central weaknesses within literature on 
nonviolent action. For one, both cases highlight the extent to which the agency of individuals and groups 
engaging in nonviolent resistance is contingent on important structural and historical factors. In each case, 
the nature of ethnic and sectarian identities, the strategic relationship each contested regim  maintained 
with important regional powers, as well as the minority status of each regime posed significant, perhaps 
insurmountable, obstacles for resistance.  For another, these factors also directly impacted many of the 
mechanisms nonviolent theory has highlighted that make nonviolent resistance effective. The nature of 
each regime’s diplomatic relationships meant that resistance was largely unable to effectively create 
international pressure. In Bahrain, the external actors’ likely to be impacted by effective messaging also 
maintained important attachments to the regime, and in Syria, the central pillars of regime support were 
highly unlikely to be influenced by such messaging (nondemocratic regimes). Further, political ju-jitsu 
and military defection were limited by both the non-institutionalized nature of each regime’s coercive 
apparatus, and the minority status of each regime. Finally, the conditions also placed limits on both the 
mobilization potential each movement possessed, and made resistance vulnerable to longer term 
dilemmas associated with regime activity. In each case, the regime actively fomented sectarian conflict, 
and created problems in terms of each movement’s ability to retain full control over its political 
messaging. 
Second, each case also highlights the importance of the interactive effects of strategies of viol nt 
and nonviolent resistance, and, in particular, the important benefits strategic violence may provide in 




Dara’a and Homs were likely to be subject to heavy repression leading to massive amounts of casualties, 
and placed movements vulnerable to violence stemming from multiple nodes. Assad’s Muhkbarakat, as 
well as other regime affiliated Shi’a populations, infiltrated and targeted opposition protests, and many 
other minority populations violently opposed opposition demonstrations as a result of their historically 
safe position under the confessionalism of the Assad regime. Finally, in Syria the transition to militarized 
resistance avowed for the more influential, and significantly symmetric, in terms of coercive capabilities, 
insertion of international assistance. Prior, the sanctions and asset withholding that the West ad placed 
on Assad had little to no effect primarily because of the regime’s continued support from other allies, and 
such sanctions had also been in place for the better part of two decades anyways. The militarization of 
resistance allowed for arms and strategic assistance, that could potentially keep up with the similar 
assistance the regime was receiving from Russia and other Shi’a dominated regimes. In short, without 
militarization the extent of international support for the opposition would have been essentially xh usted. 
Finally, as in the Egyptian case, both the Bahraini and Syrian cases highlight the importance of 
the modularity and inspiration of the Tunisian case. The use of social narratives roughly mimicked the use 
of noon-prayer in the Tunisian case, and the successful North African examples also likely itself bolstered 
the mobilization potential associated with each set of protests. In short, in both cases the expansion of 
mobilization was in large part spontaneously caused by the previous examples, and thus civil resistance in 
these cases was highly dependent on the window of opportunity generated by what essentially amounted 
to a wave of resistance.  
 
Endnote  
18 Effectively describing the extent of built up animosity between Sunni’s, Alawis, Kurds, and the 
various Christian minorities is important but beyond the scope of this project. Wieland (2012, chap. 5), 
Lesch (2013, chap 3), Stacher (2012, chaps. 2, 3, 4), and Ajami (2012, chaps. 2, 3, 4) all provide crucial 
insight. Heydarian (2014, chaps 3, 4) also provides a crucial account of how neoliberalism, and increasing 
economic globalization significantly impacted the patronage networks that were crucial to stability in 
Syrian politics, as well as across the Arab World. 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
19 For a more detailed synthesis of Alawi history Ajami (2012, chap. 2) presents a compelling 
narrative as does Kramer (1987, 237-254). More than anything, their traditional disenfranchisement as a 
result of their break from Islamic Orthodoxy and eventual adoption of Twelver Shi’ite praxis, as well as 
their geographic isolation inserted the Alawi’s as a potential ally to the French as the ruled with a divide 
and conquer mindset. Alawi hatred of Sunni Muslims was a product of generations under a clear 
subordinate status, and eventually as Sunni nationalists deprived the Alawis’ of an independent state they 
used their privileged status under French colonialism to gain access to key positions within the military 
apparatus.    
20 To be sure, reality is more complex than the cursory analysis presented here. The Bush 
administration had dropped most of the sanction regime as Assad helped target Sunni rebels in Western 
Iraq, and the relationship with both Iran and Russia was not always perfect. However, at most the Syrian 
economy was relieved from sanctions for 6 years, and the sanction regime had been internalized within 
the Syrian economy—effecting how people held money and invested for example—and made the Syrian 
regime increasingly dependent on their non-Western allies. 
21 It is important to note that plenty of sources point to the continued resistance in Dera’a being 
intricately linked with the mobilization of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. While this likely plays a role 
in explaining the events of Dera’a, there is little evidence that the MB leadership was highly involved, at 
least in these early stages, and that also represents a narrative that would benefit the Syrian government.  
22 For the purposes of this paper I will largely be focusing on the Bahraini-national population, as 
that represents the elements of the population that are politically active. This only represents around 
586,000 people, while the total population, comprised mostly of foreign migrant workers, is more than 
double this, making up an additional 690,000 people. 
23 It is important to note that while the majority of the Shi’a population is Baharna and indigenous 
to Bahrain, they are still “Twelvers”, and therefore the distinction is largely based on ancestral history. In 
general, Ajami Shi’as are wealthier than Baharna Shi’as, and many even speak Farsi and have familial 
ties to Iran. See for example Pandya (2012, 66-97) for a more in depth discussion of the difference 
between these two populations, and the specific implications it has on Bahraini society.   
24 For a more detailed discussion see Miriam (2013) pages 81-105, or Mathiesen (2013) chapters 
2 and 3. The “Shi’a problem” has been a continuous thorn in the side of the al-Khalifa family that was 
problematically influenced by the Iranian Revolution in 1979.   
25 For a more detailed account of the diplomatic history of mid-February to late March 2011 see 
for example Bradley (2012, 95-133) or Lynch (2011, 131-159). Riyadh played an integral role in limiting 
the spread of unrest to Constitutional Monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan, and many have cited the 
Saudi invasion on the 14th as the nail in the coffin of the optimism tied to the Arab Spring. 
26 For example, al-Khawaja (2013) highlights how relatively small examples of episodic violence 
were quickly picked up and exacerbated by both regional and local media outlets, and Lynch (2011, 135-
141) and Miriam (2012, 115-127) both highlight how the Bahraini government utilized Public Relations 
firms in the United States, placed op-eds in many influential newspapers, and benefitted from the state-
owned management of al-Jazeera in particular. Finally, al-Rawi (2015) shows how the sectarian nature of 
protests eventually created animosity between the Bahraini protests, and other concomitant Arab 





Chapter Six- Yemen and Libya: Fragile states, Tribalism, and Necessary Violence 
 
 
To begin, both Libya and Yemen represent cases where the implementation of sustained 
nonviolent resistance is, for all intents and purposes, practicably untenable. For one, both contain 
populations that are heavily armed, and whose political environment is defined by shifting tribal 
allegiances shaped by intermittent clashes and conflict. For another, both also contain large swaths of land 
largely outside the control of the state, and lack a definitive and entrenched national identity for divergent 
groups to coalesce around. Lastly, both represent examples extremely vulnerable to external interventio . 
Yemen maintains a contiguous border with Saudi Arabia, and has recently become a safe-haven from 
which radical Islamists can operate from. In Libya, the Qaddafi regime represented one of the most 
isolated countries in the world in terms of diplomatic relationships, having funded and abetted Left-
leaning terrorists across the globe throughout the 1970’s and 80’s. However, Libya also sits on one of the 
world’s largest oil reserves, and this will be a persistent point of contention moving forward. 
More specifically, both cases highlight three sets of weaknesses associated with nonviolent 
theory. First, in cases like Libya and Yemen, the implementation in locales separated from the loci of civil 
resistance in Benghazi, and in Yemen, the influx of tribesman at times provided a coercive advantage, 
which helped the demonstrations take and hold ground. Second, both cases highlight the complexity 
associated with the intricate relationship between the agency of opposition movements, and the impacs 
that deep rooted structural and historical factors, largely beyond the control of the movement itself, have 
on determining the outcome of resistance.  For one, especially in regards to Libya, these cases highlight, 
as in the Syrian case, how international support can serve to both cause and necessitate the abject 
militarization of resistance, and that nonviolent resistance may not necessarily be an effective strategy to 
achieve international support in many cases. For another, in both cases, the complex historical 
relationships between divergent segments of the populations, limited how effectively the protests could 
disseminate and in some instances were a direct cause of transitions to violence within resistance.  




which many strategies of nonviolent resistance may depend. Put bluntly, the way each set of 
demonstrations expanded, and the way events unfolded both depended heavily on the example set in the 
Tunisian case. In both cases, the Tunisian model bolstered mobilization to a point that pushed both Saleh 
and Qaddafi to the brink of resignation.  
(6.1) Case Five: Yemen 
To begin, the current political environment in Yemen is perhaps the most difficult to explain, 
predict, and understand of any of the cases thus far presented. At the moment, GCC and NATO based 
aerial and drone support is occurring in sections concomitantly with three geographically differentiat d 
separatist movements. In the West, the al-Q ’eda affiliated al-Qa’eda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), 
have emerged as the central power broker in the long volatile Hawdhramat, and in the North the Houthi 
rebellion movement has taken over the traditional bases of power occupied by the former Zaydi Imamate. 
In the South, moderate socialists aligned with the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), a series of more extremist 
socialist movements, and fragments of AQAP all have an interest in the reimplementation of the political 
demarcation that preceded unification in 1990. As such, fragments of support for Saleh’s Republican 
government remain in the major urban centers of Sana’a and Ta’iz, but are rapidly losing ground and 
popular support.   
In terms of the Arab Spring, the Yemeni case tends to reaffirm many of the conclusions drawn 
from the previous case studies. First, the Yemeni context highlights the lack of permanency and 
effectiveness that nonviolent resistance maintains in certain situations. Second, the existence of 
geographically, historically, and culturally determined ethnic, political, and sectarian divdes significantly 
limited the spread and permanence of nonviolent resistance. Third, the geographic proximity of Yemen to 
the rest of the Persian Gulf, its large Shi’a population, and the fundamentalist nature of both AQAP and 
the Houthi Rebellion introduced a host of problems associated with the maintenance and execution of 
nonviolent resistance in relation to international influences. In particular, as in Syria, the internal cohesion 




and social heterogeneity, the strong interest of international influences promoted the continued presence 
of Saleh even as he stepped down from the presidency, and the insurmountable levels of instability placed 
severe limitations on the logical desirability of nonviolent resistance. Finally, even though the objective of 
resistance was achieved, it had little if anything to do with the extent of nonviolent resistance on its own, 
and regime change was highly facilitated by the existence of radical flanks, both in relation to the violent 
separatist movements and the infusion of tribal influences over the primarily student-bas d resistance 
movement.  
(6.1.1) The Complexity of Structural and Historical Conditions in Yemen  
As a starting point, two divergent historical processes set the stage for one of the most important 
and persistent political divisions within Yemeni society. First, following the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1918, Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid al-Din was named as the successor to the Zaydi 
Imamate, and gradually succeeded in establishing relatively stable control over the majority of the 
Northeastern part of modern day Yemen. However, stability in Yemeni politics is inherently relative, and 
throughout the remainder of his reign Imam Yahya fought numerous conflicts with clans previously 
aligned with the Ottomans in the South, as well as with several Zaydi tribes, whom contested Yahya’s 
claim to the Imamate. 27   
Second, in the South, the port of Aden, founded by the British East India Company as a coaling 
station for British fleets, became increasingly important throughout this same time perod. Gradually, 
British influence also expanded inwards, mostly because Aden itself had no water and insufficient arabl  
land to support the population required for the functioning of the port city. However, once in place, the 
British used their traditional Indian style of colonization, and granted varying degrees of lgitimacy to 
respected notables as a means of maintaining a relatively stable influence. Throughout the 1930’s British 
control over the areas further North of the Aden hinterland was also beginning to expand, mainly as a 
direct means of limiting Imam Yahya’s power base to the North. In short, by 1950 Aden was the second 




eventually lead to the development of a relatively prosperous civil-society (Carapico 1998, chap. 3). 
However, British de-facto influence over the fringe territories in the protectorate remained largely non-
existent, and tribal conflicts, jihads, and bandits were routine problems throughout these regions, 
especially in the Wadi Hawdhramat and the Eastern Aden Protectorate.28 
Moving forward, in confluence with the continued British presence in the South, two competing 
sources of regional influences emanating from both Egypt and Saudi Arabia emerged in the second half of 
the 20th century. Essentially, the next 20 years would see both upper and lower Yemen transition from 
conflict largely between colonial interests, to a source of conflict between regional interests, specifically 
between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In the North, following the death of the successor to Imam Yahya, his 
son Ahmed bin Yahya, in 1952, a relatively inexperienced a tribal affiliate of Ahmed, Muhammad al-
Badr, formally took over the Imamate, but was quickly deposed in 1964 by junior army officers 
maintaining a strong degree of Egyptian influence led by Abd al-Rahman al- Baydani and Abdullah al-
Sallel. However, these men were highly inexperienced and not established figures in Yemeni politics, and 
consequently knew little about handling the complexities of tribal relationships, and ushered in a strong
Egyptian presence—by 1965 nearly 15,000 Egyptian soldiers were supporting the new Republic in 
Northern Yemen, and that number would eventually swell to 70,000 (Ferris 2013, 45-63). Within months 
the Saudi’s decided that an Egyptian revolution on their Southern border was unacceptable, and began to 
fund royalist opposition to the Egyptian backed government. Throughout the 1960’s Saudi support 
capitalized upon transient tribal affiliations, and as a result shifting allegiances in the countryside 
remained a continuous burden on Egyptian control.   
 In the South, fighting in Radfan began in 1963, and as resistance progressed was driven by two 
important forces. In the countryside, opposition largely resembled its counterparts in the North, with 
Egyptian subversion replacing the role that Saudi Royalists were playing in the North. Secondly, in the 
urban centers, most prominently in Aden, resistance maintained important economic overtones. The 
National Liberation Front (NLF) possessing strong Egyptian support, the Front for the Liberation of 




entity important for control of Aden, emerged as the primary factions opposing British rule.29 As such, 
throughout the 1960’s a prolonged period of violence and instability occurred, which would outlast the 
presence of the British in lower Yemen.  
Eventually, British withdrawal from the South was finalized in November 1967, and the British 
exit postdated the Egyptian withdrawal from the North, hampered by the outbreak of war with Israel, by 
roughly five months. Hence, in both regions the withdrawal of foreign influence created important 
political opportunities, as well as the potentiality of domination by forces in either region pushing for 
unification. However, in both areas the factionalization of existing actors combined with historically 
ephemeral tribal relationships created widespread instability. Typically, the Royalists, l rgely financed by 
Saudi Arabia, were of Zaydi descent, while the Republicans, whom became fragmented between the 
Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), NLF, and the FLSOY, were of Shafi’i descent, and therefore 
typically coming from a less privileged background than their Zaydi counterparts (Brehoney 2011, 20-
49). However, drawing the conflicts along sectarian or ethnic lines understates the fluidity of Yemeni 
society, as well as the role that historical and geographical conditions played in determining tribal 
allegiances. Further, while the country remained divided along the Ottoman-British treaty of 1905, the 
border between the two regions was increasingly functioning as more of a grey zone, which tended to 
shift allegiances rather arbitrarily based on existing conditions.30  
In other words, gradually, in both the North and South some strand of the Arab Nationalism 
engendered by Egyptian influence emerged; however, the South gradually adopted a far more extreme 
socialist agenda. Further, the greater relative significance of Aden to the rest of the South, compared to 
Sana’a’s importance vis-a-vis urban centers such as Ta’izz, allowed for a more centralized party 
apparatus that successfully entrenched control over lower Yemen. In the North, while Ali Abdullah Saleh 
remained powerful in Sana’a following his appointment in 1978, he faced persistent rebellion from the 
National Democratic Front (NDF), a Southern backed opposition movement, as well as Saudi funded 
royalist opposition from the Northern town of Sadah (Dresch 2000, chap. 5). Such opposition was based 




been effectively targeted and largely disbanded under Egyptian control. However, economically and 
socially the two regimes remained similar. Both were entirely dependent on remittances and foreig  
assistance for state functionality, and maintained problematic tensions between the tribal politics of rural 
areas and the ideological politics of the urban centers. In addition, by unification, achieved in 1990, both 
had amassed huge amounts of external debts, primarily consisted of subsistence agriculture with 
problematic Qat commercial production that severely drained scarce water aquifers, and generated 
inequalities that exacerbated tribal and regional disputes. 
Essentially, at the time of unification in 1990, Yemen was defined by a power-sharing 
compromise struck by Saleh’s General Popular Council (GPC) formed in 1982 and the Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP), which was the governing political power in the South. In 1990 the GPC won elections 
making Saleh president of a unified Yemen, with Ali Salim al-Baydh, the YSP candidate becoming vice-
president, and the two cabinets merging with an equal number of seats held by both sides. However, by 
1993 due to rigged electoral procedures implemented by Saleh, as well as the electoral rise of Islah, for all 
intents and purposes the MB affiliate in Yemen, the compromise of the transition period radically 
changed as the GPC won a vast majority of the seats in parliament (Brehony 2011, chap. 12). Almost 
immediately, hostilities engendered violent demonstrations and resistance, as the YSP began to rethink is
decision regarding unification. These hostilities culminated in a war of succession in 1994, which 
eventually saw forces loyal to Saleh prevail and consolidate control over the newly formed Republic of 
Yemen. 
Subsequently, Saleh’s power exhibited many of the traditional trappings of long-term Arab 
dictators: Enhancing tribal allegiances through cronyism, patronage networks, and divide-and-rule 
strategies when suitable, creating a tribally rooted police apparatus loyal to his authority, and actively 
inhibiting opposition mobilization in formal politics. Saleh also continuously ingratiated himself with 
Yemen’s military apparatus, and was able to effectively use them as demonstrations broke out in 2007, 
and at least initially in 2011. Following 1994, Saleh would align himself politically with Islah, which in 




throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s continued Southern antagonism was mixed with the dispersion of Salafi 
Islamist groups opposed to both his leadership as well as the moderate tendencies of Islah. In addition, in 
the mid-2000’s the former bases of Saudi Royalist support underwent what Fatah (2014) labels a type of 
Zaydi revivalism (221), and increasingly the Houthis operating out of the Northern town of Sadah became
a source of contention for the GPC.   
Further, beginning in 2002 a significant grouping of opposition parties developed a coalition, 
including both the former YSP and Islah, which formed the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), and in 2006 
generated increasing popular opposition to the Saleh regime. Saleh would continue his sustained electoral 
success, but with a decreased popular mandate, limiting his maneuverability, and increasingly in the face 
of extreme non-electoral political issues: The Houthi Rebellion, AQAP existing primarily in the 
Hadhrwahmat, Southern unrest in 2007, and violent clashes with the Southern Mobilization Movement 
(SMM) or Hiraak beginning in 2008. 
In short, the political context of the Yemeni uprising in 2011 was perhaps even more unstable 
than during the 1994 conflict with the Southern secessionists. Southern secession had not been entirely 
ruled out of the question, and the extent of Saleh’s territorial monopoly on the use of coercive force was 
diminishing. Further, following 2001 Yemen eventually emerged as an important cog within the War on 
Terror, and therefore saw both enhanced armament and diplomatic support from both the United States 
and Saudi Arabia. Outside of Ta’iz, Sana’a, and Aden (and in many cases even within those urban 
centers) authority was often delegated to tribal confederations, and there remained a persistent disconnect 
between the rural populations and urban elite, a fact that has not changed very much over time. In all, the
Yemeni political context represents a highly complicated one for the implementation of nonviolent actio , 
which is compounded by the fact that per capita, Yemen is the second most heavily armed country in the 




(6.1.2) Nonviolent Resistance and the Yemeni Revolution   
To begin, in January 2011 popular opposition emerged in much the same vein as it did in Egypt 
and Tunisia, and was typically immediately repressed with asymmetric violence. In short, Saleh’s reaction 
to protests triggered a succession of tribal based military defections, most importantly by Ali Muhsin al-
Ahmar. Moreover, the succession of events was seen as highly problematic by the Saudi regime, and the 
GCC quickly attempted to assert themselves as arbiters of a national dialogue, which would see a gradual 
transition from the presidency of Saleh. The Saudi lead negotiations also attempted to revert back to the 
terms of the original power sharing agreement struck in 1990, a process that created animosity within 
both the SMM and the Houthi rebels as the interests of both groups were largely ignored.  
Put differently, two aspects of the Yemeni demonstrations warrant clarification. First, the protests 
in Yemen were always organized by the JMP opposition coalition, and therefore represented attempts by 
opposition actors to capitalize on the political opportunity that the unfolding events in Egypt and Tunisia
represented rather than spontaneous protest movements. In particular, on January 27th and February 3rd the 
two main parties within the JMP, Islah and the YSP, organized a “day of rage” protest throughout the 
country. Given the constituent elements of those groups, this primarily entailed the emergence of protests 
in Aden and Ta’iz; however, significant protests also occurred in many other parts of the country. Second, 
these protests occurred on top of the three simultaneous separatist challenges facing the country, and we e 
not necessarily absorbed by these movements altogether. Hence, the protest movements represented 
separate challenges to Saleh’s legitimacy emanating primarily from Saleh’s key sources of support; or, 
basically represented intra-governmental political challenges that stood alongside the presence of 
significant and protracted non-governmental challenges. 
As such, throughout February, March, and April the central rifts between the Saleh regime and 
the protest movements occurred along two distinct fault-lines. First, the YSP and other Southern political 
organizations sought to challenge unification along the traditional North-South demarcation. Second, 
within the Northern constituency of the GPC there existed a competing set of tribally based allegiances. 




patronage networks, and as the protests unfolded this created a complex array of competing interests. 
Specific tribes aligned with Saleh due to the political and economic benefits they had traditionally derived 
from Saleh’s presidency, and other tribes quickly sided with the protest movements, engendering a 
constant barrage of defections from the regime.   
In particular, the influx of tribesmen that occurred in late February had significant implications 
for the maintenance of nonviolent strategies within resistance. For one, loyalist tribesmen could be used 
as non-regime affiliated sources of coercion, as Saleh’s security apparatus could allow armed tribesmen to 
enter protests and clash with protesters as a means of limiting the consequence of repression. For an ther, 
tribesmen also entered on the side of the protests, and in some areas outside of Ta’iz this actually shifted 
the coercive balance towards the demonstrators. Hence, protesters themselves could initiate violence, 
make territorial gains, and occupy strategic locations. 
Moreover, the durability of the protest movements eventually led to significant defections within 
the Saleh regime, and forced GCC intervention in terms of attempting to negotiate some kind of power 
sharing agreement between Saleh and the JMP. On February 20th t ibal representatives came 
from Arhab, Nahm, Anis (in Dhamar), Shabwah (near the Southwestern Hadhramat) and Abyan to 
support the peaceful protests, mostly in reaction to the influx of tribal loyalists from Sana’a, Ta’iz, Sadah, 
and Aden. Further, on February 28th, Sheikh Hussein bin Abdullah al-Ahmar, the head of the Hashid 
tribal confederation, the largest tribal organization in Yemen, and the head of the Baqil confederation, the 
second largest, both joined the demonstrations calling for the ouster of Saleh (Major Yemen Tribes, 
Protesters; Yemen: Islamist Party, Power; Yemen Opposition Spurns, Force). As a case in point, on 
March 14th, the city of al-Jawf, was even “liberated” from Saleh control, when tribesmen within 
demonstrators cornered and stabbed the provincial governor of Maarib province, Naji Zayedi, as well as 
four of his body guards (Yemen Deports Foreign Journalists). 
In addition, on March 1st Yassin Ahmad Saleh Qadish the president of the SMM officially 
asserted that if Saleh was removed, the Southern opposition would force a referendum for secession 




the popular opinion within the Southern based demonstrations was leaning towards separation, regardless 
of what happened to Saleh. Further, also on March 1st the head of the Council of Islamic Clerics and 
Yemen's MB, Abdul-Majid al-Zindani, officially joined demonstrators in Sana’a, which in combination 
with Islah meant that all of the Sunni political organizations had joined the protests in opposition to Saleh 
(Finn 2011; Kasinof 2011). Finally, on March 8th there was even evidence of military personnel 
defections in both Sana’a and Ta’iz, as around 150 military officers joined demonstration encampments in 
both cities (Hendawi and al-Haj 2011; Rival Tanks Deploy, Capital). 
From that point, in terms of outcomes, Saleh rejected GCC negotiated proposals on March 4th, 
April 30th, and May 23rd, each time following the release of official announcements indicating he was 
amenable to signing the agreements. On June 6th, Saleh was evacuated to Saudi Arabia for medical 
treatment, appointing vice president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi as interim president. Most felt that Saudi 
Arabia would prohibit Saleh’s return, but the Saudi’s eventually failed to do so on September 23rd. These 
repetitive maneuvers by Saleh and loyalist aspects of the GPC eventually forced the militarization of 
opposition, largely led by General al-Ahmar who was in charge of the Hashim Tribal Confederation 
(Saleh’s own tribe in fact). Eventually, Saleh was forced to leave for Oman, the United States, and 
Eritrea, and finally on February 23rd, 2012 former vice president Hadi was elected president; however, 
this has neither effectively ended the Saleh family’s influential presence in Yemen nor separated it from 
the ability to exercise power within the security apparatus. Concomitantly, both the Houthi rebellion, the 
insurgent activities of AQAP, and the separatist fervor within the SMM and other Southern oppositin 
movements grew in intensity. Essentially, each supported the protests throughout, but more so because of 
the political opportunities the protests represented than anything else.  
(6.1.3) Discussion 
As a starting point, in terms of strategic nonviolent action, the Yemeni case offers three cent al 
findings. First, given the extent of and complexity within Yemeni social heterogeneity—maintaining 




which nonviolent strategies could be maintained over time was severely limited. By mid-February as 
tribesmen entered on behalf of the JMP organized demonstrations, violence increased in relation to both 
hegemonic and non-hegemonic forces. Tribally led protests were far more likely to engage, even initiate, 
in clashes with the security apparatus, and were also more prone to target non-security based segments of 
the population—whether that implied tribal loyalists, Houthi demonstrators, or Salafis. Further, non-
militarized protests in both the South (Aden) and North (Sadah), transitioned to military driven strategies 
by mid-March, and the Hashim Tribal Confederation essentially became a militarized operation in late 
May as Saleh reneged on signing the GCC brokered deal for the third time. 
Second, given the fact that by the second time the GCC brokered negotiations were officially 
close to succeeding Saleh maintained almost no bases of support outside of his family and several well-
connected members within the GPC, the extent to which external forces supported the regime is 
important. To reiterate, by his second refusal, on April 30th, roughly two thirds of the former members of 
the GPC had defected, as had the two largest tribal coalitions (including Saleh’s own tribe), virtually all 
Sunni political organizations, and every Southern affiliate. Further, such defections do not even highlight 
the fact that roughly half of the country existed under the control of a non-government associated 
separatist leaning organization. However, Saleh managed to remain in power officially for over a year 
following the onset of protests, and change when it did occur did not significantly alter the existing 
political infrastructure that Saleh had built.  
More than anything, the failure of protests to instigate political change was largely due to the 
warranted concern both the GCC and the U.S. had in a political transition. According to most accounts of 
the JMP opposition, the external brokers forced significant concessions on the side of the JMP, and left 
the extent to which Saleh’s family would remain in power, as well as the time frame open to 
interpretation. Further, most opposition members felt that Saleh’s trip to Saudi Arabia in June would give 
the Saudi’s the opportunity to force Saleh’s hand, but this failed to occur. In particular, both the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia remained concerned regarding both the growth of the AQAP in Southwestern Yemen, as 




questionable assertion at the very least given the huge differences between Persian and Zaydi Shi’ites. 
Hence, these factors made all involved uncomfortable with a political transition, amenable to Saleh’s 
continued repression, and the move to Hadi occurred only as the situation became more and more 
inevitable. 
Finally, the Yemeni case shows that, at the very least, organized non-militarized protests that 
utilize violent defensive techniques and counter regime forces when possible, may be a better option in 
certain cases than complete deference to nonviolent strategies. Saleh, civilian loyalists, and the securi y 
apparatus all had the political motivation and willingness to repress on a similar scale as occurred in the 
Libyan, Syrian, and Bahraini cases. However, the insertion of violent tactics, largely aligned with the 
influx of tribesmen associated with the demonstrations, served to protect protesters, place pressure on the 
regime, engender enhanced resiliency so as to allow for the gradual insertion of external forces, and to 
increase the degree to which the regime was amenable to negotiation. The influx of both the Baqil and 
Hashim Tribal Confederations, also facilitated the JMP’s attempts at capitalizing on the political 
opportunities the protests created, and also led to increases in popular participation. The increas  i  
demonstration size was in part due to the Tribal Confederation’s ability to force member participation, but 
was also due to the enhanced security many non-affiliated individuals and students felt that the tribal 
presence guaranteed. 
(6.2) Case 6: Libya  
As a point of departure, the Libyan example presents four significant implications for strategic 
nonviolent action theory. First, the Libyan case highlights how international support for resistance is not 
clearly linked to the use of nonviolent strategies, and international support itself may even be a cause for 
transitions to violence. Put differently, the agency of resistance movements and organizers may be 
severely limited by external actors, and previously developed strategic interests and relationships in 
particular. Second, Libya also highlights how historical context can pose significant limitations for both 




transitions to violence. In particular, Libya maintains a highly heterogeneous population divided primarily 
along tribal lines, clear regional differences fostered by both historical and geographic conditions, as well 
as a poorly established national identity. Third, as Bellin (2012) and Nepstad (2013) have shown, the 
specific patrimonial and kin-based structure of the Libyan military presented significant implications for 
both the viability and desirability of persistent nonviolent resistance. Fourth, Libya is another prime 
example of the significance of the interplay and feedback between forms of violent and nonviolent 
contention. To be sure, the Libyan case was never highly nonviolent; however, many forms of resistance 
implemented in Benghazi and Tripoli maintained enhanced significance due to the effectiveness of the 
rebel insurgency in other parts of the country. 
(6.2.1) The Complexity of Structural and Historical Conditions in Libya 
As a starting point, the first two post-independence Libyan regimes—those of Sayyid Idris and 
Moammar Qaddafi—were significantly impacted by previous historical and geographic conditions. First, 
prior to World War II, large segments of the Arab and Bedouin populations in central and Northeastern 
Libya endured a brutal period of Italian colonization. In 1912, the Ottomans recognized Italian 
sovereignty over the territory of Tripolitania, and following World War One, the Italians also officially 
consolidated control over the neighboring former Ottoman territory of Cyrenaica through a remarkably 
bloody military campaign. However, Italian control over Cyrenaica was much more contentious than it 
ever was in the West, and for the remainder of Italian colonialism Tripolitania remained a base of control 
from which the Italians persistently attempted to quell Eastern resistance.31 
More Specifically, during the19th century, al-Sayyid Muhammad Ali al-Senussi had effectively 
united largely disparate tribal groups along the Norther half of the Eastern border with Egypt, building 
consensus through an emphasis on Arab self-rule and the unifying potential of the Islamic proof-texts—
somewhat similar to contemporaneous strands of Islamic Modernism in Egypt and Tunisia. Gradually, the 
quasi-religious order that al-Senusssi established adopted many tribal attributes and institutions, and 




Senussi political bloc would evolve towards a decentralized form of government managed by local 
hierarchical authority structures, and for the most part effectively incorporated and governed a highly
diverse array of identities and familial and tribal differences. The Senussis’ would also migrate further 
South, making the central city of Kufra its base operations beginning in 1895, expanding their degree of 
influence until more successful Italian opposition could be mounted (Lobben and Dalton 2014, 34-40).    
Moreover, Italian colonization essentially prevented the formation of political structures as well 
as the development of a class of literate and educated elites to ensure effective management of post-war 
Libya. The Italians also had actively fomented internecine conflict in a bid to maintain their dominance 
across both regions, essentially taking advantage of the fluidity of Bedouin tribal relationships. In 
Cyrenaica, the grandson of al-Senussi, Sayyid Idris, whom had continuously throughout the 1930’s and 
40’s organized indigenous resistance in exile in Egypt, and as World War II progressed eventually 
convinced the British to play an active role in facilitating the establishment of Senussi independence. In 
short, by1945, British rule had emerged in Tripolitania in the Northwest, and was both combined with and 
hugely dependent on the influence and power Sayyid Idris exerted as Amir in Cyrenaica.   
In addition, post War Libya was in shambles, and had been adversely effected by the war itself. 
The major ports of Benghazi, Tobruk, and Tripoli were severely damaged, and commercial activity in the 
urban centers was at a complete standstill. Further, since Italian nationals had a virtual monopoly over the 
agrarian economy, a major economic restructuring was in order, even with roughly 40,000 Italian 
nationals remaining in Libya. On the other hand, for the Bedouin populations and the Senussis in the East, 
the end of war largely meant a return to pre-Italian life. In general, as the integration of the two regions 
began to progress, political and economic life was beginning to be increasingly determined by the 
growing reluctance of a burgeoning urban bourgeoisie in Tripoli to accept Senussi political domination, 
coupled with a growing geographically based class conflict which pitted rural farmers and nomadic 
populations against the political interests of the urban centers (Oakes 2011, chap. 7; Lobben and Dalton 




Eventually, in 1949, an international compromise was enacted, which promised Libyan 
independence in 1952 after a brief period of UN trusteeship, intended to prepare the country for self-
governance. Throughout the trusteeship, a political struggle over the form of post-independence 
government ensued, which in 1952 lead to the establishment of a federal system with high degrees of 
local autonomy and a monarchically organized, relatively weak central government which elevated Idris 
to national power. However, the first four years of independence were largely defined by Libyan 
dependence on foreign aid—by 1953 in total 26 million had been awarded by the United States and 
Britain, a figure that represented a little more than half of all national income (Oakes 2011, 64-66). Thus, 
until 1956 the economic solvency of a Libyan state was highly problematic, a situation which was only 
alleviated after Idris’ decision to allow foreign capital to explore the possibility of exploiting Libya’s 
latent oil reserves. Yet, the expansion of oil production during the 1960’s was significant, and led to 
radical changes to the feasibility of an integrated Libyan state. By 1968 production had reached 1.7 
million barrels per day, a level that was on par with the other major oil exporters—Iran produced 2.8 
million and Saudi Arabia produced 3.4 million (Oakes 2011, 74). 
Moreover, while oil caused a dramatic increase in government revenue and significantly padded 
royal coffers, it also engendered important social ramifications. Urban migration ramped up, and by 1970 
Tripoli’s population was increasing at a rate of 5,000 people per year. Dramatic changes to labor demand 
forced the creation of a more technically literate populace, and continued exploration in the Libyan 
interior forced previously isolated nomadic populations to become further integrated into Libyan society. 
Such transformations were also accompanied by the surge of Arab Nationalism that had swept the Arab 
world since the rise of Nasser in Egypt, and increasingly Idris’ government was becoming isolated and 
out of touch with the political zeitgeist of the day. In brief, one of the most important consequences of the 
influx of petroleum rents was the changing demographics, and the dramatic increase in economic 
importance of the previously sparsely populated interior regions.  
Hence, on September 1st, 1969, a young 27 years old officer named Moammar Qaddafi was 




Libyan version of the Free Officers Movement in Egypt. Significantly, Qaddafi was from the interior, had 
been educated as Libyan oil wealth dramatically expanded, and as such was indicative of the fact that the 
RCC was part of a set of processes which saw the tribally dominant interior become opposed to the urban 
elite and the Senussi political hegemony. The stated goals of both the RCC and Qaddafi included freedom 
from external manipulation, the expansion of social justice and the establishment of Arab unity, and 
therefore the movement heavily drew ideologically from Egypt, even using the 1952 coup as a direct 
model for action. Hence, while maintaining Idris’ ban on opposition political parties, the RCC sought to 
effectively engage the population in order to garner a similar type of popular legitimacy to the Nasserist 
regime in Egypt. The RCC also made strenuous efforts to depict the former tribal leadership structure  
and Senussi monarchy as puppets of the foreign imperialists, as well as to effectively eliminate their 
physical and psychological influence over Libyan affairs.32 
However, in brief, the cultural and political revolution Qaddafi and the RCC was attempting to 
create remained inherently limited by the extent of traditional relations to the previous leadership both 
locally and regionally, which were for all intents and purposes entirely dependent on locally based tri l 
affiliations. The significance of such a point is difficult to understate, the People’s Councils were imposed 
on a set of existing political structures that co-opted the Councils far more than the Councils 
revolutionized existing structures. Qaddafi himself was the son of a Bedouin farmer of the al-Qadhadfa 
tribe about 45 miles south of Sirte in the central interior, and virtually all of his personal security force 
was derived directly from his tribe, and the importance of patronage networks linked to kin and clan were 
the defining element of Qaddafi’s power (Hweio 2012; Vandawelle 1998, chaps. 2 and 3).  
Further, over time Qaddafi’s regime became dependent on a fragile coalition of three principal 
tribes: the al-Qadhadfa, the al-Magariha, and the al-Warfalla, all of which were from the central and 
Western interior. In effect, this coalition counterbalanced the extent of the regional supremacy garnered 
by the former domains of the Senussis in the East. However, the People’s Councils that existed in the 
Eastern interior and Benghazi were reflective of the authority structures that had dominated during the 




attempt to better harness the capacity of tribal elites to maintain stability, a move Frederic Wehrey (2013) 
explains as, “a tacit admission not only of the importance of tribes and traditional elites in Libyan politics 
but also that the regime’s longstanding instrument of state power—the despised revolutionary 
committees—had grown too corrupt and sclerotic to control the population.” (254).33  
Furthermore, as domestic tensions varied, internationally, Libya gradually became one of the 
most isolated countries in the Arab World. Qaddafi’s revolution was ideologically entwined with Nasser, 
and over time socialist tendencies began to foster a strengthened relationship with the Soviet Union. Put 
differently, Qaddafi’s regime maintained an important ideological coalition that would falter over time. 
Infitah, the Camp David Accords, and Sadat’s redirection of Egyptian diplomatic relations were 
indicative of the general trend throughout the Arab World of moving away from the socialism and Arab 
Nationalism that the Qaddafi regime embodied. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the general global 
transition to neo-liberal paradigms simply served to further isolate the Libyan regime. Moreover, such 
ideational trends were also coupled by a series of direct provocations that severely strained or altogether 
destroyed its relationship with many Western countries. State sponsored terrorism for groups like the 
Basque ETA, the IRA in Ireland, anti-contra movements in Nicaragua, and most importantly the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Libyan patrol boat confrontation with the US 6th fleet in 
1985, and, the most polemic example, the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 all isolated Libya from separate 
actors (Harley 1984, Oakes 2011, chap. 9).  
In addition, such antagonism began to have direct consequences for Libyan oil production, as 
following the American bombings of Benghazi and Tripoli in 1986, imports of Libyan oil were banned, 
Libyan assets were frozen, and all cooperation between the regime and American oil companies was 
ordered to cease (Oakes 2011). Hence, Libya’s isolation began to negatively impact its rentier 
dependencies, preventing potential transactions and stripping Libya of important sources of technical 
expertise. Furthermore, as the Libyan labor supply was largely unable to fill such technical gaps these 
trends increasingly presented a severe threat to regime stability. Put differently, at the turn of the century 




destructive, and the necessity of reform was becoming more and more pronounced. As the Arab Spring 
approached the problematic financial position of the Libyan was largely unchanged, and discontent was 
growing rapidly.  
In short, two principle factors are important to reiterate within the preceding discussion. First and 
foremost, the long term implications of Italian Colonialism, the establishment of the Senussi Monarchy, 
and the largely necessary use of oil rents as means of assuring political stability on the basis of tribal 
identity, have created largely geographically separated tribal groups that have not changed significantly 
over time, especially outside the major urban centers. As such, in the Libyan case tribalism largely 
mirrors the impact that sectarian and ethnic divisions exerted in other cases. Those tied to the three cen ral 
tribes within Qaddafi’s coalition, as well as smaller tribes such as the Tuareg and the Asabea were highly 
skeptical of regime change (Lacher 2011; Lobben and Dalton 2014, chap. 4).34 Second, the combination 
of two central factors, the vast oil wealth contained in Libya’s central interior and the fact that Qaddafi 
dragged Libya into what Oakes (2011) labels a “Pariah State”, meant that Qaddafi maintained little to no 
external bases of support in a country with a strong incentive for intervention.    
(6.2.2) Nonviolent Resistance and the Libyan Revolution 
In terms of the Arab Spring, chronologically, on February 15th, 2011 the beginnings of the 
Libyan revolution emerged in Benghazi. Rumblings of planned protests in commemoration of 
demonstrations in 2006 intended to proceed on the 17th, forced the Qaddafi regime to jail two prominent 
activists, Fathi Terbil Salwa and Idris al-Mesmari. In response, several hundred people gathered in order 
to push for the release of the popular prisoners, and within a matter of hours police disbanded the 
demonstrations. While the protests on the 15th faltered, the arrests and violent repression, served to 
enhance the size of the actual protests on the 17th, and Qaddafi was forced to respond by sending his 
Interior Minister as well as his son Sa’adi in an attempt to subvert popular unrest. Police and military 
officers were also ordered to disperse the protests through violent measures, which combined both 




themselves. In all, accounts suggest that roughly 14 people died on the 17th (Fresh Clashes with, Dead; 
How Libya’s Second, Revolt). 
In response, on the 18th, protests spread from Benghazi to several other Eastern to cities such as 
al-Bayda (just East of Benghazi), Darnah, al-Zintan, and Jalu, and by the 22nd protests had spread further 
West to Sirte, Misrata, Khoms, Tobruk, Zawiya, Zouara, and Tarhounah (How Libya’s Second, Revolt; 
Kessler 2011; Libyan Regime Collapsing). In virtually every case, the emergence of popular unrest was 
met with immediate regime repression, and within the first week of protests anywhere from 10 to 45 
people were killed in clashes with regime forces each day (Preshad 2012, 38). As such, the protest 
movements themselves quickly resorted to defensive measures, and had largely resorted to organized
military tactics by the time Benghazi was “liberated” on the 21st. Elite political figures fled, and troops 
that remained loyal were killed. On the 19th, military bases were captured in Darnah and al-Bayda, and as 
more and more cities within the Eastern province of Ajdabiya fell to rebel forces, the fragility of the 
Qaddafi regime became increasingly evident.  
To be sure, throughout the period of resistance, the Eastern manifestations of the Libyan 
“movement” remained highly decentralized, and each city maintained largely independent authority 
structures determined by tribal leadership (How Libya’s Second, Revolt; Gadhafi’s Grip on Libya, 
Killed). Further, the degree of ideational variation across these protests is significant: It ranged from 
constitutional democrats, to constitutional monarchs, from neo-liberal secularists (as in many of the ex-
patriots that returned to Benghazi following February 17th) to political Islamists and radical 
fundamentalists. However, a dichotomy eventually emerged which served to transcend the diversity of 
ideational trends, a dichotomy that effectively pitted Qaddafi loyalists against everybody else, and this 
almost completely occurred along tribal fault lines. This delineation became especially pronounced in 
certain instances, as rebel movements began to generate narratives of collective responsibility that will 
likely be highlighted in future accounts as examples of ethnic cleansing. For example, the predominantly 
immigrant town of Tawergha had long been a source of recruitment for Qaddafi’s forces, and as 




rebel forces. Within the Tawergha example, rather than engaging with pockets of Qaddafi support, rebel 
forces simply attempted to eliminate it entirely, exercising organized collective violence, which saw 
entire neighborhoods targeted (Preshad 2012, chap. 3).  
Moreover, as the oppositions control in Benghazi and the rest of the former territory of Cyrenaica 
became consolidated, protests rapidly spread across the country. Only two days after the liberation of 
Benghazi on the 22nd, mass protests occurred in the capital Tripoli, and a slew of elite and military 
defections occurred in response to reports of Jets and Helicopters firing on demonstrations (Libyan 
Regime Collapsing; Police Break Rank, City; Tripoli in Hands of, Flees). On the 24th the United States 
renewed its sanction regime on Qaddafi, and the European Union followed suit on the 28th (World 
Ratchets Up, ‘love me’). False reports of Qaddafi being extradited to Venezuela emerged amidst bellicose 
talk from Qaddafi’s inner circle about “fighting to the last drop” (Gadhafi’s Grip on Power, Killed; 
Tripoli in Hands of, Flees). However, the decentralized nature of the opposition, which throughout 
maintained a large degree of local autonomy and power, even if locales remained loyal to the Transitional 
National Council (TNC), eventually presented problems in terms of both organization and the cooperation 
of geographically stratified forces. By March 5th, the tide had turned back towards the Qaddafi regime, as 
he re-took cities in the Western part of the country, and began to amount a charge Eastward, eventually 
leading to massive amounts of casualties in Misrata and Ras Lanuf (Battle to Oust, Ban; Sobecki 2011a, 
2011b).   
In particular, the failure of the Eastern organized resistance to push farther Westward than Ras 
Lanuf presents an important set of insights in relation to the analysis under construction. For one, this
period of setbacks for the opposition coincided with an increase in both their capacity for strategic 
decision making, as well as external pressure on the Qaddafi regime. Like the Assad regime in Syria, 
Qaddafi had shouldered a harsh Western sanction regime for the better part of three decades, and unlike
Assad he had access to massive oil reserves to keep his coffers padded. In short, Western sanctions had 
little to no effect on how events unfolded, and once again the playbook available to external actors in




movements were also severely outgunned, and little evidence exists that Qaddafi would have simply 
allowed Benghazi to return to the pre-revolution status quo. For another, the geography of the failure to 
push past Ras Lanuf is also instructive. In particular, it borders on many of the cities in the central int rior 
that make up the majority of regime support, and that became booming economic zones in the 1960’s 
following the discovery of oil. Ras Lanuf is roughly 20 kilometers from Qaddafi’s home town of Sirte, 
and effect these loyalist cities formed a road-block that presented protests in the former Cyrenaica to 
integrate with those in the Western part of the country.     
Eventually, following Qaddafi’s siege on Misrata the insertion of NATO and American aerial 
support once again turned the tide of the revolution back towards the opposition. For one, it served to 
insulate the rebels from aerial attacks, thereby destroying Qaddafi’s greatest comparative advantage. For 
another, it actually played into the technology the rebels did possess; in particular, the rebel rsistance 
began to use a type of cat-and-mouse technique, which entailed using converted Toyota trucks, far more 
mobile than the tanks and armed vehicles Qaddafi’s regime utilized, to engage with Qaddafi forces in 
strategic locations, and then quickly disengage. Effectively drawing in Qaddafi’s forces to be exploited by 
NATO airstrikes.35 Eventually, on August 22nd, Tripoli fell to rebel control, and gradually Qaddafi’s 
forces began to be pushed inwards towards Sirte, becoming increasingly outflanked on the East, West, 
and towards the North. On October 20th, Qaddafi himself was killed, effectively ushering in an 
unpredictable and contentious era of Libyan politics, which has yet to be entirely determined. 
(6.2.3) Discussion 
In short, as in the Syrian case, the confluence of three central factors, social heterogeneity, 
external influences—albeit anti-regime forces in the Libyan case—and brutal and persistent regime 
repression served to effectively limit the spread of nonviolence, and facilitate the escalation of violence. 
However, unlike the Syrian case, the transition to militarized resistance was essentially immediate, and 
within a month rebel forces were receiving armament and aerial support from N.A.T.O. The central 




within international relations, as well as the absence of any large scale Shi’a populations, which could 
potentially lead to the emergence of problematic Iranian influences. The strategic importance f Libya’s 
oil reserves likely was a point of interest as well. 
Further, the central reasons for the escalation of violence were twofold. For one, Qaddafi, much 
like Assad, was extremely willing to repress, and thus the absence of militarized resistanc  presented the 
huge potential of a catastrophic regime siege on Benghazi in the vein of the one conducted on Misrata. 
For another, the historical differences created by the Senussi political hegemony in the East, Qaddafi’s 
reliance on the trinity of tribes emanating from the central interior, and the relatively decentralized nature 
of Libyan governance mixed with a high degree of regional autonomy, all inhibited the cohesive nature 
and dissemination of protests throughout Libya. Such a conclusion, is even in part supported by the 
geography of Qaddafi’s repression, which effectively focused entirely on the contentious cities of 
Benghazi and Misrata and left the capital Tripoli relatively untouched until deep into the rebel insurgency. 
Hence, Qaddafi’s thought process was first and foremost focused on the necessary repression of the 
Eastern resistance, as both Qaddafi and the military elite thought that the resistance in Tripoli would 
essentially end once the repression succeeded. 
Moreover, the lack of adequate conditions for both the internal cohesion and geographic 
expansion of nonviolent resistance, in confluence with the Qaddafi’s willingness to violently repress any 
and all anti-regime resistance, leads to the potential conclusion of entirely rejecting primarily nonviolent 
strategies in the Libyan case. For one, following Qaddafi’s push East, militarized resistance facilitated the 
protection of Benghazi from what could have been a humanitarian disaster, and also directed repression to 
sparsely populated locales or towards those populations most capable of effectively dealing with it. For 
another, it allowed for the effective insertion of external forces. Without rebel movements to effectively 
draw in Qaddafi’s forces in non-populated areas, N.A.T.O aerial support would have likely been 
untenable at best, especially as Qaddafi began to embed himself into more densely populated regions (as 




destruction of the regime’s repressive capabilities and insulated the rebel groups in relation to the relative 
disadvantages they maintained vis-à-vis the regime.  
In short, structural conditions severely limited the potential of nonviolent resistance, forced the 
transition to militarized resistance, and international forces did not enter based on the existenc  of 
nonviolent strategies. External involvement was based primarily on both humanitarian and strategic 
considerations, and as such violence may be just as likely to beget international supporters as 
nonviolence.   
(6.3) Summary 
In short, the Yemeni and Libyan cases highlight three important points in regards to strategic 
nonviolent action. First, both cases highlight the contingency that the agency of individuals and groups 
engaging in nonviolent action has on specific historical and structural conditions, as well as the ambiguity 
specific mechanisms through which nonviolent action can be successful may hold in relation to these 
conditions. In regards to the former point, the deep tribal fissures formed through historical and political 
processes, and the ethnic and sectarian fault lines existing in either case limited the dissemination of 
resistance across geography. The lack of a clear national identity, or conflict between conflicting ational 
identities, also created divergent messages tied to regionally separated demonstrations, and played a 
significant role in reducing the longevity and resiliency of civil resistance. Further, in Yemen the 
problematic realities of a contested unification and two separate actively operating secessionist 
movements placed limitations on the cohesiveness with which political messaging could spread, and the 
insertion of external influences played an important role in facilitating increased resiliency n Libya and 
keeping Saleh inside the political dialogue in Yemen. 
In terms of the second point, that specific mechanisms may be ambiguously related to nonviolent 
action, the insertion of external aerial and armament support in Libya represents a case in point. As
Qaddafi regrouped beginning around February 29th, and began pushing Eastward through Misrata towards 




essentially been exhausted. Beginning on the 21st Barack Obama placed harsh sanctions on the Libyan 
regime, and froze the majority of the countries access to Sovereign Wealth Funds. The European Union 
froze nearly 70 billion dollars in Libyan assets a day later, and on the 22nd Libya was effectively 
suspended from the Arab League (Libya Suspended from Arab 2011; Libyan regime collapsing 2011). 
However, within a week regime forces had effectively regained control over Western cities such as al-
Zawiya and al-Zintan, and were beginning to March East across the country. At that point, given regim 
rhetoric such as “we will find you in your closets” in relation to Qaddafi’s planned siege on Benghazi and 
the evidence of repression up to that point, external assistance necessitated the transition to militarized 
resistance. In short, nonviolent resistance would have been unable to take advantage of the U.N. 
established no fly-zone, and N.A.T.O aerial support, and probably would have been unable to maintain 
effective levels of mobilization in the face of impending repression. 
Second, in part related to the point made above, transitions to violence may be necessary 
components of resistance in highly unstable political environments with dictators with a history of brutal 
repression. In Yemen, the infusion of tribal actors acting in support of the protests played a central rol  in 
turning the tide in favor of the protest movement. The Hashem Tribal Confederation caused significant 
defections from the Saleh regime, and in many locales shifted the balance of coercive force in favor of the 
opposition. In Libya, the transition to militarized resistance put an end to the “massacres” associated with 
many of the early protests, and therefore increased mobilization and support and even, in part, eventually 
led to important regime defections. In short, in some instances violence and violent strategies may b  
strategically important to insert alongside strategies of civil resistance. 
Third, as in all previous cases excluding Tunisia, the importance of the modularity of the 
Tunisian example cannot be understated, and therefore nonviolent resistance may be highly dependent on 
specific windows of opportunity. In Libya, largely peaceful civil resistance that began in Benghazi on the 
16th and 17th of February, had spread to the Tunisian border by the 20th, and clashes in Tripoli, the center 
of Qaddafi’s control, by the 22nd. While these protests were not really linked to each other, maintained 




dispersed as regime repression appeared, the geographic span of demonstrations highlights the unique 
mobilizing potential the Arab Spring possessed. Similarly, in Yemen, opposition movements in Sana’a 
and Ta’iz had been largely ineffectively operating for at least a decade, and the Yemeni movement, in 
reality, was an attempt by the JMP opposition coalition to capitalize on the unique mobilization 
opportunity the Arab Spring represented. In short, without the Tunisian revolution, the Yemeni and 
Libyan revolutions probably would not have occurred.       
Endnote  
27 Here, it is important to note the complexity of the Zaydi identity. For example, Fatah (2014, 
207-221) notes the gradual dissolution of visible sectarian differences between Zaydi’s and Sha’afis (the 
predominant Sunni sect) over time. Zaydi’s are Shi’a, but they are not Twelvers and thus have a 
complicated relationship with their Twelver, or Persian counterparts. Many actually refer to th m as a 
fifth school of jurisprudence for Sunni Islam, as they differ little in terms of praxis, but do differ in their 
historical preference for the Fifth Caliph.  
28 For more information on Aden from a British perspective see for example the oral histories 
presented by Hinchecliffe et all (2006, 235-293). Boxberger (2002, 183, 240) provides an indispensable 
account of the violence and unrest endemic to the Hawdhramat, as well as its role in Southern Yemeni 
politics. Carapico (1998, chap. 2) also provides important insight into the vibrancy of civil society in 
Southern Yemen in the years directly leading up to and following independence from Britain. 
29 For a more detailed history of the Southern insurrection see Brehoney (2011, 1-30).  
30 This was particularly important in the South, as groups like ATUC that made up a relatively 
vibrant civil society in Aden, were surrounded by transient and unstable tribal relationships in te 
Hawdhramawt and the Easter Aden Protectorate. As such, the control exerted by the metropoles on the 
periphery was always relatively weak. 
31 For a more detailed description of the degree of brutality and long-term impacts of Italian 
colonialism see for example Lobben and Dalton (2014, 37-51), Oakes (2011, chap. 4), and Vandewalle 
(2015, chaps. 2 and 3). The long-term impact of this period was also amplified by the fact that Libya was 
one of the few African countries to be colonized by an axis power, and thus became a major site of 
conflict during World War Two. 
32 The extent of the revolutionary zeal of the RCC, as well as the actual influence of Qaddafi’s 
ideological standpoints produces an interesting lens into the nature of the Qaddafi regime. Owen (2012, 
96-102) and Vandewalle (2013, chap. 4) propose the idea of a possible “mirror state” where elites to a 
certain degree appeased Qaddafi, but acted on the basis of their own vested interests. Pargeter (2012, 
chaps. 3 and 4) also provides an interesting analysis of the radical nature of the political reforms 
implemented. On some level, Qaddafi likely genuinely attempted to implement a relatively unique system 
of popular democracy; however, these attempts ultimately failed, and forced increasingly authoritarian 
action.     




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
33 Here, in particular, Hweio (2012), Lacher (2011), and Vandawelle (1998, especially chap. 4) 
present essential narratives. Essentially, although initially Qaddafi and the RCC had attempted to fost r a 
unified national identity, their failure to do so eventually forced the Libyan elites to revert to the use of 
tribal affiliations as a means of divide-and-rule. Qaddafi thus reverted to pitting privileged tribes over 
others, a process essentially identical to the governing strategies of Sayyid Idris, and therefore 
modernization paradoxically produced an intensification of tribalism in Libya (Hweio 2012, 117).   
34 See Lacher (2011) in particular for a more explicit description of what tribes remained 
loyalists, what tribes defected, and whom within these groups were especially important in terms of 
expanding mobilization. Essentially, in the East families historically connected to the Senussi Monarchy 
almost universally defected, whereas those in the central interior typically did not.  
35 For more information on the NATO air campaign see Bradley (2012, 115-133) and Lynch 
(2011, 167-177). Lobben and Dalton (2014, chap. 5) also provide an essential analysis of the innovation 






Chapter Seven- Discussion 
 
 
As a point of departure, this project has highlighted three important issues associated with 
strategic nonviolent action literature in relation to the six primary cases of the Arab Spring. First, in every 
case the nonviolence of resistance was never total, and in terms of increased resiliency across cases, 
explanatory significance can be found within the interaction between forms of violent and onviolent 
resistance. For one, in all cases the extent to which nonviolent resistance pervaded demonstrations was 
highly selective. In Tunisia and Egypt, selective violence against differing segments of the p pulation, 
most notably wealthier neighborhoods and regime loyalists, quickly infiltrated resistance. In the other 
four cases, social heterogeneity derived in some sense or another from divisive sectarian, tribl, or ethnic 
fault-lines created selective individual level aggression targeting different segments of the population, 
which posed far greater difficulties for the maintenance of nonviolent resistance. Furthermore, in Bahrain 
and Syria, already divisive sectarian fault-lines were also exacerbated by the characteristics of reg me 
repression, both the al-Khalifa and Assad regimes actively fomented internecine conflict, and utilized 
troops ethnically differentiated from protesters as a means to avoid defection. In Yemen, Saleh’s carefully 
constructed patronage networks, intended to separate various tribes, led to inter-tribal conflict on the basis 
of the privileged relationships some tribal confederations had with the Saleh regime. Finally, in Lib a, 
pro-regime and anti-regime conflict pervaded civil demonstrations after the first couple days of conflict, 
and demonstrations in the Eastern part of the country also targeted many immigrant populations, often 
because they had complicated relationships with the Qaddafi regime. 
For another, nonviolence in every case was also highly limited. Even in the most nonviolent of 
contexts, for example Tahrir Square in Egypt, transitions to violence occurred within a week, and 
primarily nonviolent strategies were entirely absent from many other areas of the country. Similarly, in 
Tunisia, the initial protests in Sidi Boazid quickly turned violent, and as protests expanded to th  urban 
centers reports of clashes, gun-battles, and chaos quickly ensued. Furthermore, in the other four cases, the 




conditions of each case necessitated transitions to violence almost immediately. Even where nonviolent 
strategies existed, as in the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain, they occupied a highly limited geographic space 
(essentially just the roundabout), and were eventually either effectively dispersed or lacked the resiliency 
to maintain meaningful resistance. For example, in Bahrain, clashes between Sunni and Shi’a 
demonstrations, occurred contemporaneously with the largely nonviolent demonstrations around the Pearl 
Roundabout in other parts of Manama, and the occupation of the Pearl Roundabout was interrupted five 
different times as a result of regime repression.  
Moreover, in Libya, the militarization of resistance had two principle effects on the resili ncy of 
civil resistance in the Eastern part of the country. First, it allowed resistance to direct engagement with 
regime forces in strategically chosen areas, which became especially important as N.A.T.O. aerial support 
ramped up. In short, nonviolent resistance seemingly requires typically urban, densely populated areas o 
be effective, while violent strategies can be successful across a more diverse array of te in, as in deserts 
or forests for example, and therefore combining these strategies may hold important interactive ffe ts for 
this reason. Trucks drew Qaddafi’s forces into sparsely populated desert locations, and this both 
weakened Qaddafi’s ability to direct his coercive capabilities on urban centers and made him vulnerable 
to drone warfare. Second, the militarization of resistance in Libya also helped create a visible delneation 
between combatants and noncombatants, which helped bolster the resiliency of civil action. Qaddafi’s 
threats on Benghazi, and his actions in Misrata are both instructive in this regard. In Misrata, the loss of 
life was disproportionately associated with young to middle-aged males, which seems to indicate, given 
that most reports describe protests with much more diversity, that Qaddafi, at least on some level, did not 
revert to entirely indiscriminant killing in Misrata. Further, given the extent of Qaddafi’s secret-security 
and intelligentsia, there was probably at least some capability of deciphering the combatants that Qaddafi 
needed to target and kill. As such, women, children, and older men could all engage in civil resistance 
with the freedom to leave the city center once the full force of Qaddafi’s repression was imminent.  
Collectively, these examples regarding the extent to which nonviolent and violent strategies 




outcomes associated with each set of demonstrations. To begin, the selective nature of nonviolence had a 
dual effect on the key mechanism through which nonviolent resistance was successful, increased social 
mobilization. For one, in cases with stark degrees of social heterogeneity the threat of selective violence 
may have an initial negative impact on the maximum level of mobilization. In Damascus, such a threat, 
alongside other considerations tied to the relationship between the regime and various segments of the 
population, entirely prevented protests from reaching the capital city, and similar evidence exists in the 
Bahraini, Yemeni, and Libyan cases. For another, these fault-lines represent opportunities for regimes, 
and thus strategically organized repression, as in using sectarian minority troops in Bahrain and Syria, can 
exacerbate sectarian divisions and create mobilization problems over the long-run. Hence, resistance in 
cases with social heterogeneity may also have reduced resiliency, and may face difficulties in term  of
maintaining significant levels of mobilization.  
In addition, the limited nature of nonviolence, that is in terms of temporal and geographic scales, 
and the strategic interaction of violent and nonviolent strategies are both highly important fac ors to 
consider in many cases. In Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt after the first week (the “battle of the camel” on 
February 2nd), Libya, and Yemen some centralized loci of resistance did maintain nonviolent resistance 
for a relatively short period of time in a tight geographic space (often times one square or monument); 
however, in all cases these examples of nonviolent strategies were simultaneously supported by fringe 
episodic violence. In other words, understanding how to incorporate strategic violence as a means to 
bolster the resiliency of nonviolent resistance may be an important innovation within future research.  
Second, in every case the overall agency of individuals and groups engaging in resistance was 
contingent upon specific cultural and historical conditions. That is to say, that individuals and groups in 
Tunisia and Egypt were avowed greater amounts of agency as a result of the favorable conditions evident 
in each country than were individuals and groups in the other four cases, and this occurred for four 
primary reasons. First, both countries lacked the heterogeneity that was problematic in other contexts. The 
relatively extreme homogeneity of either population allowed protests to spread evenly and coherently 




short, little could separate the demands, messaging, and strategies implemented between either Tu is and
Sfax or Alexandria and Cairo, and this cannot be said about any of the other cases. In Syria and Yemen, 
secessionist movements espoused different political messages than movements in other urban centers, 
even if they maintained some similarities. In Libya, while protests initially spread quickly across the 
country, geographically separate protests maintained different degrees of resiliency, and different lev ls 
of participation. In al-Zawiya (west of Tripoli) resistance essentially folded the second Qaddafi’s coercive 
apparatus posed any threat to those in the city center, and did not maintain militarized resistance 
afterward. Continued resistance in the face of Qaddafi’s full coercive capability was a primarily Eastern 
phenomenon, with some Fezzani tribes playing a role as well.   
Second, the extent to which external actors supported or resisted regime change played a central 
role in determining how influential individual protest movements could be. In Bahrain, the secarian 
divide, and the fact that Bahrain was a member of the GCC led to an invasion by GCC forces that 
destroyed the architecture of resistance and essentially curtailed further demonstrations by the Shi’a 
population. In Libya, external assistance followed the militarization of resistance, in and of itself 
highlighting the ambiguity of many of the mechanisms attributed to successful nonviolent action, and 
existed in large part because of the extent of Qaddafi’s diplomatic isolation. In Syria, continued support 
from the Russians and other Shi’a regimes allowed the Assad regime to maintain its capacity in the face 
of oppressive Western sanctions, and provided important degrees of arms, financial, and logistical
support. In Yemen, the continued presence of Saleh for another two years post resistance, and the strong 
drone presence of U.S. and N.A.T.O. forces, are both indicative of the extent of tribal division with n the 
country, as well as the issues surrounding the continued presence of A.Q.A.P. in the Western 
Hawdhramat.  
In short, in each case, the resiliency or lack of resiliency afforded to the regimes in power was 
highly dependent on the characteristics of external diplomatic and economic relations, and this meant that 
the influential potential of each set of demonstrations depended in large part on factors beyond their 




actors, and the extent to which those actors have the capacity to impact the regime in question represe t 
highly important considerations for future examples of civil resistance. In Syria, for example, protesters 
were at a severe disadvantage because Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, and this may potentially apply to 
many non-democratic regimes in general, were unwillingly to put financial and political pressure on the 
Assad regime. Further, the means through which the West could place pressure on Assad had already 
been exhausted, and had even been in place for the better part of two decades. Egypt, on the other hand, 
was in a far better position in this regard, given the extent to which the Egyptian government depends on 
Western assistance for financial solvency. However, Bahrain, also provides a counter-example to the 
over-generalization of the Egyptian case, as the al-Khalifa regime also maintained strong financial ties to 
the U.S.; however, other strategic considerations prevented Shi’a demonstrators from obtaining effective 
international pressure on the regime in power. 
Third, the wave-like nature of the Arab Spring represents another factor that is important t  
consider. All subsequent cases drew heavily from both the modularity and the inspiration derived from 
the Tunisian example, and this effect only strengthened as protests spread throughout the region. In each 
case, years of political repression, economic stagnation, and rampant nepotism and inequality failed to 
produce any significant political movements for several decades in some cases; however, within a ma ter 
of weeks each of these countries, along with several others in the region, witnessed demonstrations on  
national scale. As such, the existence of windows of opportunities tied to events in other parts of the 
region, or possibly even elsewhere in the world, may significantly bolster the agency of oppositi n 
movements. In short, waves may increase the ability to mobilize large amounts of people, and may 
provide successful and relatable examples to emulate and learn from. However, such a period of time is 
inevitably temporary, waves may not have a prolonged effect on long-term resiliency, and differing 
regimes can likely learn and adapt as quickly as protesters can. 
Fourth, it is important to understand the dynamics of civil resistance in relation to the long-run 
agency of organizers and protesters to maintain strategic control over demonstrations. As shown 




mobilization, inevitably entailed a loss of centralized control by the initial organizers of resistance. 
Moreover, in all cases, as participation increased, the selective nature of violence became exacerbated, 
and this had differing effects on protest movements in differing situations. In Egypt and Tunisia, the 
problems associated with selective violence could be overcome, largely because they targeted very small 
minorities of the population. However, in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and Libya such violence posed huge 
problems in terms of both the coherence of geographically stratified demonstrations, and in terms of 
maintaining stable levels of mobilization. Furthermore, the degree of spontaneity present within most of 
these protest movements (Yemen being a possible exception), especially in relation to the Tunisian case, 
highlights the importance that unpredictability may have for maintaining both resilient and influential 
resistance. To be sure, acting unpredictably may be a specific strategy, but this may be harder to achieve 
in practice than in theory. 
Finally, and cumulatively, this project highlights the reality that nonviolent resistance may not be 
generalizable across all cases, and may in fact apply to only a select few. To be sure, some degree of civil 
or nonviolent resistance occurs in every example of resistance, but so does some degree of violent 
resistance as well. More to the point, primarily nonviolent strategies may be ineffective in some cases, 
and finding factors that determine the adequate balance between violence and nonviolence should be a 
central concern for future research. Moreover, identifying and understanding the nature of the conting nt 
agency demonstrations possess represents another strand of research with fruitful potential.     
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